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 In this dissertation, I examine the role various forms of counting citizens have played in 
mass campaigns in twentieth-century American political culture. Scholarship in political science, 
history and rhetorical studies tells us that the census and public opinion polling have long been 
used to tell Americans who they are or to justify political actions in democracy. Scholarship on 
citizenship suggests that civic rituals and collective civic actions are a substantial way citizens 
learn or lay claim to citizenship and understand their obligations or relationship to the collective. 
My research project fills this gap by examining mass movements in 20th century civic culture 
that make many of these same claims to public identity or beliefs, and negotiate many of the 
same tensions of homogeneity and difference. In each case, I analyze how calls to be counted 
articulate what it means to be counted as one among many in a mass campaign or as part of a 
collective citizenry more broadly, and why being counted matters at all. My dissertation consists 
of four case studies, beginning with women’s suffrage petitions in the early 1910s, continuing 
with President Franklin Roosevelt’s calls for citizens to send letters en masse from 1934-1937, 
proceeding to the Million Man March in 1995, and culminating in Moveon.org’s groundbreaking 
1998 online petition campaign. In my analysis, I find that arguments about what it means to be 
counted are shaped by the specifics of the contexts, issues, and technologies of counting. Central 
to these distinct arguments about counting is the concern for what is being counted by the 
campaign, from public opinion, demands, a nation, or public interest; all represented through 
distinct types of counting, from degree to quantity, aggregation, or oneness. These are bolstered 
by common rhetorical figures of counting, including magnitude, accumulation, repetition, and 
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CHAPTER 1: ANXIETIES OF COUNTING IN DEMOCRACY 
 
“[T]o care about democracy is to care whether and how citizens speak,” as Robert 
Hariman states.1 The question of how (and how should) citizens speak is central to rhetorical 
scholarship. Rhetorical scholars celebrate “engaged citizens,” explicitly or implicitly contrasting 
them with more lackluster forms of engagement.2 Ideals of the public see the collection of citizen 
data as displacing the citizen “voice” from political participation for the opinion survey, or even, 
the petition.3 A rhetorical construct of public opinion, Gerard Hauser argues, entails something 
more than merely being counted, aggregated, or quantified; it entails a capacity for judgment, 
and judgment requires discourse.4 Thus rhetorical studies together with related approaches to 
democratic citizenship, distances itself from merely “counting.” 
And yet, counting citizen preferences, discourses and arguments, characteristics, and 
actions is a prominent way that the relation between the individual citizen and the collective 
“nation” or “public” has been imagined. 5 Democratic citizens not only regularly speak through, 
but also about counting. Citizen groups debate government statistics or contest the quantitative 
                                                
1 Robert Hariman, “Amateur Hour: Knowing what to Love in Ordinary Democracy,” in The Prettier 
Doll: Rhetoric, Discourse, and Ordinary Democracy, ed. Karen Tracy, James P. McDaniel, and Bruce 
Gronbeck (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2007), 224. 
2 E.g. Christian Erik J. Kock and Lisa Storm Villadsen, introduction to Rhetorical Citizenship and 
Public Deliberation, ed. Christian J. Koch and Lisa Strom Villadsen (University Park: Pennsylvania State 
University Press, 2012), 5.  
3 Susan Herbst, Numbered Voices: How Opinion Polling Has Shaped American Politics (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1993), 18.  
4 Gerard Hauser, introduction to Rhetorical Democracy: Discursive Practices of Civic Engagement, 
ed. Amy Grim and Gerard Hauser (Mawah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2008), 2.  
5 Sarah E. Igo, The Averaged American: Surveys, Citizens, and the Making of the Mass Public 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), 14.  
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measures that might represent majority opinion in polls.6 The concerns for the impact of 
counting on democratic deliberation only make more salient the need to understand how these 
counts are framed and contested in discourse.  
Counting has taken on a number of discursive forms in American democracy. For one, 
being counted can mean being “aggregated.”7 Mass letter campaigns, rallies, votes and petitions 
are all forms of “counting” that often focus on the collection of signatures, bodies, or documents 
to demonstrate an addition as a sum being a simple “mass.” I use aggregate in this dissertation as 
a way to indicate a focus on a collective with an emphasis on size or volume. Some campaigns 
that rely on these aggregate forms of participation explicitly focus on representing the collective 
as a number, or quantity: a focus on a million signatures, or a hundred thousand bodies in a rally. 
Other mechanisms of more complex aggregation in polls or surveys seek to provide an aggregate 
in the form of degree, in which percentages, ratios, or other forms of comparison help to place 
actions or opinions on a scale to claim something about the whole, either in terms of its 
relationship to the broader population or trends within the whole. This is common to the 
discourses of social scientific sampling, the process by which a variety of agencies seek to use a 
sample—a “part”— in order to characterize a broader class of women, the middle class, voters, 
or American citizens: the “whole.” In turn, charts, graphs, and other forms of statistical 
representation often operationalize processes of citizenly quantification to provide a norm or 
“average” of that opinion, characteristic, or set of values. Finally, where the aggregate gestures to 
                                                
6 J. Michael Hogan, The Nuclear Freeze Campaign: Rhetoric and Foreign Policy in the Telepolitical 
Age (East Lansing, Michigan State University Press, 1994); Frank J. Stec, “Bringing Attention to the 
Human Costs of War: Grievability, Deliberation, and Anti-War Numbers,” Southern Communication 
Journal 81, no. 5 (2016), 273. 
7 Jeffrey J. Juris, “Reflections on #OccupyEverywhere: Social Media, Public Space, and Emerging 
Logics of Aggregation,” American Ethnologists 39, no.2 (May 2012): 260. Juris argues that aggregation 
involves gathering in one spaced, as opposed to more networking as more diffuse.  
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size without the precision of quantity, the idea of the whole as oneness or one—as in perhaps the 
one nation, or the American people—is too a discourse of counting, albeit one that glosses over 
the many even as it relies on a sense of a collective.  
In addition to scholarly concerns for engagement, discourse, and judgment, the role of 
counting in citizenly opinion and collective identity has often inspired broader anxieties about 
the relation between the individual citizen and the collective political body. In particular, 
counting and grouping citizens produces anxieties about individual identity, expression, and the 
imposition of the “unruly” crowd. The long-held tensions between liberalism and republicanism 
gain particular traction when our sense of the collective is not just “community” but the 
aggregate of a “mass” or a “whole.” Hence, the tensions of the “mass” -- and the process of 
aggregation that inspires them -- are not self-evident extensions of the form of counting that 
produces them. Instead, these anxieties invite consideration for how the significance of these 
aggregate forms express a relation to the mass; specifically, being counted does not only mean 
being aggregated into a whole. Registering a vote, signing a petition, or showing up at a rally can 
be a means of individual expression, citizenly self-empowerment, civic duty, or social 
equalization.8  
In this dissertation, I argue that aggregate campaigns—be it petitions or rallies— have 
often acquired narratives about what they can and do represent with respect to the aggregate they 
collect. Mass participation could be justified as a marker of public opinion (a directive, for 
example) or as an expression of collective or individual identity.9 By examining citizenly calls to 
                                                
8 Robert Asen, “A Discourse Theory of Citizenship,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 90, no. 2 (May 
2004): 205. See Asen for this last point on equalization. 
9Herbst, Numbered Voices, 3. Herbst argues that numerical representations of opinion have long been 
perceived through their function to be made efficient for policy making, but that they have a long history 
of being used for symbolic purposes. 
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be counted by participating in aggregate campaigns, this dissertation project extends Danielle 
Allen’s efforts to understand “how democratic citizens imagine ‘the people’ of which they are a 
part.” Allen argues that modern citizenship’s preoccupation with voting is a failure of this 
process of imagination. Elections make concrete the “will” of the people through “a mass 
compilation of votes.” The metaphors by which citizens imagine the nation are thus given a 
“recognizable and living form,” and in civic practices some are more productive or perhaps 
ethical than others.10 In this project, I aim to understand how citizens have been asked to imagine 
“the people” through the ways in which they have asked to be counted, and conversely, how 
quantitative civic practices shape these discourses. Closer attention to the rhetorical strategies of 
counting provides a better understanding of the potential or negative implications of counting 
through democratic deliberation and engagement.  
To explore these issues, this dissertation focuses on citizen campaigns that see a telos in 
counting—be it in a quantity of a million signatures or an aggregate of bodies in order to better 
understand how citizens are asked to view what it means to “count” or be counted in American 
democracy. This project therefore explores the rhetorical problems of counting in public 
discourse–be it degree or a simple quantity by asking what counting meant to citizens in the 
twentieth-century American democracy.  
This introduction proceeds in three sections. First, I will suggest that historical 
democratic practices of quantification exhibit a variety of discourses and tensions around 
counting. Second, I situate this project in the context of two bodies of literature: public opinion 
and citizenship studies. Third, I close by identifying the goals of the study, its methods, and 
proposed case studies. 
                                                
10 Danielle S. Allen, Talking to Strangers: Anxieties of Citizenship Since Brown v. Board of 
Education (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 16. 
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The Problem: Calls to be Counted 
As Sarah Igo and other scholars show, aggregate measures of citizen beliefs and 
characteristics have played a significant role in our understanding of American democracy and 
its citizens. Surveys and polls have not only long rendered citizens visible to government and 
private institutions, they have reflexively provided Americans with a sense of “who they are, 
where they fit, and how they compare to other citizens.”11 Aggregates of citizen characteristics or 
beliefs have also provided plenty of fodder for debate. Americans have often called to be counted 
in order to contest their lack of agency or influence in the political process, and endeavor to 
assert their authority. Likewise, political leaders and governing institutions have counted in order 
to assert or otherwise forward their own authority.12 Counting, in short, is and has been basic to 
the logic and rhetoric of political authority in mass democracies. A history of calls to be counted, 
therefore, is also a history of the tensions of representative democracy. 
In this section, I use historical examples to illustrate a range of ways citizens have called 
to be counted in order to demonstrate that citizens have engaged in many of the same counting 
practices that have often been attributed solely to institutions. In addition, I show that these calls 
to be counted articulate a range of what it means to consider the various discourses of 
representing the whole, from an aggregate, quantity, degree or oneness. Finally, I close by 
considering how the democratic anxieties engendered by these campaigns present constraints.  
The voting booth has been a key site of calls to be counted, from the women’s suffrage 
movement of the 1920s to controversies over “hanging chads” in the 2000 presidential election 
between Al Gore and George W. Bush. In the 1950s and 60s, the civil rights movement took 
                                                
11 Igo, Averaged American, 15.  
12 David Levasseur, “The Role of Public Opinion in Policy Argument: An Examination of Public 
Opinion Rhetoric in the Federal Budget Process” Argumentation and Advocacy 41, no.3 (2005), 155-157.  
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issue with discriminatory practices that barred African Americans from voting, a theme that 
continues to have salience in contemporary arguments about restrictive voter identification laws 
that manifest in calls to be “allowed” to be counted. Being counted is often a form by which 
individuals come to see themselves as “counting” or mattering in democratic society. Citizens 
have also called for a right to be counted at different stages of the democratic process through the 
vote, as was the case in popular arguments about voting in the primaries during the progressive 
era. Public controversies over elections, like that of the contentious campaign to remove 
Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker in 2012, reveal calls to be counted again. Calls to be counted, 
that is, are one way that citizens’ express dissatisfaction over a desire for more substantive input 
into democratic decision making and governing. 
 Citizens have also emphasized the mass expression of opinion as an important mode of 
making demands of the state. Counting signatures on mass petitions became a means for citizens 
to express their political opinion on policy in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 13 When the 
popular opinion represented in mass petitions is ignored by those in power—as seen in Shay’s 
Rebellion (1787), the Whiskey Rebellion (1794), and most notably in the language of the 
Declaration of Independence—the neglect of petitions can serve as a justification for more 
radical forms of protest, even revolution.14 Beyond petitions per se, letter campaigns, prewritten 
comment cards, and campaigns meant to inundate political representatives with phone calls are 
all practices by which citizens seek to be counted for political effect. It was progressive activists 
and not institutions that were initially at the forefront of collecting survey information from 
citizens with an eye to social reform. Contemporary examples – such as recent citizen initiatives 
                                                
13 Raymond C. Bailey, Popular Influence upon Public Policy: Petitioning in Eighteenth-Century 
Virginia (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1979), 27-29. 
14 Susan Zaeske, Signatures of Citizenship: Petitioning, Antislavery & Women’s Political Identity 
(Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2003), 18. 
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to collect data about experiences of racial discrimination from law enforcement – call for citizen 
experiences to be counted as a way to contest insufficient institutional metrics and enter public 
debate. 
Citizens have also sought to have their very “heads” counted as a means of expressing 
political opinions. They have showed up at marches, rallies, assemblies, and other political 
gatherings to perform acts of identity and make a show of force. Numerous social movements in 
modern American history—from the civil rights movement, to pro- and anti-abortion 
movements, to Occupy Wall Street—have relied on the rhetoric of counting in this way to 
exercise political influence.15 Citizen groups responsible for the 1999 World Trade Organization 
protests in Seattle, for example, wanted to take advantage of the global stage set by the Clinton 
Administration by gathering en masse.16 It is this sentiment that makes journalistic practices 
around attendance counts at rallies particularly contentious for activists who believe that 
underestimation presents a detriment to their public impact.17 Like voting and petitioning, rallies 
sometimes seek to apply pressure, or create visibility, albeit in ways less easily calculated. 
And then there is the internet, which has created new contexts, processes, and rhetorics 
for citizenly aggregation. Citizen organizations during the net neutrality debate called for 
prewritten comments to the FCC in ways that emphasized numbers over unique suggestions to 
demonstrate the majority of Americans. Likewise, social media spaces like Twitter hashtags and 
Facebook groups have become sites in which citizen activists seek to gather as many users as 
possible around a particular issue, from Occupy to the collection of instances of gender 
                                                
15 Herbst, Numbered Voices, 133-153; Juris, “Reflections on Occupy,” 262.  
16 Kevin Michael Deluca and Jennifer Peebles, “From Public Sphere to Public Screen: Democracy, 
Activism, and the ‘Violence’ of Seattle,” Critical Studies in Media Communication 19, no.2 (2002): 138. 
17 Herbst, Numbered Voices, 149-153.  
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discrimination through #yesallwomen.18 Petition websites have often been sold as a way to build 
community and promote engagement as a whole, rather than through particular issues.  
American history is full of citizenly calls to be counted, or as the case has often been, to 
be counted differently. The American Philosophical Society, for example, created and signed a 
petition to Congress in 1800 to add more categories to the census.19 Steven Kelman argues that 
various groups desired to be counted in the census as a way to earn special status, but also to be 
included in the context of the “normal.” In addition, redistricting has long been a source of 
arguments for new modes of counting.  
These historic practices of democratic quantification reach down into the very discourse 
of democratic citizens: citizens variously want and do not want to be “counted” for various 
reasons and in various contexts. These examples serve not just to illustrate a history of practices 
and calls to be counted, but also often coincide with citizens who justify and describe the 
significance of being counted. These debates over how citizens are counted recall and revise 
Hariman’s comment that began this chapter: to care about democracy is to care whether and how 
citizens are counted. 
Still, the discourses and practices around the counting of citizens inspire more than a few 
anxieties in American democratic culture. Hannah Arendt suggests that at the heart of these 
anxieties is what she calls the “crisis of authority.” In On Revolution, she notes that the 
majoritarianism built into democratic forms of governance carries with it the risk of undermining 
the very conditions for democracy, as the will of the majority implies not only the existence of a 
minority, but “majority rule” risks discounting (or, more perniciously, eradicating) the voices, 
                                                
18 Juris, “Reflections on #Occupy,” 261. 
19 Steven Kelman, “The Political Foundations of American Statistical Policy,” in The Politics of 
Numbers, ed. William Alonso and Paul Starr (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1987), 287. 
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will, and sentiments of the minority.20 Majoritarianism, argues Richard Tuck, has long inspired 
fears of a democratic “monarchical sovereign” with unchecked powers through majority vote.21 
This becomes particularly salient when, as Jeffrey Drury argues, invocations of concepts like 
“public opinion” authorized by social scientific methods do not only sanction political decision 
making but also “recognize and afford legitimacy” to those in power.22 Majorities legitimize part 
of the public, but often carry an association with the will of the “people” more uniformly. 
Counting has often been a source of trepidation about the role of the state in private life. 
In the early stages of opinion surveys, for example, Americans viewed poll results with great 
suspicion for the private nature of the very public results. The numbers often did not seem to be 
accurate to their own perceptions.23 Today, Americans continue to express complex feelings 
about the census: on the one hand, being “counted” on the census can provide important financial 
support from the state. On the other, racial minorities in particular have often expressed a 
mistrust of government and skepticism of the categories being counted as justifications for 
refusing to participate in the census.24  
 These anxieties do not disappear when it is citizens or advocacy organizations that collect 
citizen data for political purposes. Aggregates of citizens are often viewed as the work of 
“pressure groups” rather than actual participation. Despite his affinity for collecting citizen 
opinions, for example, Franklin Roosevelt held much less esteem for the bags of pre-written 
letters he received which paled in comparison to the “scrawled, perhaps illiterate, but always 
                                                
20 Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (New York: Penguin Books, 1991), 155. 
21 Richard Tuck, The Sleeping Sovereign (NY: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 257. 
22 Jeffrey Mehltretter Drury, Speaking with the People’s Voice: How President’s Invoke Opinion 
(College Station, Texas A&M University Press, 2014), 5. 
23 Igo, Averaged American, 18-19.  
24 Sarah Kershaw, “Who Lives Here? Who’s Asking?; In a Black Community Official Mistrust 
Hinders Census,” The New York Times (New York, NY), May 16, 2000.  
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sincere note from the obscure person.”25 In this context, counting also places the citizen and their 
right to individual expression as a passive spectator in the process. For example, popular 
narratives about online petitioning lament the low effort required for so-called “slacktivists.” 
These anxieties depend, not just on the existence of the aggregate, but on how that aggregate is 
expressed. For example, the response to increasingly popular mass petition campaigns in the 
1830s revolved around a lack of deference and an increasing emphasis on citizenly “demands” of 
the legislature.26 Petitions, in other words, required an expression of citizenship that negated the 
mass or the ever-present fear of the unruly and illogical “crowd.”  
Thus, numerical aggregates have only further entrenched a number of democratic 
anxieties around conformity, the imposition of the state, and a fear of the unruly “mass” or 
crowd. These anxieties can at times come into conflict with American commitments to 
individualism and “voice,” namely through discursive expressions of opinion. In this context, it 
is not simply that certain civic practices orient around aggregation and inspire these anxieties, 
but also how citizens and civic groups have justified these practices. As one example of how 
counting is both integral to the rhetorical construction of political authority and fraught with 
anxieties and tensions, let us turn to public opinion polling. 
Contestations Over Methods of Counting “the Public”  
 A small subset of public opinion scholars sees survey results as contributing to political 
agenda setting by virtue of their ability to include all citizens in democratic processes.27 One 
                                                
25 Michael Wilrich, “‘Close to that Place of Hell’: Poor Women and the Cultural Politics of 
Prohibition,” Journal of Urban History 29, no. 5 (2003): 559.  
26 David C. Frederick, “John Quincy Adams, Slavery, and the Disappearance of the Right of 
Petition,” Law and History Review 9, no.1 (1991), 120-138. 
27 Lawrence R. Jacobs and Robert Y. Shapiro, Politicians Don’t Pander: Political Manipulation and 
the Loss of Democratic Responsiveness (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), 18; Sidney Verba, 
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school of political scientific thought suggests that aggregates are able to counterbalance the 
biases of the electorate on the strength of their numbers. 28 More often, public opinion scholars 
argue that polls cannot be translated into adequate representations of public opinion in 
democratic discourse. Scott Althaus situates the reluctance to see a political avenue for public 
opinion polls as an extension of the longstanding discussion of the methodological challenges of 
achieving a representative sample.29 Adam Berinsky, for example, argues that survey refusals are 
disproportionately high in particular demographics. This eliminates diverse perspectives 
necessary for proper representative sampling.30 In turn, contemporary scholars view survey 
results as narrow sources of information that identify and explain broad preferences and 
behaviors but do not fully represent them.31 
The challenges of inclusion are only further exacerbated in the context of the 
proliferation of poll results in journalism and public discourse. Empirical studies of the role of 
surveys in the democratic process provide context for understanding how the public has broadly 
engaged with statistical representations of opinion. Studies have centered on two concerns: the 
influence of public opinion on public policy and citizen perception and interaction with poll 
results. To the former, scholars of public opinion often suggest we should aim to limit rather than 
expand the role of polling. A report on polls and democracy released by the Association for 
American Public Opinion Research, for example, suggests that public opinion scholars should 
                                                                                                                                                       
“The Citizen as Respondent: Sample Surveys and American Democracy,” American Political Science 
Review 90, no. 1 (1996): 1-7. 
28 Robert S. Erickson and Kent L. Tedin, American Public Opinion: Its Origin, Content and Impact 
(New York: Pearson, 2005), 1-15.  
29 Scott Althaus, Collective Preferences in Democratic Politics: Opinion Surveys and the Will of the 
People (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 282.  
30 Adam J. Berinsky, Silent Voices: Opinion Polls and Political Representation in America 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 2-4.  
31Althaus, Collective Preferences, 290. 
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help policy experts understand that polls should not directly translate to citizen preferences or 
replace expert information in political decision making. 32 In other words, they argue that polls 
should not necessarily directly translate to policy issues.  
Proponents of a more limited role for polls in democratic discourse also cite the potential 
impact polls might have on limiting public debate of issues. Scholars concerned with the 
“bandwagon effect” have tried to gauge whether established markers of public sentiment are 
likely to have an impact on individual preferences.33 On a broader level, scholars suggest that 
citizens are more likely to align with an opinion that they know is more popular.34 Perhaps more 
significantly, scholars argue that the circulation and distribution of poll results might hold undue 
influence on opinion formation and displace other “richer formulations.”35 A poll that cites 90% 
of the American population, for example, masquerades as a decision that has already been made, 
and thus does not invite further engagement.36 Aggregate campaigns like petitioning, even ones 
that make claims to public opinion, have much more space to present that opinion as not yet 
“finished.” Nonetheless, these concerns suggest that an emphasis on numerical aggregates in 
democratic discourse often place constraints on the kinds of engagement it offers to citizens. 
Debates over the influence of polls on policy, however, suggest that there is much more 
space for citizens to dispute even statistical representations of citizen characteristics and 
                                                
32 Frank Newport, et al, Polling and Democracy: Report of the AAPOR Task Force on Public Opinion 
and Leadership, special report prepared for the Association for American Public Opinion Research, 2013.  
33 The concept of bandwagoning was a popular framework in the early 1990s, but the use of the term 
largely seems to have disappeared. See for example Catherine Marsh, “Back on the Bandwagon: The 
Effect of Public Opinion Polls on Public Opinion,” British Journal of Political Science 15, no. 1 (1985): 
51-74.  
34 Diana C. Mutz, “Impersonal Influence: Effects of Representations of Public on Political Attitudes,” 
Political Behavior 14, no. 2 (1992): 89-122. 
35 Herbst, Numbered Voices, 166. 
36 Ibid., 165. 
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preferences. Alain Desrosières argues that rigorous debates over counting in the United States 
meant “more than in other countries,” yet these statistics “were linked to the process of 
argumentation rather than to some truth presumed to be superior.”37 Within the policy world, 
Susan Herbst shows that different stakeholders in the policy process have varied understandings 
of what counts as public opinion and how to measure it.38 Activists, for example, tended to view 
aggregate measures as more reliable than elites or journalists, whereas local politicians placed 
trust in personal networks. 39  
If public opinion is not always synonymous with statistical representation in the policy 
sphere, so too do studies of the perceptions of citizens offer a murkier sense of what these polls 
can tell the broader public. In studies of citizens that ask them to provide their perceptions of 
polls, many citizens express that public opinion and polls are distinct concerns. Further, these 
studies suggest that citizens do not identify poll results as fully accurate representations, even if 
they are likely to be influenced by public opinion more broadly.40 Igo points out that historically, 
Americans held often-contradictory perceptions of survey research, where they both questioned 
the validity of the results even as they accepted some of the norms these results showed.41  
Empirical accounts of the influence of opinion polls suggest that politicians and ordinary 
citizens engage frequently with some sense of public opinion, and that polls are often a popular 
practice in journalism. Taken together, the discussion of the diffuse impact of polling on policy 
                                                
37 Alain Desrosières, The Politics of Large Numbers: A History of Statistical Reasoning (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), 192.  
38 Herbst, Reading Public Opinion: How Political Actors View The Democratic Process (Chicago, IL: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1998), 151. 
39 Ibid., 150. 
40 Herbst, Numbered Voices, 18. Herbst argues that though these studies are inconclusive – the 
limitations of polls are more often a result of the narrow structured process of opinion measurement.  
41 Igo, Averaged American, 16.  
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decisions, and the suggestion that citizens often dispute the representations of aggregates that are 
given to them, suggests that discourse about aggregates in general involve a complex discursive 
negotiation. In other words, even statistical forms of aggregate representation are not fully self-
evident or indisputable. There is room for citizens to make claims to represent something like 
public opinion through other forms of representation like repeated conversations with other 
citizens or aggregate practices like petitions. In part, this is because public opinion is itself a 
diffuse concept.  
The central contribution of opinion scholarship to this project is to emphasize that the 
concept of public opinion itself is contested. That is, what we understand to count as public 
opinion requires consideration of how different measures of opinion –like polls or news 
coverage—come to stand in for the public. 42 Theories of the “public-as-fiction,” J. Michael 
Hogan explains, “correctly suggest the public's role in the policy-making process is a product, 
not of the actual opinions of the great mass of real people, but of the portraits of the people 
constructed rhetorically by the policy makers themselves.” This does not mean that public 
opinion is a “wholesale” fiction, but rather that it is debatable; and indeed, Hogan finds, it is 
heavily debated.43  
Herbst argues that what public opinion means is often revealed through micro 
articulations, where people tend to “define public opinion as part of the argument they make” 
about particular issues.44 These claims about public opinion are inseparable from broader 
                                                
42 W. Lance Bennett, “Constructing Publics and Their Opinions,” Political Communication 10, no. 2 
(1993): 103. See also: Murray Edelman, “Contestable Categories and Public Opinion,” Political 
Communication, 10, no. 3 (1993): 231-242. 
43 Hogan, The Nuclear Freeze Campaign, 120.  
44 Herbst, Reading Public Opinion, 13. 
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“mental models” of how democracy functions.45 At the same time, as Herbert Blumer argues, 
what counts as public opinion is often reflective of political and social conditions of a given 
moment. 46 In that sense, there are often dominant paradigms of opinion to contend with. This 
project extends this work by studying micro articulations--- in citizenly calls to be counted--- that 
show how citizen groups reveal and dispute dominant constructs of public opinion and aggregate 
representations.  
In addition to the constraints of dominant paradigms, research into the social construction 
of public opinion suggests that methods do play a significant role in how the aggregate 
representation is perceived. Conceptions of public opinion are at least in part reflective of the 
methods by which a given measure is collected.47 For example, advances in social scientific 
methods are precisely what allowed polls to gain prominence as “objective” measures in 
American public discourse.48 Discursive justifications of opinion metrics have often relied on the 
methods of collection to make claims about their relevance and objectivity to the general 
citizenry.49 Methods of collecting opinion, however, present some barriers for citizens to contest 
opinion measures. Where there is certainly ample evidence to suggest that politicians think 
differently about public opinion in the era of polling, there is less evidence that they do so 
publicly. That is, in drawing on public opinion to justify particular actions, politicians rarely 
refer specifically to polls or other means of understanding the public will. They are much more 
                                                
45 Ibid., 21. 
46 See Herbert Blumer, “Collective Behavior” in New Outlines of the Principles of Sociology, ed. 
Alfred Lee (New York: Barnes and Noble), 167-222.  
47 Igo, Averaged American, 5.  
48 Igo, Averaged American, 1-10. For example, Igo’s historical account of early survey research 
reveals the link between academic and technological advancements and the rise of aggregate metrics of 
opinion. 
49 Gerard Hauser, “Vernacular Dialogue and the Rhetoricality of Public Opinion,” Communication 
Monographs, 65, no. 2 (1998), 104; Herbst, Numbered Voices. 
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likely to refer broadly to the “majority of Americans,” or even the singular “American public.”50  
“Finally, it is important to note that the “channels of political representation” conceived 
by public opinion scholarship are limited by the strict delineations of the methods and contexts 
that are often studied. It is in this context that the limitations of the commitments of public 
opinion scholarship for this project are most apparent. Public opinion has often been studied as 
narrow expressions of opinion collected by scholars and institutions.51 Taeku Lee, for example, 
argues that the Civil Rights movement reveals the commitments of public opinion scholars, who 
have too often suggested that elite opinion drives mass opinion. This has often led them to ignore 
the role of social movements and the interaction between elites and the masses.52 Even 
perspectives that engage with aggregates of individual citizens have not given much attention to 
the role of the citizen beyond the recipient or provider of that individual opinion. In addition, 
public opinion scholarship has often focused on political opinions of citizens solely with respect 
to pre-determined policy issues.53 Thus, these paradigms, it seems, are not sufficient for 
understanding how citizens have counted themselves or called to be counted, or for 
understanding the rhetorical power of counting itself in democracies. By one line of thinking, the 
alternative to polling and public opinion scholarship in constituting political authority is the 
                                                
50 Fay Lomax Cook, Jason Barabas and Benjamin I. Page, “Invoking Public Opinion: Policy Elites 
and Social Security,” Public Opinion Quarterly 66, no. 2 (Summer 2002), 235-264; David Levasseur, 
“The Role of Public Opinion in Policy Argument: An Examination of Public Opinion Rhetoric in the 
Federal Budget Process, Argumentation and Advocacy,” Argumentation and Advocacy 41, no. 3 (2005), 
164. Cook, Barabas and Page analyze policy elites in a series of social security debates to show that 
appeals to public opinion are relatively prevalent, but often ambiguous. Levasseur finds a similar pattern 
of argument in budget hearings, though he suggests that references to public opinion are less common.  
51 Taeku Lee, “The Sovereign Status of Survey Data.” in Navigating Public Opinion: Polls, Policy, 
and the Future of American Democracy, eds. Jeff Manza, Fay Lomax Cook, and Benjamin I. Page 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 290-312. 
52 Taeku Lee, Mobilizing Public Opinion: Black Insurgency and Racial Attitudes in the Civil Rights 
Era (University of Chicago Press, 2002), 6.  
53 Robert S. Erickson and Kent L. Tedin, American Public Opinion: Its Origin, Content and Impact 
(New York: Pearson, 2005), 85. 
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practice of citizenship itself.  
Citizenship: Civic Rituals and Collective Enumeration 
Studies of citizenship call us to consider a much broader set of practices beyond citizen 
preferences, from petitioning, to voting, to participation in social movements and deliberation. 
As a field, citizenship has been studied in a variety of contexts that include citizenship as legal 
recognition; rights; practices; or collective identity and membership. 54 In this review, I focus 
first on theories of citizenship as a collective identity and the performance of civic rituals; and 
second, on historical accounts of statistics, surveys, and polls in providing a sense of American 
nationalism and civic identity. I argue that we have not yet done enough to understand the 
relationship between aggregate acts and the numerical representations that they often produce.  
Scholars of citizenship also emphasize the importance of studying citizenship in practice. 
For example, Robert Asen theorizes citizenship as “a mode of public engagement,” rather than as 
a “possession” which requires attention to how citizens enact citizenship. 55 J. David Cisneros 
argues that this process often involves a shift from normative to “empirical grounds” to study 
how citizenship has been defined in specific practices through both discourse and performance.56 
Using theories of citizenship that emphasize enactment, performance or ritual, I intend to 
demonstrate how participation in practices of civic engagement like voting influence our 
conceptions of what it means to be a citizen and to be “counted” as one.  
Citizenship is constructed over time outside of strict legal interpretations of rights. Isaac 
                                                
54 For a useful categorization of literature on citizenship, see Linda Bosniak, “Universal Citizenship 
and the Problem of Alienage,” Northwestern University Law Review 94 (2000): 963. See also Will 
Kymlicka and Wayne Norman, “Return of the Citizen: A Survey of Recent Work on Citizenship Theory,” 
Ethics 104 (1994): 352. 
55 Robert Asen, “A Discourse Theory of Citizenship,” 191. 
56 J. David Cisneros, “The Rhetorics of Citizenship: Pitfalls and Possibilities,” Quarterly Journal of 
Speech 100 (2014): 376. 
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West argues, for example, that legal status or rights are not “self-executing” but instead require 
attention to how they are articulated in specific cultural circumstances.57 In this context, 
citizenship can be a site in which new collective identities are articulated. 58 Scholars have 
studied how political rhetors, most often presidents, have constructed national identities that 
provide ideal characteristics or duties of citizens.59 Beyond their articulation in discourse, 
scholars suggest that participation in the rituals of citizenship like voting or petitioning is one 
way that citizens have made claims to citizen status that they were otherwise denied.60 For 
example, Susan Zaeske’s account of women’s abolitionist petitions shows how women made 
claims to citizenship as a political subjectivity through the act of signing a petition.61  
Of particular relevance to this project, is how scholars of citizenship have attempted to 
show that the relationship between the individual and the collective is a significant challenge of 
modern citizenship. Robert Hariman and John Lucaites argue that iconic images of individuals 
serve as sources of civic identity precisely because they “exemplify” the magnitude appropriate 
to collective identity while maintaining a basis for individualized identification suitable to a 
                                                
57 Isaac West, Transforming Citizenships: Transgender Articulations of the Law (New York: New 
York University Press, 2014), 8.  
58 Allison Piepmeir, Out in Public: Configurations of Women’s Bodies in Nineteenth Century 
America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004): 130.  
59E.g., Mary E. Stuckey, Defining Americans: The Presidency and National Identity (Lawrence, KS: 
University of Kansas Press, 2004); Vanessa Beasley, You, the People: American National Identity in 
Presidential Rhetoric (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2013).  
60 Josue David Cisneros, “(Re)Bordering the Civic Imaginary: Rhetoric, Hybridity, and Citizenship in 
La Gran Marcha” Quarterly Journal of Speech 97 (2011): 26-49; Angela G. Ray, “The Rhetorical Ritual 
of Citizenship: Women’s Voting as Public Performance, 1868-1875,” Quarterly Journal of Speech,93, no. 
1 (2007): 1-26. 
61 Susan Zaeske, “Signatures of Citizenship: The Rhetoric of Women’s Antislavery Petitions,” 
Quarterly Journal of Speech 88.2 (2002): 148. Zaeske suggest that abolitionist women articulated 
themselves as citizens in the text of the petition, but also through the act of signing petitions. 
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liberal-democratic society.”62 The particular practices and discourses of citizenship similarly 
constrain the rhetorical possibilities of citizenship in offering a particular vision of the relation 
between the individual and a community. For example, Judith Shklar argues the right to vote has 
become central to defining citizenship because it was a status symbol that differentiated between 
members of a community.63 Similarly, Allen argues that the process of citizen relations has often 
centered on metaphors of “oneness” that require homogeneity, rather than “wholeness” that 
would allow differentiation.64  
The potential for citizenship to offer unproductive relations to the whole has inspired a 
significant debate about whether citizenship is a productive concept in a healthy democracy. A 
number of scholars have seen citizenship as a rhetorically potent call to membership in a 
community that might address the challenges of modern democracy.65 On the other hand, 
scholars have also argued that citizenship operates primarily to enforce boundaries of 
exclusion.66 These critiques are particularly significant for a project that examines articulations 
of numerical representations of the collective, given that such representations have often been 
used to establish borders and norms. This project aligns with approaches that have argued for the 
need to consider both the exclusionary capacity of citizenship and its potential for collective 
                                                
62 Robert Hariman and John Lucaites, No Caption Needed: Iconic Photographs, Public Culture and 
Liberal Democracy (Chicago; University of Chicago Press, 2007), 91. 
63 Judith Shklar, American Citizenship: The Quest for Inclusion (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1991), 2.  
64 Ibid., 18. 
65 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press: 1958), 22-24; 
Ronald Beiner, “Why Citizenship Constitutes a Theoretical Problem in the Twentieth Century,” in 
Theorizing Citizenship, ed. Richard Beiner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995), 2. 
66 See for example Karma Chavez, Queer Migration Politics: Activist Rhetoric and Coalitional 
Possibilities (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2013), 13; Glen S. Coulthard, “Subjects of Empire: 
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identification and engagement. 67 As Cisneros argues, enacting citizenship is often a “hybrid” 
that both offers possibilities and engages with habits that enable certain norms and identities of 
citizenship over others.68  
Aggregative forms of civic participation offer a unique set of constraints for how 
citizenship as membership can be imagined. Concern for the enforcement of “oneness” or 
“homogeneity” has led some scholars to view voting as an unproductive way to imagine 
citizenship.69 For example, Engin Isin and Greg Nielsen argue established rituals like voting do 
not adequately break with the norms of civic engagement. Voting is doubly insufficient given the 
individual nature of the act.70 In contrast, Angela Ray argues, “voting itself calls attention to the 
interplay of the individual actor and the collective, as the citizen performs the ritual creating and 
displaying an active public.”71 Voting is thus one way in which the individual citizen considers, 
but also experiences, the nation and other citizens. This process is made only more salient when 
considering civic practices that aim specifically at the collection of a numerical aggregate. This 
project approaches the challenges of citizenship, both in imagining the relation between the part 
and the whole, and the potential for exclusion by considering carefully the form in which citizens 
are asked to participate.  
A second subset of scholarship on citizenship has specifically explored the role of the 
numerical aggregate in representing “who we are” and “what we believe.”72 Scholarly accounts 
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of aggregative discourse in citizenly identity have often focused on statistical representation – 
through census data, public polls, and other such institutional metrics that can be quantified and 
compared. Such quantification of citizens is often attributed to the rise of mass society or to what 
Paul Starr refers to as the “rationalization” of comparative politics.73 Through statistics 
policymakers are able to justify policies, political parties are able to fine-tune platforms, 
corporations are able to create and appeal to market segments, and so on.  
William Alonso and Paul Starr’s influential account of the systems of government data 
collection argues that official statistics collected by the census have influenced American society 
both with respect to policy and to what Alonso and Starr refer to variously as “images of our 
society” and “national self-perceptions.”74 Igo adds that social surveys helped to create a sense of 
the very existence of the mass public.75 The power of quantification—rendering citizen beliefs 
and acts as numbers—has been magnified by a claim to “objectivity.” Statistics offer citizens a 
“scientific” representation of themselves and other citizens. 
Yet, if statistics play a role in how Americans understand themselves, how they 
implement this process is a matter of scholarly debate. Some argue that statistics emerge from 
and articulate American citizenship as a function of “diverse and competing groups” that are 
derived in part from the “discrete categorizations” of data collection processes around the census 
and surveys.76 In other words, statistics present Americans as a citizenry differentiated into 
                                                
73 Paul Starr, “Sociology of Statistics,” in The Politics of Numbers, ed. William Alonso and Paul Starr 
(New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1987), 13-14. 
74 William Alonso and Paul Starr, introduction to The Politics of Numbers, ed. William Alonso and 
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75 Ibid., 8. 
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various socio-economic categorizations. Hence, Theodore Porter argues that statistics are unique 
in part for the “demands placed on people to classify things so that they could be counted and 
placed in the appropriate box in an official table.”77 Likewise William Peterson argues that the 
appeal of the census and statistics is that they provide recognition for minority populations who 
could be identified and situated among other groups in the national whole.78 Being counted can 
be a form through which individuals come to see themselves as “counted” or mattering in 
democratic society.  
 Other scholars have demonstrated that statistical data has also provided a problematic 
vision of cohesion rather than differentiation. Categories in the census were often calculated to 
derive “median” values that helped describe and configure norms.79 Igo suggests that the modern 
opinion survey became so prevalent in part because of the ways it “responded to a cultural 
demand for common mores in the face of anxiety about heterogeneity and a lack of national 
unity.”80 In practice, statistical representation often accomplishes both. Kelman’s study of 
discourse about statistics is particularly instructive here for the ways in which it demonstrates the 
power of aggregation to foster identity and difference.81 Stephanie Grey argues that this dual 
                                                                                                                                                       
American democracy where more republican accounts were much less invested in perpetuating statistical 
measures.  
77 Theodore Porter, The Rise of Statistical Thinking: 1820-1900 (Princeton: Princeton University 
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80 Igo, Averaged American, 8-11. 
81 Steven Kelman, “The Political Foundations of American Statistical Policy,” in The Politics of 
Numbers, ed. William Alonso and Paul Starr, 275-303 (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1987). 
   
23 
function can be used to foster hierarchy while also building community.82 Like conceptions of 
public opinion, understanding collective identity thus requires attention to how these values are 
described and circulated, and how citizens respond.  
 Studies of citizenship help us consider the processes of imagining collective ties and 
identities. Citizenship results from numerical representations in civic discourse as well as 
participation in aggregative civic rituals. These concepts of civic identity in relation to the 
aggregate, however, have often focused solely on institutional data in the census and surveys. 
This limits our understanding of the role of aggregates in democratic discourse by focusing more 
substantively on only one form of aggregation: in statistical representation. Similarly, it ignores 
the process by which these aggregates are collected. In addition, studies of the performance or 
habits of citizenship have helpfully revealed the importance of how citizens participate in civic 
life to our conceptions of what citizenship is. However, these accounts have focused on 
performance or practice to the point that it has often ignored the numerical representations that 
are produced as part of that participation. The contribution of this dissertation is to begin to 
understand how a telos towards numerical representation frames and perhaps influences the 
performance of citizenship that is so essential to the habits and practices studied by scholars. I 
argue that this requires attention to how citizens justify, negotiate and respond to the numerical 
representations that are produced by their own practices and rituals.  
Method and Chapter Summary 
This dissertation explores the discourses of counting in four case studies across twentieth 
century American democracy. Political scientist John Gerring defines a case study as the “in 
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depth study of a single unit” that is meant to speak to “a larger class of similar phenomena.”83As 
a class, I have selected four citizen movements in which numerical representation is an explicit 
goal. Each chapter focuses on a moment in which the counting organized around an exemplary 
call to be counted that animates broader questions about the class, but also investigates a unique 
angle of civic movements around counting in each case. My aim is to better understand how 
Americans have been asked to imagine their relationship to other citizens and their role in 
government decision making through distinct discourses, practices, and logics of counting civic 
action; and also how these respond to democratic anxieties about the mass.  
 The organization of this project into case studies rests on a set of contentions about calls 
to be counted. First, these calls are contingent articulations that are best explored by looking at 
the discourses in and around particular calls to be counted at different times and places. Disputes 
over what counts as public opinion, what constitutes ideal civic participation, and what various 
forms of aggregation might represent are manifest not just in scholarly debates, but also in 
political discourse. Does attendance at a rally mean something different than signing a petition or 
clicking a mouse? As scholars of citizenship argue, distinct practices of civic life provide 
different visions of the individual’s relationship to the whole.84 I have selected case studies that 
engage with a different form of counting – from petitions, a mass letter campaign, rallies, and 
digital systems.  
Second, aggregate civic actions, while a regular part of American democratic history, are 
not self-evident expressions of what it means to be part of a collective citizenry or a nation. 
Counts of citizens in mass campaigns often masquerade as having a sort of objective meaning, 
                                                
83 John Gerrring, “What is a Case Study and What Is It Good for?” The American Political Science 
Review 98 (2004): 341-354.  
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and an obvious instrumental function. A million people signing a petition often seems to be an 
empirical statement, and appeals to scale seem to be obvious ways to gain attention or 
demonstrate the importance of an issue. But how many citizens need to be counted to warrant 
our attention or speak to our collective concerns as a public? Moreover, do these movements 
want attention, or a change in policy, or do they see the movement as a representation of 
collective opinion at all? The case studies in this dissertation, explore these questions. To further 
understand the scope of the rhetoric of counting, I have chosen cases that have different 
exigencies and goals. I have included case studies with explicit policy outcomes, but have also a 
campaign centered on building community identity to better understand the range of civic 
discourses of counting.  
Third, these articulations of collective action and identity often come up against 
democratic anxieties about what it means to be represented as part of a whole. Citizens worry 
about being merely a number or being part of a mass. Questions of how many citizens must be 
counted, and in what way, invite still more: who signs petitions or attends rallies, and how much 
do they know or even care about the issue? To what extent are they concerned with self-interest, 
or group interest, or something more like the public interest? These anxieties however, are 
dependent not just on the form of counting, but in how those counts are represented and the 
subsequent claims about American democracy that emerge. Representations of counts of citizens 
do not always include homogeneity, nor do they always reject the personal. Drawing inspiration 
from Herbst’s study of public opinion and policy, I aim to study the arguments about each 
campaign in order to understand the assumptions about democracy through the arguments they 
make about what methods best provide an understanding of the whole.85  
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In order to be attentive to the contextual nature of these discourses, each case study 
explores how specific groups have variously responded to the challenges of civic counting in 
different geographic, historical, and cultural context. The contingency of these arguments, 
moreover, means that they are best understood through representative anecdotes that provide a 
consistent vision of what it means to be counted. The focus on a specific set of texts as 
representative of counting in these movements does provide some limitations. This dissertation 
focuses heavily on the discourses of movement leaders. However, I argue that a close study of 
how citizens ask to be counted, and the discourses in which they are represented as a number to 
negotiate authority, are necessarily a study of prominent voices. For the vast majority of the 
twentieth century, the campaigns in which citizens are counted involve significant resources, 
both organizational and financial, and often require access to a platform to reach the public. I aim 
to be self-conscious about these absences. As a scholar of citizenship, I am particularly attentive 
to where the process of counted might reinforce or introduce exclusions. 
Fourth, rhetorical concepts already offer a use starting vocabulary that can help us arrive 
at an understanding of the discourse of counting. Of particular use is the Aristotelian concept of 
megethos, or magnitude, which Thomas Farrell argues is central to understanding rhetoric. He 
defines rhetoric as the “fine and useful art of making things matter” and argues that magnitude is 
the primary means of establishing the importance, or what he calls the “weight” of rhetoric. 86 
Magnitude is concerned with “a sort of inventional logic for what sort of perspective is needed to 
size up and take in actions and events of a certain magnitude.”87 Magnitude’s concern for an 
evaluation of degree, or quantity or volume as a way to lay claim to the relative significance of 
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issues in public life and is a productive avenue for exploring the rhetoric of counting.88 
Magnitude provides a vocabulary for counting, in particular, size, quantity, and degree. I use 
quantity to refer to numerical representation and the related focus on size as aggregate. Similarly, 
degree helps describe terms that focus on the relative size or impact, including Rice’s concern for 
the idea of “scale” or “scaling up,” which should be distinguished from a focus on “great size” 
more characteristic of the aggregate (size or volume).89 Magnitude also offers a series of other 
rhetorical strategies that often describe or are paired with the rhetoric of counting. These include 
accumulation, repetition, and elaborate description.90 
In each case study, I draw broader conclusions by asking three key research questions 
that animate this dissertation. First, how do different groups justify participation in the campaign 
through some form of counting (e.g., public opinion, collective identity, a demand)? I examine 
how these texts articulate what it means to be counted as one among many in a mass campaign, 
and/or as part of a collective citizenry more broadly, as well as why being counted matters at all. 
Second, how do these calls negotiate the opportunities and constraints of cultural discourses and 
anxieties about democratic aggregation? Third, what rhetorical strategies or figures emerge that 
might help us understand how the discourses of counting function persuasively? 
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We begin in chapter 2 with the paper petition. Petitions were a prominent tactic at the 
turn of the twentieth century. They have frequently served as a way that citizens demand action 
from their government and even lay claim to citizenship.91 This chapter orients around calls to 
participate in the National American Woman’s Suffrage Association’s “big petition” campaign 
between 1908 and 1912. The campaign sought to reinvigorate suffragists – during a perceived 
lull in both legislative successes and in enthusiasm – through an unprecedented call for a million 
signatures. However, this call took place in the midst of a prominent series of arguments with 
anti-suffragists about who and what should be counted in democratic decision-making. I orient 
this chapter on three exemplars of this debate, a series of published letters and pamphlets by 
prominent British anti-suffragist, Mary Ward, and American suffragists Julia Ward Howe and 
Alice Stone Blackwell. Anti-suffragists at the turn of the century increasingly argued that “all 
women” needed to want the right to vote in order for suffragist’s calls to vote to have political 
legitimacy. Suffragists, in turn, developed an ironic appeal for a movement that sought to be 
counted through the vote: they determined that not all citizens should count. In comparing all 
suffragists to anti-suffragists, from votes for state amendments for suffrage, to membership in 
organizations, to petition campaigns, Blackwell and Howe made concrete their claims that what 
mattered were active citizens rather than broad concerns for public opinion.  
In chapter 3, I turn to letters as a means of counting citizen opinions. This chapter follows 
President Franklin Roosevelt’s calls for citizens to send letters from 1934-1937 in the midst of 
his re-election campaign. I turn to these letters to understand how presidential negotiations of 
public opinion shape and constrain citizen’s capacity to understand and debate how they are 
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counted. Presidents regularly invoke the public to justify support for particular policies, but also 
as Jeffrey Drury argues, present the public as a demand on the office that must be attended to.92 
As one of the most popular presidential recipients of letters, Roosevelt is a key figure to study; 
indeed, his presidency marks a shift in the popularity of the practice.93 At the same time, 
Roosevelt developed one of the earliest and most expansive polling enterprises to systematize the 
nations’ attitudes, techniques he applied to the letter campaign even as he publicly expressed 
suspicion for mass letter campaigns for their superficial contributions.94 In this analysis, I draw 
upon two of Roosevelt’s famous “fireside chat” radio addresses in which he sought to encourage 
citizens to send letters, a popular magazine article from presidential secretary Louis Howe, and 
Republican criticisms of FDR’s letter-processing procedures to consider what it meant to be 
counted through a letter in 1930s America. I argue that letters to the White House were framed as 
both expressions of an aggregate public will and also of the authentic and personal relationship 
between the president and citizens. In calling for letters from citizens, Roosevelt used letters to 
affirm the effective and efficient agency of government and to strengthen his presidency as a 
means of personally channeling the voice of the people. 
Next, in chapter 4, I explore a historic rally on the Washington Mall, considering the role 
of materiality and spirituality in the politics of counting. 95 I analyze the controversial 1995 
Million Man March, and the calls to be counted by its figurehead, Louis Farrakhan, leader of the 
                                                
92 Jeffrey Mehltretter Drury, Speaking with the People’s Voice: How President’s Invoke Opinion 
(College Station, Texas A&M University Press, 2014), 9.  
93 Alfred B. Rollins, “Young FDR and the Moral Crusaders,” New York History 37 (1956): 3.  
94 Melvin G. Holli, The Wizard of Washington: Emil Hurja, Franklin Roosevelt and the Birth of 
Public Opinion Polling (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 39; Mary Stuckey, Voting 
Deliberatively: FDR and the 1936 Presidential Campaign (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State 
University Press, 2015), 27. 
95 Franklyn S. Haiman “The Rhetoric of the Streets: Some Legal and Ethical Considerations,” 
Quarterly Journal of Speech 53 (1967): 99-100.  
   
30 
Nation of Islam. Much of the lead up to the march was focused on the distance, or lack thereof, 
between the message of the march and Farrakhan himself.96 In turn, Farrakhan sought to 
reinforce his own authority. I examine Farrakhan’s public calls for mass attendance prior to the 
march, particularly in the announcement of the march in the Nation of Islam newspaper, Final 
Call, and then turn to his keynote speech during the march. I show that Farrakhan drew a great 
deal of inspiration from the civic myths and materiality of nation-making central to the 
Washington Mall. The national mall has often been a site in which Americans learn who they are 
as citizens, but also where citizens, and particularly African Americans, have gathered to contest 
these visions.97 Farrakhan’s unique brand of numerology focused on divining the secrets of the 
memorials on the national mall to transform its civic history into a distinctly African American 
history. Farrakhan’s numerology culminates in what is for him the most important number, the 
number one, which engenders a transformation into “one” nation. In doing so, Farrakhan 
conveys the whole, the one, as something far more than the sum of its parts. Farrakhan counts to 
reveal, and to create the black nation within the American nation.  
Chapter 5 culminates in a study of web-based systems of counting through the online 
petition. This case study focuses on MoveOn.org’s landmark 1998 “Censure Clinton and Move 
On” campaign. In 1998, President Bill Clinton faced impeachment proceedings for, among other 
charges, lying under oath about an affair with Monica Lewinsky. To counter the impeachment, 
MoveOn founders Joan Blades and Wes Boyd developed a web petition to gather signatures to 
                                                
96 John L. Pauley II, “Reshaping Public Persona and the Prophetic Ethos: Louis Farrakhan at the 
Million Man March,” Western Journal of Communication 62, no. 4 (1998): 512. Pauley argues these 
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“censure” Clinton and “move on” to more important national and political issues. The petition 
would quickly help build MoveOn into a prominent advocacy organization. MoveOn’s 1998 
petition campaign is a key moment to study the early history of a new technology’s use in 
politics. Damian Pfister argues such moments help establish the norms of engagement.98 I 
analyze the MoveOn website over the course of the first six months of its campaign, from 
September 1998 to February 1999. The sheer prevalence of “counts” on MoveOn.org—from 
counts of petition signers to downloads of a web banner—helped MoveOn portray “digital 
activism” as comprised of short but intense moments of focused action by citizens in a loose 
alliance. The numerous counts and use of percentages and ratios were meant to demonstrate, as 
Blades repeatedly suggested, that the internet could be a means of activating a new American 
consensus in an era typified by partisan political fracture.  
In my analysis, I find that arguments about what it means to be counted are shaped by the 
specifics of the contexts, issues, and technologies of counting. Central to these distinct arguments 
about counting is the concern for what is being counted by the campaign. These discourses are 
variously concerned with what the “whole” of the campaign might represent, from public 
opinion, to votes or decisions on an issue, to demands on the government, or moral 
commitments. Similarly, they offer different claims as to what extent participants in a campaign 
might speak to the whole of the public, be it quantity, degree, or aggregates; or whether that 
“whole” public matters at all. Taken together, these four case studies show that claims to 
represent the public through counting inevitably require broader arguments about counting in 
democracy. In particular, concerns for who should be counted in public decision making in the 
nation, and who should do the counting. Finally, how these movements count citizens can be 
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explained by rhetorical strategies of magnitude, including accumulation, repetition, and elaborate 
description. 
Conclusion 
In this introduction, I have argued that aggregate practices of democracy have long been 
justified and debated in public discourse in ways that merit scholarly attention. I have suggested 
that public opinion scholarship shows that public opinion is a contested construct that is often 
expressed as part of broader political arguments. The same can be said of other forms of public 
“counting.” Studies of citizenship provide conceptual grounding in how collective identities and 
ties that are authorized by citizenship result both from numerical representations in civic 
discourse and the performance of aggregative civic rituals. Taken together, I argue that a more 
complete picture of democratic life would emerge from consideration of how citizens express 
and reject calls to be counted through both institutional statistics and their own aggregate 
campaigns. There is, in short, nothing straightforward about the rhetoric of counting.  
I have briefly illustrated that counting has been part of the practice of everyday 
democracy and the aspirations of citizens that ranges from arguments to participate in petition 
campaigns, gain access to voting, and demonstrate the force and visibility of rallies. In the 
chapters that follow, I analyze how calls to be counted negotiate the anxieties about the majority, 
about homogeneity, and about citizenship in democracy. All together, these chapters illustrate 
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CHAPTER 2: “THE PUBLIC SPIRITED MINORITY”: COUNTING INTENSITY IN 
THE NATIONAL AMERICAN WOMAN SUFFRAGE ASSOCIATION 1908-1912 
 
Harriet Stanton Blatch succinctly described the state of the woman’s suffrage movement1 
at the turn of the 20th century in this way: “we were told to organize, organize, organize, to the 
end educating, educating, educating public opinion.”2 Stanton Blatch, the daughter of notable 
suffragist Elizabeth Cady Stanton, returned to the United States from England in 1902 to a 
movement she proclaimed to be “completely in a rut.”3 She argued in her memoirs that suffrage 
organizing—driven largely by the National American Woman Suffrage Association 
(NAWSA)— displayed a lack of foresight about the methods for attaining suffrage because of 
the same “old” focus on “educating, educating, educating.” The movement, she continued, 
“bored its adherents and repelled its opponents. Most of the ammunition was being wasted on its 
supporters in private drawing rooms and in public halls where friends, drummed up and harried 
by the ardent, listlessly heard the same old argument.”4 In the eyes of many, the movement had 
stagnated; it needed the means to attract new membership while pacifying the old. 
 Eleanor Flexner’s foundational account of the American women’s suffrage movement 
places Stanton Blatch within a growing push from younger suffragists, who were heavily 
influenced by the English movement’s turn to tactics of agitation over education.5 The new 
generation pushed for marches and other public demonstrations. At the same time, suffragists 
                                                
1 Like most suffragists, Blatch refers to “woman” suffrage, which I do here, but I change to the 
modern usage of “women’s suffrage” throughout. 
2 Harriet Stanton Blatch and Alma Lutz, Challenging Years: The Memoirs of Harriet Stanton Blatch 
(New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1940), 92. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Eleanor Flexner, Century of Struggle: The Woman’s Rights Movement in the United States 
(Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1959), 243.  
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were facing new forms of resistance as lawmakers and anti-suffragists increasingly argued that 
“all women” needed to want suffrage for their cause to be legitimate. In the midst of this 
opposition, suffragists introduced a new national petition campaign for a million signatures at the 
NAWSA Annual Convention in October 1908, which would demonstrate for the cause. Yet, 
even as suffragists argued for mass participation in the “big petition,” they also began to debate 
the merits of prioritizing the quantity of women’s support for suffrage over the intensity of 
activist commitments. Prominent suffragists increasingly refuted claims that “all women” needed 
to support suffrage, using a number of speeches, columns, and pamphlets to argue that the 
opinions of the broader public were not as important as the public actions of suffragists. 
In this chapter, I analyze how suffragists’ conflicted calls to be counted navigated 
anxieties about mass democracy by engaging in debates over what counts as actionable beliefs 
and sentiments of the public. I begin my analysis by identifying the rhetorical strategies around 
counting from anti-suffragists. I argue these strategies offered opportunities for suffragists to co-
opt anti-suffragist arguments in their favor. To do so, I analyze a highly contentious 1908 letter 
by Mary Ward, a British novelist and founder of the Woman’s National Anti-Suffrage League. 
Ward’s letter is an exemplar of anti-suffrage arguments that not “all women” supported suffrage 
and thus the movement was invalid. I then turn to two of the most prominent suffrage responses 
to Ward’s not “all women” arguments: a 1908 letter responding directly to Ward by Julia Ward 
Howe, and a popular pamphlet by young suffrage upstart Alice Stone Blackwell called When All 
Women Want It, which was circulated by NAWSA in 1910. Finally, I return to NAWSA calls to 
be counted at the start of the “big petition” campaign from 1908 to 1910, analyzing repeated 
rhetorical strategies in newspapers, public letters, and speeches. My aim in this chapter is not to 
provide a comprehensive account of the strategies for discussing the petition campaign, but 
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rather to identify exemplars of a few prominent patterns that offer a comparison to Howe and 
Blackwell’s arguments about “all women.”  
I argue that Howe and Blackwell invoked counting to advance a view of public opinion 
that drew away from majoritarian logics to instead focus on discrete civic actions—which Howe 
and Blackwell argue can be counted—rather than a more amorphous and uncountable sense of 
majority opinion. Ironically, Howe and Blackwell limited who should be counted to “those who 
care,” or those who vote, instead of the “whole” of the population. Even if there were a silent 
majority of women who opposed suffrage, they should not count. Analyzing suffrage debates 
over civic counting demonstrates how arguments about what measures best represent public 
opinion or public actions inevitably become much larger debates about how democracy should 
work. This chapter thus introduces a key debate in civic counting: who gets counted in American 
democracy?  
In turn, suffragists deployed rhetorical strategies of magnitude to make claims about the 
degree and quantity of support for suffrage as compared to anti-suffrage. Suffragists contrasted 
counts of civic activities for and against suffrage represented as a simple quantity against 
representations of these activities as percentages and ratios to emphasize the degree, thus adding 
weight to their claims of majority representation. The repetition and accumulation of these 
quantities—strategies of magnitude—served not only to provide further proof of the majority, 
but also to amplify the idea of a majority. Suffragists created this repetition through the 
separation of quantities into time and space, creating the impression of pockets of intense belief 
and action for suffrage. 
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From “Too Many” to Not Enough 
Early petition campaigns played an important role for women suffragists, enabling 
women’s participation in the public sphere, particularly as part of women’s political advocacy 
beginning with 1820s abolitionism.6. This participation, however, often required substantial 
justification.7 Alisse Portnoy argues, for example, that women who petitioned against the 
removal of Native American populations in the 1830s framed their signatures as an extraordinary 
act commensurate with the moral significance of Native American removals.8 Susan Zaeske 
argues that 1840s women’s abolitionist petitions helped develop a political identity for women as 
citizens.9 In providing their signatures, women asserted their citizenship in the only way they 
were allowed. These efforts, among others, slowly eroded the prohibition of women from public 
life.  
Woman suffragists at the turn of the century faced opposition that was rooted in long-
standing anxieties about both gender and democracy. The push for suffrage inevitably stirred up 
concerns about the wisdom, or lack thereof, of the “masses.” NAWSA President Carrie Chapman 
Catt described the opposition to women’s suffrage as a belief that “too many people are voting 
already.”10 At the turn of the century, the common refrain about the masses was that they lacked 
the literacy skills necessary to vote wisely. Suffragists responded by turning to what Aileen 
Kraditor calls “expediency claims,” which reaffirmed the importance of voter qualifications so 
                                                
6 Flexner, Century of Struggle, 77.  
7 Susan Zaeske, Signatures of Citizenship: Petitioning and Antislavery, & Women's Political Identity 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003). 
8 Alisse Portnoy, Their Right to Speak: Women’s Activism in the Indian and Slave Debate 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005). 
9 Susan Zaeske, “Signatures of Citizenship: The Rhetoric of Women’s Antislavery Petitions,” 
Quarterly Journal of Speech 88, no. 2 (2002), 149.  
10 Carrie Chapman Catt, “President’s Annual Address,” National American Woman Suffrage 
Association Convention (Washington DC, National American Woman Suffrage Association, 1904), 3.  
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that potential women voters who met them could be included, and those who were undesirable 
voters could be excluded.11 In turn, suffragists embraced the racism, classism, and xenophobia 
that often drove anxieties about the masses.12 Many of these same voices, however, also 
regularly decried the sad showing at the polls. As Blackwell noted in her pamphlet, “so many 
men stay away from the polls that every year a bill is introduced in some State Legislature to 
impose penalties on men who neglect to vote.”13 On the surface, the concern for a lack of voters 
seemed to contradict the anxieties about “too many” voters. However, the belief that “too many 
people are voting” had always been more about “too many” of the “wrong” people voting.  
In the early 20th century, arguments that women lacked the proper educational 
qualifications for the vote were superseded by the claim that women lacked another more 
important quality: the desire to vote. Opponents of women’s suffrage noted that some women 
clearly desired to vote, but they went on to argue that the majority of women did not. Alice Stone 
Blackwell lamented that these pleas for “all women to want [suffrage]” were overused arguments 
that the opposition predictably revisited. An article in The Suffragist described such arguments as 
                                                
11 Aileen Kraditor, The Ideas of the Woman Suffrage Movement, 1890–1920 (New York: Norton, 
1981), 2. In her Presidential Address to NAWSA in 1904, for example, Catt provides a litany of statistics 
about male and female literacy rates to show that there were a great number of well-educated women that 
had the proper qualifications to vote, but that there were also populations of both men and women that 
lacked these qualities. 
12 Sarah Hunter Graham, Women Suffrage and the New Democracy (New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press, 1996), 4; Louise Newman, “Reflections On Aileen Kraditor’s Legacy: Fifty Years Of Woman 
Suffrage Historiography, 1965– 2014,” The Journal of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era 14 (2015): 
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an “armor plate” for legislators, but celebrated that the efforts of suffragists into the 1910s had 
finally begun to “rust” the armor.14  
Refuting the idea that a majority of women needed to want suffrage was made more 
changing by the general perception that suffrage advocacy was in decline. Suffragists adopted 
the term “doldrums,” to describe the common view of depressed enthusiasm and activism at the 
turn of the 20th century. 15 These doldrums were certainly reflected in Stanton Blatch’s lament 
about “educating, educating, educating.” Historian Sarah Hunter compellingly argues that the 
“doldrums” of the movement were exaggerated in historical accounts that focused largely on 
white women’s organizations on the east coast.16 Nevertheless, arguments that the movement 
was experiencing a decline were rife in public discourse at the time. Anti-suffragists identified 
this decline in a number of measures including votes, legislative achievements, and membership. 
These measures bolstered arguments that women lacked the desire to vote.  
The Private Opposition 
In July 1908, Mary Ward, an anti-suffragist activist, published a column in the London 
Times asking “Is Woman Suffrage Inevitable?” 17 Her answer—an emphatic no—offered a less 
than flattering assessment of the suffrage movement in the United States. Ward’s screed in the 
London Times prompted a flurry of responses from suffragists. What set her argument apart from 
the regular old “armor plate” was her quantification of the suffrage and anti-suffrage movements, 
                                                
14 “The Will of the People,” The Suffragist, May 16, 1914. The article in question focuses specifically 
on a May 1914 parade as evidence of such a rust.  
15 Flexner, Century of Struggle, 248.  
16 Graham, Women Suffrage, 4-5. Graham focuses on women’s organizations in the west to suggest 
that suffrage activism during this period. 
17 Mary A. Ward, “Is Woman Suffrage Inevitable,” London Times, June 30, 1908. In subsequent 
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which she claimed showed the movement was in decline. Ward’s arguments were grounded in 
two ways of counting suffrage and anti-suffrage movements. First, Ward used accumlatio to 
showcase the numerous defeats of suffrage votes at the turn of the century. Second, Ward 
utilized the discourses of scale to contextualize the long time frame and substantial labor of the 
suffrage movement to argue that the four states that granted suffrage prior to 1909 represent 
meager gains in comparison to the outsized impacts of anti-suffragists. The implications of 
Ward’s strategies placed substantial emphasis on the question of who counts, where Ward argues 
that to take into account “all women” would reveal a “quiet majority” of women who were 
against suffrage. 
 First, to provide evidence of the decline of the suffrage movement, Ward listed failed 
state amendments for suffrage and even the more modest amendments for school-suffrage 
(which allowed women to vote in school district elections). Her list began with:  
Since 1896, indeed, in five states the suffrage Constitutional amendments have been 
defeated at the polls, and in 1903 the Legislatures of 13 States rejected Woman Suffrage 
bills of one type or another. School-suffrage has been secured off women in 25 States, 
but the striking thing is that the suffrage agitation and the ‘unwise pressure brought to 
bear on Legislatures and public officials’ has hindered the natural progress of women in 
the field of work so well suited to them. In two States—Connecticut and Ohio—the 
abolition of the school suffrage has actually been discussed. School-suffrage votes have 
been defeated in five States in the last three years, and a Bill ‘requiring that at least one-
third of the members of boards of education appointed by mayors should be women was 
defeated in New York in 1899. 
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Looking at the years since 1896, Ward constructed a trend by providing a long list of defeats. 
Ward used the rhetorical strategy of accumulatio, long lists of examples to add emphasis. 
Counting the five states with defeated amendments, the 13 states that rejected suffrage, and the 
five failures in school-suffrage all in a row, drove home the “decline” Ward argued for. By 
presenting the defeats in short episodes of time, Ward was able to create a lengthy list of 
evidence of declining enthusiasm through the failed votes. 
Still, the arguments here shared no consistent timeline. For example the failed votes for 
constitutional amendment required a calculation in the years since “1896,” while the “13 states” 
that “rejected Woman Suffrage bills” were attached to a specific year, “1903.” The “school-
suffrage” defeats were given a three-year time frame before 1908. These defeats, however, had 
an unclear relationship with the “25 states” that had secured school-suffrage, which received no 
specific timeframe. Indeed, Ward rarely attached specific dates or time frames to the successes of 
the movement. For example, in the lack of such detail provided for the four states that passed 
suffrage amendments. Arguably more damning was Ward’s lack of consistency in determining 
these counts. She argued that it was not men being counted, but women. However, the defeat of 
many of these measures would have likely rested on the votes of men. Nevertheless, Ward’s 
argument was effective enough in its imprecision. Rhetorically, it was less about chronology 
than it was about litany.  
Ward was not concerned with the linear chronology from 1896 to 1908 in which suffrage 
experienced the litany of defeats. And yet, she was concerned with the chronology of suffrage 
organizing as a whole. In the “60 years of agitation” beginning with Seneca Falls Convention, 
Ward argued, the mere “four” states that had granted suffrage over a sixty-year period clearly 
showed that women’s suffrage was waning. The length of time provided a scale by which to 
   
41 
measure the accomplishments of the movement. Ward granted that the “second-third of the 19th 
century” (the 1830s to 1860s) witnessed a degree of success and enthusiasm for women’s 
suffrage, but these victories were long behind the movement. In turn, Ward portrayed the resolute 
work of suffragists over 60 years as a weakness in the movement. The minimal gains in 
amendments or school suffrage were of little value in the context of the scale of time in which 
they were achieved. In contrast, the “recent” period post 1896 showcased a litany of defeats for 
suffragists. 
Ward used the recent defeats of suffrage amendments to argue against any and all 
progressive narratives for suffrage advocacy. Instead, the slow progress was portrayed as the 
movement’s largest weakness. Ward argued that suffragists relied on a mistaken belief in 
progress. Ward noted that suffragists and anti-suffragists alike seemed to believe that “when, in a 
democratic country a claim of this kind has been asserted sufficiently long and with sufficient 
vehemence, mere clamor and insistence wear down opposition.” Ward denied that suffragists 
would see progress simply because of the length of time the movement persisted. Ward thus 
challenged any view that suffrage was “inevitable,” historically or otherwise. As such, she 
challenged ideas about the “progressive” nature of history as it applied to suffrage. 
Second, Ward argued that the litany of suffrage defeats was the result of the counter-
work of anti-suffragists. She credited the anti-suffragists with revealing lack of public support for 
suffrage and driving down enthusiasm in the early 1900s, which had “defeated the woman 
suffrage movement.” She contrasted the great amount of labor by suffragists with the 
comparatively small efforts of anti-suffragists, building on the minimal success of the suffrage 
movement over time to showcase the outsized impact of anti-suffragists. The anti-suffrage 
movement began, she argued, “by quiet opposition through petitions and personal pleas,” but 
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“year by year the movement grew,” to become a “quiet, resolute, and slowly strengthening 
opposition.” Notably, she did little to explicitly quantify the anti-suffrage movement outside of 
the “thousands” of documents produced. Ultimately, Ward argued that small pockets of active 
anti-suffragists were all that was needed to send women’s suffrage to the doldrums.  
Finally, Ward argued the “quiet” and “private” anti-suffragists outnumbered the 
suffragists. Women, not men, represented the primary opposition to the inevitability of suffrage. 
Paradoxically she argued that anti-suffragists could not be objectively counted even as she 
counted them: she wrote of the “preponderating number of the women who refuse to petition at 
all in either direction.” Indeed, women had chosen to “use their influence to strengthen the vote 
of men.” Women who opposed the vote were the majority, she suggested, but they could not be 
counted. To be publicly counted would be to violate the very principle of their opposition that a 
woman’s place was not in public. Ward thus argued that while suffragists might appear larger in 
quantity, it was the “quiet majority” of anti-suffragists that were “more passionate,” and far more 
effective. Such claims, though slippery, were particularly vexing for suffragists. Ward created a 
significant challenge for suffragists: how do you count women who do not show up in public to 
be counted? 
Counting Women Who Participate in Public 
Suffragists sent bunches of letters responding to Ward to a variety of British and 
American publications from July to October 1908 when NAWSA held its annual convention to 
announce the “big petition.”18 Julia Ward Howe wrote one of the more prominent responses to 
                                                
18 See for example, Alice Stone Blackwell, “Mrs Humphry Ward on Suffrage in America,” Woman’s 
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Ward in a letter published in the London Times in October 1908, copied in full in the primary 
NAWSA newsletter, The Woman’s Journal, as well as excerpted in a number of regional 
publications, and widely quoted in NAWSA pamphlets.19 In response to Ward’s claims about the 
“quiet” majority of anti-suffrage women, Howe asked what we should consider the “whole” 
against which suffrage should be measured? Ward’s “all women,” became in Howe’s arguments, 
“all women who demonstrate an opinion by means of participation in suffrage activities on either 
side.”20 Howe’s argument hinged on a concern for the intensity of pro-suffrage participation 
contrasted with that of the anti-suffragist efforts. She used two primary strategies to demonstrate 
the intensity of the pro-suffrage movement: representing the scope of the movement in the range 
of suffrage activities, and by dividing these counts in specific spaces, namely in cities or states. 
In both, Howe compared counts of pro- and anti- suffrage activities to demonstrate the intensity 
of suffrage and the relative paucity of the anti-suffrage efforts.  
 Howe opened her response by taking issue with Ward’s characterization of the suffrage 
movement as in decline. Recalling the “second third of the century” Ward attributed this success 
to, Howe states, “I well remember, the movement was small and unpopular, and the object of 
unlimited ridicule.” Instead of being in decline, Howe argued, suffrage organizations “[had] 
grown steadily in numbers and strength ever since.” Howe argued that Ward’s vision of recent 
failures was inaccurate, just like her false depiction of the early advances of the movement. For 
example, Howe emphasized the growth in membership of NAWSA, and how the “annual income 
                                                
19 Julia Ward Howe, “Mrs. Howe Answers Mrs. Humphry Ward,” Woman's Journal, August 1, 1908, 
121.  
20 Ibid., 1. 
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[of the organization] had risen from 2,544 in 1892 to 25,662 in 1907.”21 The metrics of income 
and membership provided a way to counter Ward’s narrative with quantitative detail.  
Howe set out to further dispute Ward’s narrative of decline. To do so, she focused on 
precise comparisons of all measure of activities for or against suffrage, from petition signatures, 
membership, organizational income, and votes. Howe directly contrasted counts of pro-suffrage 
membership or activities directly against the same measure in anti-suffrage groups. She utilized 
this same comparison for the production of literature: where “the women’s anti-suffrage 
movement in American maintains only one small four-page quarterly as its mouthpiece; the 
woman suffrage movement maintains one weekly paper and seven monthlies.” These 
comparisons took a fairly typical form in much of the letter, emphasizing specific quantities 
segmented by geographic space. For example, Howe brought up the “constitutional Convention 
in New York” where “the suffragists secured more than 30,000 signatures to their petitions,” and 
immediately turned to “the anti-suffragists,” who could only produce “15,000.”22 These 
comparisons of counts portrayed the strength of the suffrage movement against the anti-suffrage 
efforts.  
To reinforce the arguments about the differences in degree of support, Howe provided a 
long list of suffrage movement activities to out-accumulate Ward, in order to further demonstrate 
the importance of the majority support for suffrage. Howe followed the pattern of comparing 
suffrage and anti-suffrage metrics, providing a long list that served to reinforce her claims about 
the popularity of the suffrage movement. The anti-suffrage quarterly, Howe suggested, included 
a list that showed “state anti-suffrage associations exist in only four out of the 46 states of the 
Union, and small anti-suffrage ‘committees’ in four more. On the other hand, Woman Suffrage 
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Associations exist in 33 states and several territories.” She added further contrasting measures: 
the number of local branches in New York State (4 anti-suffrage to 125 suffrage), and 
Massachusetts (38 to 111), then transitioning to petition signatures for suffrage presented at the 
constitutional convention in Michigan (13,000 to 175,000) and then to the organizations working 
for a city charter to give women the ballot in Chicago (1 to 97). 23 This list of counts displayed 
the vast difference in scale between the membership and actions of suffrage organizations and 
those of anti-suffrage. Using space not only created quantities that could be accumulated, but 
also helped to make the significance of the suffrage activities vivid and concrete, and a clear 
measure of public attitudes about suffrage. If the individual comparisons make the relative 
popularity concrete, then the list of activities by which this can be measured only further 
emphasized the intensity of the suffragists. 
In addition to the range of activities, Howe supported her arguments about the popularity 
of the suffrage movement by showcasing the breadth of influence of the movement across many 
states. What mattered, Howe argued, was the size, scope, and level of activity of the suffrage 
organization. For example, to count petitions to the Chicago charter, Howe made a point to 
quantify the signatures (10,000) obtained and the number of organizations that advanced the 
campaign (97) in contrast to the sole anti-suffrage organization that opposed.24 Howe used this 
methodology of quantifying “members and strengths” to refute Ward’s claims and also turn the 
tables on her questioning anti-suffrage numbers. The strength of the movement could be found 
with the clusters of activities, members and/or organizations in spaces that spanned the country. 
Furthermore, the concentrated clusters reflected the intensity of the movement, and it was this 
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intensity to be counted that would play a large part in the ultimate success for the women’s 
suffrage movement. 
Howe therefore argued that organization and activities were the best measure of the 
intensity of commitment in a geographic area. Her emphasis on intensity as a measure of 
counting was even clearer in her disparagement of anti-suffrage membership. While contrasting 
suffrage and anti-suffrage numbers, Howe made an important argument about what should 
reasonably be included in these counts. Howe used the example of the Massachusetts 
Association Opposed to the Further Extension of Suffrage to discuss what can be counted as 
membership. Howe argued that members of that anti-suffrage association “pay no dues,” 
contrasting this to the suffrage associations that did pay dues. She then proceeded to unpack the 
“14,000 members” they claim, a number she found overstated. Howe argued that the “so-called 
members” had only “sign[ed] an anti-suffrage document,” and that “those who signed many 
years ago are still counted.” She concluded, “the statement that they have collected 14,000 
members merely means that in 13 years they have collected 14,000 signatures.” Howe went on to 
contrast this to the Constitutional Convention in Michigan, where suffragists “collected 175,000 
signatures to their petitions in a few months.” 25 For Howe this was an excellent counterpoint to 
Ward’s contention of a suffragist decline over time, and it was a means to compare two distinct 
locales (in Michigan and Massachusetts) as a function of activity level, thereby quantifying 
membership between suffragists and anti-suffragists.  
Howe’s arguments sought to demonstrate the significance of suffrage organizing 
capability. “In most of the States where defeats [of woman suffrage bills] had taken place,” 
Howe argued, “there was no anti-suffrage organization of women at all.” Howe contended that 
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this was because suffragists required more commitment from their members. In addition to dues, 
membership cards, and petition signatures, there was the more significant work of canvassing 
and letter writing. The passion and dedication of members in such efforts was a key way of 
demonstrating the “public sentiment,” and a means for Howe to counter Ward’s argument that 
anti-suffragists had to exert little or no effort to “drive” the defeats of suffrage amendments. 
Howe’s emphasis on labor and effort also set the boundaries for what could be measured 
as the “whole” through which the American people could then determine public action and 
public sentiment about suffrage. To demonstrate the “whole,” Howe added one last measure: “in 
Maine, Iowa, Kansas-in short, wherever women have sent to the Legislature petitions for 
suffrage and remonstrances against it, the petitioner has always outnumbered the remonstrant 50 
or 100 to one.” 26 The “whole” that really counted, she argued, was not an elusive “public 
opinion,” but rather the quantity of suffragist women who had petitioned, and subsequently, the 
degree of support this represented in the ratio. In this regard, suffragists far outnumbered anti-
suffragists.  
At the close of her litany of counts, Howe argued that the real issue was who should be 
counted. In a quotation that circulated widely in suffrage literature, Howe wrote “in America, 
most women are still indifferent on the question of suffrage; but, of those who take any lively 
interest in it either way, the vast majority are in favor. This has been demonstrated wherever the 
matter has been brought to the test.” Howe used this argument to address the indifference of 
most women in America on the question of women’s suffrage. She argued that suffragists, 
politicians, and the public should concern themselves not with all women, but with the 
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dedication and intensity of the women who weighed in and took part. 27 The answer to Howe’s 
question of how to count women who did not show up in public was to dismiss them from 
concern. Howe had encapsulated a new view of counting for the suffrage movement; the 
movement no longer needed to count all women, the movement only needed to quantify those 
that stepped forward to be counted.  
The Majority Who Votes 
This surprising claim was further polished by Alice Stone Blackwell, who offered a 
prominent and lengthy expansion on Howe’s original letter in a popular pamphlet aptly named 
When All Women Want It. Published by NAWSA in 1910, the pamphlet was reprinted and 
circulated throughout the decade. In it, Blackwell briefly demonstrated the “lively interest” of 
suffrage work and reiterated the counts included in Howe’s letter. She was, however, far less 
concerned with demonstrating the scope and intensity of suffrage activities. Blackwell’s 
pamphlet was set against the increased popularity of the claim by anti-suffragists that suffrage 
could not be legitimately attained “until the majority of women asked for it.” 28 The call for all 
women Blackwell argued, led to a push by legislators that amendments for suffrage had to 
demonstrate a near unanimous majority in a decisive vote.  
Blackwell argued, “neither all men nor all women have ever been unanimous in wanting 
anything.” 29 She disputed the idea of a unanimous vote of all women. Democracy, she argued, 
had never been driven by all but rather by the majority of those who vote. Blackwell adopted a 
new language of the “public spirited minority,” to develop an argument based in historical voting 
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patterns. 30 First, Blackwell analyzed voting patterns to show the low participation of men, and 
then provided a number of examples of votes that passed without a majority of eligible voters. 
Second, she analyzed the ratios of suffrage or school suffrage votes to compare the majority to 
these successful votes. She argued that democracy has never required a majority of all eligible 
voters, and yet these are the standards to which women were held. 
Blackwell went on to place the arguments that “all women” had to vote for suffrage in the 
context of longstanding challenges of a lack of voter participation in American public life. “It is 
notorious,” Blackwell declared, “that large numbers of men are indifferent to the right of 
suffrage.”31 This could be proven, she argued, with “published statistics [which] show that, 
except at Presidential elections, the majority of the men who could register and vote do not 
generally do so.”32 Blackwell provided a number of examples of such lackluster counts, 
including “one election in Gosnold, Mass., [where] not a single vote was cast.” She subsequently 
shifted in space to generate another example of where “the same thing happened in a Michigan 
township.”33 These patterns persisted, she argued, in spite of countless efforts to address the lack 
of enthusiasm. Even with “brass bands, campaign oratory, personal work, and the most fervent of 
printed appeals,” men regularly did not vote. 34 Blackwell applied the standard for “all women” 
to desire suffrage to men, using voting patterns to illustrate the hypocrisy of the argument. Low 
participation had not been sufficient cause to take the vote away from the “more public-spirited 
minority,” even as the majority of men were indifferent. 35 She argued the standard for women 
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should reflect the same emphasis on the public spirited minority instead of all women or even a 
majority of women to vote for suffrage.   
In addition to enthusiasm, the existence of the public spirited minority in voting patterns 
for men demonstrated that a majority of eligible voters had never been required for a successful 
vote. She demonstrated the low threshold for a majority vote by providing a lengthy example of 
four constitutional amendments in New York, which passed with a majority of voters. Blackwell 
presented the vote as a function of percentages she calculated by including the eligible 
population of voters as the whole. This means that the “successful vote” was achieved when 
“only about 25 per cent of the voters wanted these changes, while 75 per cent were ‘either 
indifferent or opposed.’”36 This yes vote appeared well below what sounded like a reasonable 
majority; and yet, Blackwell added, “since less than 25 per cent of the voters were actually 
opposed, all the amendments were declared carried.” 37 She went on to demonstrate that the 
“public spirited minority” clearly carries through in the threshold for successful votes and 
frequently requires only the smallest of margins to achieve a majority. In one case, Blackwell 
added, “a constitutional amendment had sometimes carried when only 10 per cent of the men in 
the State voted for it.” 38 She expanded on this point, adding that even where the majority only 
includes voters, “none of these states have ever been able to carry at a general election any 
amendment” because “a majority of the men voting for Governor do not take the trouble to vote 
even for the most popular amendment.” 39 Based on these voting patterns, Blackwell argued, 
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there has been a longstanding practice of accepting the opinions of the public spirited minority in 
American democracy. 
Blackwell sought to show that the threshold for “all women” to reach a consensus on 
suffrage was several orders of magnitude higher than the marginal majorities of male voters. She 
argued that the question of suffrage also “ought to be decided, as other questions put to vote…by 
the wish of the majority,” of “those caring enough to vote on it.” 40 In contrast to the low voting 
patterns of men, these same calculations in women’s votes on suffrage revealed a very different 
outcome. For example, Blackwell celebrated the participation of women in the territory of 
Wyoming was a territory, in which “ninety per cent of them voted” when allowed.41 Women 
seem to make much better voters than men.  
Blackwell also used percentages to show the majority of women voted for suffrage. She 
provided a lengthy example of votes from an 1895 Massachusetts suffrage amendment that 
showed this majority. Blackwell detailed the results, where in “238 out of 322 towns of 
Massachusetts, not one woman voted no,” and “out of the 575,000 women in the whole State 
who might have voted in the negative, only 861 did so.” 42 Not satisfied with these counts, 
Blackwell went on to reiterate this conclusion by presenting the percentages for the small 
opposition from 561 women, which amounted to “less than one –sixth of one percent,” or “an 
average of 26 to 1” by district.43 The use of ratios and percentages helped to drive home what 
simple counts might not. The conclusion: an overwhelming number of women voters supported 
suffrage. Blackwell quoted Howe, who noted that “it will be said that this did not show the 
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whole number of women opposed,” but again argued that “it shows with absolute accuracy the 
number of those women who opposed, who believed that the right to vote implies the duty.”44 
Blackwell offered a response to the arguments that suffrage would force unwilling women to 
vote by noting that the small number showed this was unlikely. The litany of concrete examples 
of suffrage votes showcased the positive voting patterns of woman suffragists, and the continued 
unfairness of the outcomes in contrast to the acceptance of the “public spirited minority” by men. 
Howe also placed the suffrage votes in the context of eligible populations of men to 
further demonstrate the challenges of a full majority. If all women needed to desire and vote for 
suffrage, then what did it mean to have so many men not vote? Blackwell again used the 
example of Massachusetts to draw a direct contrast between the “less than one-sixth of one 
percent” of women opposed to suffrage against the outcome of the vote determined by men. 45 
She shifted the “whole” from all those who voted to the total population of men, concluding that 
“two-thirds of the men were either indifferent or in favor,” making the majority that defeated the 
measure a mere “33 per cent.”46 Blackwell, like Ward, could project the views of the general 
public who had not registered their official opinion. Men who did not vote were “indifferent” and 
thus could be collapsed with men in favor. Blackwell argued that in spite of the “two-thirds” of 
men “indifferent or in favor,” the figures were “properly taken as that of the men who cared 
enough about it to express themselves.” 47 This, Blackwell argued, was the standard in which 
“the figures of the women’s vote ought to have been taken.” The women who voted “26 to 1” 
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should “have been taken as equally conclusive.” 48 By comparing votes to the population, 
Blackwell demonstrated that the threshold for “all women” to reach a consensus on suffrage was 
several orders of magnitude higher than typically practiced in American democracy.  
In addition to applying the same standard to suffrage votes, Blackwell contrasted the 
practice of minority votes with an example where a clear majority was unsuccessful. She 
provided a second lengthy example of a suffrage vote in Wyoming’s statehood. Wyoming had 
granted suffrage as a territory, and in the process of the constitutional convention of women and 
men, delegates included suffrage for women “by an almost unanimous vote.” 49 Then, the 
“constitution was submitted to voters, men and women, and was accepted by a large majority.” 
Instead, the amendment was then put to a vote separately from the constitution, and voted on by 
men alone. The majority, in this case mattered little. Even with the interference, Blackwell 
added, it still “came very near carrying Congress,” and yet it was ultimately rejected. 50 The 
“public spirited minority,’ and indeed in some cases, the public spirited majority of women had 
voted, but had not been held to the same standard. Howe relies substantially on counts of voting 
patterns to highlight the importance of the voting population as compared to the general 
population. These trends established a precedent for the emerging suffragist’s arguments that not 
everyone need be counted. The logic of the “public spirited minority” was in essence already the 
logic of American democracy. 
“A Conspicuous Demonstration” 
NAWSA’s ambitious “big petition” campaign was introduced at the Annual Convention 
in 1908. The petition campaign was initially organized by Carrie Chapman Catt, the chairman of 
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the Committee on Petition to Congress. Catt served as NAWSA President from 1900-1904 and 
her tenure was often associated with a shift in philosophy towards organizing.51 The petition 
campaign was aimed at bolstering the movement’s membership numbers through the organizing 
and public outreach work of a massive petition campaign. Suffragists developed two distinct 
strategies to discuss the significance of the ambitious scale of the big petition campaign. First, 
NAWSA claimed that active engagement in the campaign demonstrated success and intensity. 
Second, however, they often publicly called for signatures by emphasizing the sheer size of the 
campaign, thereby reflecting the rhetorical figure of magnitude. These discourses of magnitude 
embraced, rather than rejected the calls for “all women” to want suffrage. 
First, suffragists internally claimed that the counting of signatures as reflected the 
intensity of members and the scope of suffrage work. This purpose was often reflected in what 
suffragists chose to count during the “big petition” campaign. The report from the NAWSA 
Committee on Petition to Congress at the 1910 convention by Rachel Foster Avery celebrated 
the range and scale of activities from the national office alone, “in 100,000 petitions and 5,000 
individual letters sent from New York under Mrs. Catt’s supervision. There had gone out from 
the headquarters… 60,000 more petitions, 11,000 more letters, and 1,185 postals with appeals.”52  
Avery reported on the scope of activities and celebrated member enthusiasm. The petition 
campaign, she argued, “has given many people who have never before done anything for 
suffrage an opportunity.” 53 The emphasis on intensity of volunteer work was also present in 
updates on the campaign, which sometimes reported on such individual efforts. For example, an 
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update in The Woman’s Journal celebrated several accomplishments of the petition, including 
that “Miss Winifred Pease of 3020 S. 63d street, Tacoma, Wash., aged 14 years, has done 
splendid work for the petition, securing 21 names all by herself.” 54 Suffragists celebrated the 
campaign in the substantial efforts of volunteers.  
Publicly, however, suffragists framed the importance of the 1908 petition campaign 
primarily through magnitude. As Jenny Rice argues, magnitude can often have an aesthetic 
component that foregrounds the sense of “more” or abundance as itself a kind of claim to 
importance.55 When they introduced the petition campaign in 1908, the call for “a million” 
signatures was front and center. A call for signatures in the woman suffrage publication Progress 
in July 1909 called on the “millions of suffragists in the United States,” and emphasized, “we 
want just one million of those names to lay before Congress.”56 If it was not the “million” 
signatures they sought, suffragists referred to the “big petition” or the “monster petition.” In a 
July 1909 New York Times article aptly titled “A Million for Suffrage,” the update on the 
campaign carried the subtitle “Mrs. Avery Says That Her Monster Petition is Nearly 
Complete.”57 Announcements about the campaign trumpeted the “larger scale than ever before 
attempted.”58 This public demonstration focused less on the intensity of activities and much more 
substantially on the sheer number of signatures.  
 Certainly, a million signatures did not necessarily require all women to sign the petition. 
The appeal to the million as many, however, introduced some challenge to suffragists emerging 
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arguments about the “public spirited minority.” The sheer scale of the campaign was positioned 
as a significant demonstration of public opinion. Elizabeth Cady Stanton described petitions 
about suffrage, which were delivered “by the tens of thousands” and “piled up in the national 
archives, unheeded and ignored.” The overabundance of signatures and the innumerable pages 
submitted to Congress were, according to Stanton, a substantial show of the force of public 
opinion.  
In some cases, NAWSA framed the petition campaign in direct opposition to the 
narrative that not “all women” wanted suffrage. A December 1909 call for last minute signatures 
emphasized the need to “be representative of the suffrage sentiment in this country at the time it 
is presented.”59 To be representative of the suffrage sentiment, that is, did not necessarily require 
all women, only a majority. And yet, many calls for signatures on the big petition embraced, 
rather than rejected, the need for “all women” to want to vote. At a speech in Colorado in 1909 
shortly before Taft took office, Anna Howard Shaw emphasized the importance of the petition to 
appeal to the President. She cited “Mr. Taft has often said he was willing the women of America 
should have the right of franchise if they desired it.” Taft’s emphasis on “desire” echoed the new 
arguments that called for “all women” to want suffrage. In turn, Shaw positioned her call for 
participation in the petition campaign in response, calling for the “signature of every woman in 
Colorado” because “now is the time to give him the opportunity to show what he meant by this 
statement.”60 These exemplars demonstrate the limitations of focusing on the minority for calls 
to participate.  
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Conclusion 
This chapter has focused on how anti-suffragist arguments that “all women” needed to 
want the vote presented both challenges and opportunities to turn of the century suffragists. In 
the midst of the “doldrums” of the suffrage movement, and the start of a new “monster petition” 
campaign, suffragists developed new claims about what it meant to be counted. Suffragists 
presented counts of the petition, of membership in suffrage organizations, and in votes. My 
analysis demonstrates the significance of time and space as clear strategies for making claims to 
magnitude, in this case by creating the potential for more quantities to list, and by making those 
quantities more vivid and concrete. Suffragists like Julia Ward Howe and Alice Stone Blackwell 
emphasized the importance of counting active citizens, of those with a “lively interest,” and 
therefore, the “public spirited minority” of voters. They began with the premise that public 
activities were all that should be counted, and thus used comparative measures of suffrage and 
anti-suffrage activities to make concrete the intensity of the suffrage movement. They then 
broadened the premise of focusing on active citizens to showcase the affinity with the logics of 
American democracy.  
Suffragists thus argued that not “all women” need to be counted in American democracy, 
just as “all men” have not been. In the broader dissertation, this chapter demonstrates the 
importance of questions of who should be counted to discourses of civic counting. Claims to how 
best to understand public opinion are inseparable from substantial democratic questions about 
whose voice does or should matter in democracy, whether these arguments are implicit or 
explicit. Anti-suffragists claims about the need for “all women” to desire the vote for legitimacy 
forced suffragists to make claims about the majority and the active voter more explicit. 
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The “big petition” demonstrated the limitations of suffragist strategies of counting the 
intensity of the active citizenry while trying to frame new calls to be counted in a campaign. 
Ultimately, however, the suffragist focus on the “minority” found little traction in the most 
prominent form of counting during this period of the introduction of the “big petition.” Their 
strategy to focus on those with an active interest in the matter as a measure of how to evaluate a 
campaign was in effect, an effective argument after a campaign. It was not then, and is not now, 
however, easily reconcilable with a singular focus of demonstrating a mass in calls to be 
counted. In the end, the public focus on showcasing the need for “all women,” demonstrated the 
challenge of recruiting new members or signatures by eliminating those who might be convinced 
to be counted.  
The limitation of the “whole” to those who care also has potential negative implications 
for democracy. The barriers to voting, including socioeconomic status and disenfranchisement as 
a result of imprisonment, would only be exacerbated by these concerns. Indeed, early scholars of 
polling saw it as a means to correct the problems of limited participation to democracy. For 
example, Sydney Verba’s oft-cited argument to expand the use of opinion polls in policy rests on 
the belief that polls offer the possibility to overcome the biases of political participation. Verba 
makes this claim despite the problems of self-selection of the “elite” and the comparative lack of 
resources required to participate in polls. 61 While polls largely struggle to do so given the 
previously discussed sampling issues, this concern for representativeness would likely extend to 
suffragists claims about who should count. If NAWSA and many prominent suffragists rejected 
arguments that women were not qualified to vote, they rarely disputed the sensibility that there 
should be qualifications and in some cases, that the “masses” were not to be trusted. That is, 
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suffragists at the turn of the nineteenth century still frequently embraced the qualifications 
argument for the vote, merely arguing that some women were qualified. Given the history of an 
overall lack of concern for women of color, this discourse leaves open a lot of possibilities for 
exclusion.62 Suffragist’s long history of embracing the qualifications of education and 
assimilation likely indicated that it was not truly all those with a “lively interest” that would or 
should have been counted.  
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CHAPTER 3: “THINKING AS A NATION”: AGGREGATION AND AUTHENTICITY 
IN FDR’S APPEALS FOR LETTERS, 1934-1937 
 
The turn of the twentieth century brought an emergent sense of America as an 
increasingly uniform mass society and mass culture brought about by mass media and new 
trends in consumer capitalism.1 At the same time, political culture was taking on new look. 
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt joined a twentieth-century line of “rhetorical” presidents 
who used mass media and oratory to vocally lead the nation and drive government agendas. 2 
According to the logic of both mass society and the rhetorical presidency, American citizens 
were becoming part of a relatively homogenous American “public” comprised of common 
characteristics, experiences, and opinions.3 As Thomas Farrell argued, Roosevelt regularly 
addressed Americans a necessary part of the federal government response to emerging issues, 
with corresponding civic responsibilities. Collective action, for Roosevelt, was public action, and 
public action was critical to navigating the crisis of the Great Depression.4 This required 
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extraordinary rhetorical effort. Indeed, Mary Stuckey argues by his 1936 bid for reelection the 
crises of the Depression and the impending threat of war meant that Roosevelt’s “personal 
authority was weakened” along with the belief in the public interest. Roosevelt responded in 
force, arguing repeatedly that an active and engaged citizenry with a strong commitment to 
national interests needed to work in tandem with the president to ensure the progress of both his 
domestic and international agendas.5 Roosevelt sought to reinforce the importance and power of 
the public to strengthen the office of the presidency as the engine of public interest and the chief 
means of public representation.  
In order to establish the presidency as the primary means of citizen representation, 
Roosevelt sought to enhance the channels of communication between the president and the 
public. This begins with his famous use of the radio to reach into the heart of the American home 
across the country. In turn, Roosevelt appealed to citizens to communicate in kind. Crucial to this 
were his repeated calls for letters, often in his famous fireside chats. Roosevelt further promoted 
letter right through regular public affirmations of their importance.6 In Roosevelt’s first term, the 
volume of mail to the White House ballooned. They received 6,000 to 8,000 letters a day, 
compared to one hundred a day under President McKinley (1897-1901) and 800 a day under 
President Hoover (1929-1933).7 The volume of mail was such that Ira Smith, the first White 
House Chief of Mails, lamented in his memoirs that “when the President told them to write about 
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their troubles,” the public “took him at his word.”8 Roosevelt, however, was far more pleased 
with the influx of letters.  
Citizens responded with such enthusiasm that the White House had to set up a new 
department for handling mail.9 The mail office was concerned not just with responding to the 
high volume of letters, but also with making sense of their contents. Indeed, Smith’s office 
became for FDR a kind of crystal ball. “Whenever there was a decrease in the influx of letters,” 
Smith remarked, “we could expect to hear from him or one of his secretaries who wanted to 
know what was the matter—was the President losing his grip on the public?”10 Roosevelt’s 
vaunted letters continued to serve as a key index of public sentiment, even as the administration 
invested in new mechanisms such as opinion polling to gauge the beliefs of the public.11  
This chapter analyzes the ways that the Roosevelt administration rhetorically framed 
letter writing from 1934-1937—the years bookending the 1936 election— in order to better 
define what it meant to be “counted” as a citizen in the new age of mass democracy and the 
rhetorical presidency. Hence, I take up Jeffrey Mehltretter Drury’s call to study “invoked public 
opinion” and the presidency. How do presidents lead by public opinion, rather than just trying to 
get a gauge of public opinion?12 Rhetorical scholars have tended to study the rhetorical 
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presidency by understanding presidential speech as an appeal for public support. To study 
leadership by public opinion is to analyze how presidents define and use public opinion as a way 
to navigate the demands of the public on the office.13  
I argue that Roosevelt’s calls for citizens to send letters, and thus be counted, framed 
letter writing as both expressions of aggregate public interest and as means of forming personal 
bonds with the president. By using the term aggregate, I aim to encompass a discourse of 
counting that foregrounds individual expressions or letters as part of the whole that are distanced 
from more simplistic focus on quantity (i.e., numerical representation) favored by suffragists. 
Rhetorically, aggregation as a form of claims of magnitude is still grounded in size as a way of 
claiming importance, but lacks the precision of quantity or even degree that reduce the individual 
parts to a number. Roosevelt relies substantially on pairing the discourse of aggregation with two 
other strategies of magnitude, elaborate description and repetition, which provide opportunities 
to emphasize the personal while still creating a means to scale up to speak to the nation rather 
than just the letter writers. This helped mediate the two competing visions of letters, as both 
relatively impersonal indexes of public sentiment and intimate vehicles of personal connection 
with a powerful public representative. Roosevelt navigates this tension by presenting the 
presidency as a channel through which the public interest could be both objectively aggregated 
and empathetically understood. 
 There are two key implications of this analysis for the dissertation. First, the tension 
between the individual and the aggregate reveals the boundaries of the rhetorical figure of 
magnitude and the extent to which the characteristic emphasis on “more” might become too 
                                                
13 Drury, Speaking with the People’s, 3. Drury is concerned primarily with Presidents as a way to 
contrasts view of the rhetorical Presidency that take up public opinion as influenced by Presidents.  
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much or too big in service of making claims to what matters in public life.14 Second, Roosevelt’s 
reliance on presidential authority as a channel through which the aggregate is understood 
showcases the centrality of questions of who does the counting. I consider both how Roosevelt 
foregrounds the importance of this argument, but also how his lack of public transparency about 
the means of counting constrains the debate. 
I begin by considering how FDR framed his calls for letter writing by looking at two 
fireside chats where soliciting letters was an explicit goal, comparing the fireside chats to a 
popular article written early in the FDR administration by presidential secretary Louis Howe on 
the importance of mail to the White House. I then turn to a political debate about White House 
mail during the 1930s, focusing on a statement released by the Republican National Committee 
in 1937 that condemned the processes by which mail was sorted. 
Thinking as a Nation: Roosevelt’s Calls for Letters in Fireside Chats 
 During Roosevelt’s presidency, social data played an increasingly significant role in 
understanding and making claims about American mass society. Political institutions had long 
gathered statistics on citizens,15 but the increasingly popularity of public opinion polls in the 
1920s and 30s increasingly told “who they are” and “what they believe.”16 As Sarah Igo 
                                                
14 Jenny Rice, “The Rhetorical Aesthetics of More: On Archival Magnitude,” Philosophy and 
Rhetoric 50, no. 1 (2017), 59. 
15 See for example, James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human 
Condition Have Failed (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998); Paul Starr, “Sociology of Statistics,” 
in The Politics of Numbers, ed. William Alonso and Paul Starr (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 
1987), 13-14. Political institutions had long embraced technocratic practices to track citizenly 
characteristics and behaviors to aid in decision making. 
16 For the quotes, see Igo, The Averaged American, 11-18. See also, William Alonso and Paul Starr, 
introduction to The Politics of Numbers, ed. William Alonso and Paul Starr (New York: Russell Sage 
Foundation, 1987), 1-6. Igo situates the rise of opinion polling as a newer phenomenon concerned with 
public expressions of “normal” citizen opinions. Igo notes that surveys prior to this period were more 
often a tool for reformers studying narrow populations at risk. Alonso and Starr refer to the emergence of 
“national self-perceptions.” 
   
65 
compellingly argues, polls did not simply respond to an appetite to understand the nation, but 
helped to create it.17 Pollsters like George Gallup gained prominence, contending that scientific 
measures were far more trustworthy than traditional means of gauging public opinion. And yet, 
these new forms of “counting” citizens engendered a great deal of apprehension and uncertainty, 
particularly into the 1940s.18  
The Roosevelt administration relied heavily on these new methods of the social sciences 
to ostensibly better gauge public sentiment. Roosevelt’s efforts to gauge the public opinion were 
varied: he summoned feedback from political allies, took trips across the country, and instituted 
staffs of pollsters and social scientists to quantify public sentiment. Indeed, surveys, polls, and 
the collection of demographic data played a new and vital role in New Deal governance.19 Letter 
writing was still important in this respect and remained part of this broader social-scientific 
approach to governance. Letters were sorted and “read” using sophisticated processes of data 
analysis. The roughly twenty-five staffers of the mail department (which had numbered only one 
when FDR took office) read, categorized, and distributed mail, tallying letters by subject matter, 
geography, and demographics in a “scientific check” producing mail briefs for the president. 
These sophisticated analyses included tracking interest in topics over time.20 
Roosevelt’s famous fireside chats, broadcast via the radio into millions of American 
homes, were the means by which Roosevelt appealed to the public to urge participation in their 
governance by writing letters. I will examine two prominent examples: the April 28, 1935 
fireside chat on the newly implemented Works Relief Program, and the October 12, 1937 fireside 
                                                
17 Igo, The Averaged American, 11-18. 
18 J. Michael Hogan, “George Gallup and the Rhetoric of Scientific Democracy,” Communication 
Monographs, 64, no. 2 (1997), 162. 
19 Holli, The Wizard of Washington, 39. 
20 This process is described in more detail in Sussman, “FDR and the White House,” 9. 
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chat for an extraordinary session of Congress. I will refer to these as the 1935 fireside chat the 
1937 fireside chat, respectively. In both speeches, Roosevelt appealed directly to the public to 
express their concerns, struggles, and even criticisms through letter writing. These calls were 
grounded in one of Roosevelt’s most common arguments during his presidency: that there 
existed the ability for the nation to speak as a whole and indeed “think” as a whole when 
deliberating about national problems. In the 1935 fireside chat, Roosevelt argued that the 
public’s “new” capacity to “think as a nation” was a “tremendous gain for the principles of 
democracy.”21 This capacity of the public was a fundamentally new phenomenon, Roosevelt 
argued, “as never before in our history, each section of America says to every other section, ‘Thy 
people shall be my people.’”22 The character of this argument provided an important key to 
understanding Roosevelt’s calls to be counted via letter writing.  
Key to understanding Roosevelt’s appeals for public participation is an understanding of 
how he navigated the question of democratic authority, both his own and that of the public. 
Roosevelt’s body of speeches provide important context. As Mary Stuckey notes, Roosevelt’s 
appeals to the public affirmed that citizens had a strong role in decisions made on their behalf by 
the government and foregrounded the authority of the presidency; the result of which, Roosevelt 
argued, “empowered people,” and subsequently “granted authority to the national government 
and its president.”23 Roosevelt thus justified expansions to the authority of the presidency 
through appeals to the national interest and support. 24 Roosevelt often represented American 
                                                
21 Franklin Roosevelt, “Fireside Chat #7: Works Relief Program,” April 28, 1935; Series 1 Master 
Speech File, Box 21. Courtesy of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library and Museum website; version date 
2013.  
22 Ibid., 2. 
23 Stuckey, Voting Deliberatively, 91.  
24 Farrell, Norms of Rhetorical Culture, 88. Farrell argues Roosevelt cemented his own power through 
public support in his first Inaugural.  
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citizens as in support of his proposed New Deal policies. These appeals are typical of 
presidential invocations of public opinion, which Drury argues also function to navigate the 
demands of the public and affirm their agency.25 
Roosevelt presented himself as a medium of public agency. As Thomas Farrell argues, a 
“characteristic” of Roosevelt’s rhetoric was that he spoke not as himself but as the voice of the 
people—speaking “through the people to others.”26 If the president was the trusted agent to 
whom the public spoke and the primary means by which the public influenced policy; then the 
president’s duty was to seek to collect and translate the public expressions that revealed the 
public interest and then speak for his people. Roosevelt’s appeal to “think as a nation,” was 
carefully broad. Roosevelt commonly referred to the “public interest,” which encapsulates 
opinions, beliefs or values, but also the characteristics of citizens, common struggles, all under 
the same umbrella. It was not, that is, simply a collection of opinions expressed in letters that 
could be tallied. In constructing himself as a medium, Roosevelt emphasized the need for 
widespread and constant expressions of citizenly opinions to the White House. He also subtly 
positioned the people in a mass democracy as not always able to count themselves: they could be 
best counted if they spoke through the channel of the president. 
Roosevelt’s used two distinct strategies to call for letter writing as a responsibility of an 
actively engaged citizenry in his two fireside chats. In his 1935 address, Roosevelt invited direct 
oversight of the implementation of the Works Relief Program through citizen letters in order to 
                                                
25 Drury, Speaking with the People’s Voice, 9. This is characteristic of “invoked public opinion,” 
whereas Drury argues these appeals often both convey public support for a policy, and affirm the agency 
of the public.  
26 Farrell, Norms of Rhetorical Culture, 90, emphasis original.  
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ensure they were being adequately served.27 Here Roosevelt followed the pattern of summoning 
citizenly voices so that he could channel them. In his 1937 fireside chat, by contrast, Roosevelt 
called upon citizens to amplify his own voice by encouraging citizens to send letters not to him, 
but to congressional representatives, in order to generate support for an extraordinary session of 
Congress. If key to the pursuit of the national interest was public participation, from which 
Americans come to “think” and “feel” as a nation, Roosevelt’s call for citizens to send letters 
provided the basis for how they might speak, through or with him, as one. 28 
The 1935 fireside chat reporting on the implementation of the new Works Relief Program 
(WRP) called for citizenly participation to help assess the successes and failures of the program. 
Roosevelt called upon Americans to write letters as a feedback mechanism: through their letters, 
he suggested, the program could be evaluated and modified. In the 1935 fireside chat, Roosevelt 
argued that one of the main problems faced by New Deal programs were their scale and 
complexity. Knowing how they were working and what they were doing called for feedback 
from American citizens en masse. Roosevelt appealed to the need for magnitude, for more 
information and more letters as the best way to understand the importance and function of the 
WRP.  
Roosevelt argued that “it must, however, be recognized that when an enterprise of this 
character is extended over more than three thousand counties throughout the nation, there may be 
                                                
27Sussman, “FDR and the White House,” 14-15. On a number of occasions, Roosevelt also called 
upon the public to put pressure on the Senate or House, a tactic he learned as governor of New York. As 
governor, Sussman argues FDR regularly appealed to constituents via the radio in moments when the 
state Legislature was uncooperative to his agenda.  
28 Franklin Roosevelt, “Fireside Chat Discussing Legislation to Be Recommended to Extraordinary 
Session of Congress,” October 12, 1937. fireside chats of Franklin D. Roosevelt. Courtesy of the Franklin 
D. Roosevelt Library and Museum website; version date 2013. 
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occasional instances of inefficiency, bad management or misuse of funds.” 29 Roosevelt thus 
called for a response suited to the scale and complexity of the implementation of the program in 
the form of “the eternal vigilance of the American people themselves.”30 He continued, “I call 
upon my fellow citizens everywhere to cooperate with me in making this the most efficient and 
the cleanest example of pubic enterprise the world has ever seen.” 31 Hence, Roosevelt called for 
citizens to write letters to him as participants in a supervisory exercise:  
If you will help, this can be done. I therefore hope you will watch the work in 
every corner of this Nation. Feel free to criticize. Tell me of instances where work 
can be done better, or where improper practices prevail. Neither you nor I want 
criticism conceived in a purely fault finding or partisan spirit, but I am jealous of 
the right of every citizens to call to the attention of his or her government 
examples of how the public money can be more effectively spent for the benefit 
of the American people.32 
Citizens, Roosevelt argued, had already shown themselves capable of playing such a 
supervisory, critical role. If “the objective,” and thus the direction, of the country had changed 
from the time in which the “general good was at a discount,” Roosevelt attributed this change to 
the efforts of citizens.33 He celebrated, for example, the “three years of hard thinking” that 
characterized his first years in office, during which “more and more people, because of clearer 
thinking and a better understanding are considering the whole rather than a mere part relating to 
                                                
29 Roosevelt “Works Relief Program,” 9. 
30 Ibid., 9-10. 
31 Ibid., 10. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid. 
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one section or to one crop, or to one industry.”34 This was important because he alone could not 
ensure success. He noted “the most difficult place in the world to get a clear open perspective of 
the country as a whole is Washington.”35 Washington, he suggested, comprised a kind of echo 
chamber that needed to be opened up to new channels of communication. 
In contrast, Roosevelt did recognize the limitations of the public in seeing the whole. 
Even as he argued for citizens to “think as a nation,” he frequently conceded that this was 
difficult for citizens in practice. This was true of evaluating the WRP, which he compared to the 
“building of a ship,” where “when one of these ships is under construction, and the steel frames 
have been set in the keel, it is difficult for a person who does not know ships to tell how it will 
finally look.”36 Roosevelt appealed to the sense of Roosevelt therefore presented the presidency 
as the primary means through which the public could begin to see the whole. The president, 
much like the ship builder, could “get away from the trees” in order to “look at the whole forest,” 
and “see the country in long-range perspective.” 37 Letter writers he declared, should thus “call to 
attention,” or “tell me,” of their experiences.38  
The perceived intimacy of the radio address supported the view of Roosevelt as having a 
deeply personal relationship with citizens.39 In this regard, calling for letters in the voice of 
                                                
34 Ibid., 2. 
35 Ibid., 3. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid., 10. 
39 Elvin T. Lim, “The Lion and the Lamb: De-Mythologising Franklin Roosevelt’s Fireside Chats,” 
Rhetoric & Public Affairs 6 (2003), 437-464. I use “perceived” intimacy here deliberately. As Elvin Lim 
has argued, Roosevelt’s rhetoric is not particularly intimate. Regardless, however, there was and remains 
a perception of this intimacy. In these two Fireside addresses, in addition, it is clear in how Roosevelt 
framed letters to citizens as intimate expressions. Stuckey argues Roosevelt is an example of a shift 
towards personalized politics in the sense that the candidate, and their personality become central. 
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individual citizens completed a system of perceived intimacies. It was not simply that Roosevelt 
reinforced his own authority through the public, but also that he presented the presidency as 
intimately beholden to the public. Roosevelt argued that the executive branch held a unique 
relationship to the public: “there are, after all, only two positions in the nation that are filled by 
vote of all of the voters.” 40 This position, Roosevelt argued, came with a corresponding “duty” 
to speak “to and for” the American people.41 In this context, Roosevelt encouraged citizens to 
write and express their concerns and opinions to be channeled by the president for the common 
interest. This citizenly supervision of government activities was the means for citizens to bond 
with their government leader. 
 Roosevelt’s October 12, 1937 fireside chat “On New Legislation” did not contain as 
explicit a call for letters. In the address, Roosevelt discussed his proposal to convene an 
extraordinary session of Congress in order to consider the renewal and expansion of New Deal 
legislation six weeks before the regular session was set to begin. Accounts from staff members 
suggest the purpose of the speech was to motivate citizens to send letters to Congress, and thus 
put pressure on congressional representatives to support both the extra session and the new 
programs to be discussed.42 Roosevelt was already facing accusations in Congress about 
executive overreach with respect to the implementation of the New Deal. He used the 1937 
fireside chat to call for citizens to support him in his battle against Congress. This was made all 
                                                                                                                                                       
Roosevelt in particular cultivated a perception of a close relationship with citizens. See Stuckey, Voting 
Deliberatively, 63.  
40 Roosevelt “Works Relief Program,” 3. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Sussman, “FDR and the White House,” 14. Sussman cites a number of accounts from staff 
members that suggest this tactic was intentional, including a quote about a 1944 fireside chat to veto a tax 
Bill in which Roosevelt reportedly remarked “I’m going to put it right up the housewife” to “hold the 
boys in line better than I can.” 
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the more salient by the opponents to the extraordinary session of Congress who claimed such a 
session was anti-democratic—yet another example, according to his critics, of the president’s 
heavy-handed approach. 43 
Roosevelt began the speech on a familiar theme. He emphasized the importance of his 
office, where “for a President, especially, it is a duty to think in national terms.”44 He reiterated 
that “first-hand knowledge of the nation as a whole” was indispensable for “anyone charged with 
proposing or judging national policies.” In this case, the term “anyone” did significant work for 
Roosevelt. Congressional representatives, he suggested, by virtue of their office did not have a 
duty to serve the national interest so much as their smaller constituencies. The presidency, by 
contrast, demanded a view of the whole. Roosevelt, for example, refers to “hearing certain 
people [in Washington] talk and talk about all that Government ought not to do.” If these people 
were to, like Roosevelt, “go out through the country and feel the common wisdom that the time 
to repair the roof is when the sun is shining,” they would find that “they [the people] do not look 
on Government as an interloper in their affairs. On the contrary, they regard it as the most 
effective form of organized self-help.”45 Here congressional representatives were presented as 
not only partial in their view of national crises, but as out of touch. 
In appealing to Americans for their support for the extraordinary session, Roosevelt 
invoked the support of an “overwhelming majority of our citizens” for New Deal programs. The 
New Deal, he suggested, was the consensus position. Americans knew what was going on, and 
what was needed: they realized “these facts [of continued economic struggle]. That is why they 
                                                
43 Stuckey, Voting Deliberatively, 9. Stuckey argues for the very real perceptions and fears of 
executive overreach. 
44 Roosevelt, “Fireside Chat Discussing Legislation.” 
45 Ibid. 
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ask Government not to stop governing simply because prosperity has come back a long way.” 
Roosevelt asserted that the presidency, when coupled with the support of the majority, comprised 
the “twentieth-century machinery” of government. The will of an active public channeled 
through a strong executive, he implied, represented a new and proper reconfiguration of political 
authority for the age of mass democracy. 
The assumption then was that the president knew what the consensus position of the 
public was. Roosevelt based this claim to knowledge of the aggregate public interest primarily 
through repetition. Roosevelt referred to varied engagement with the public in personal ways. 
For example, he noted “again this year I have taken trips to all parts of the country.” Over and 
over again he invoked the authority of national opinion linked directly to the means by which he 
knew it to be so. For example, the “outstanding impression” of public support for “the broad 
objectives and policies” of the New Deal, he argued, was “gained on this recent trip to the 
Pacific Coast and back.” Roosevelt justified raising wages for low-income laborers based on a 
“recent trip,” in which “many people have talked to me about the millions of men and women 
and children who still work at insufficient wages and overlong hours.” Notably, for all the ways 
in which his administration embraced and utilized social scientific methods of data collection 
and analysis, his claims to know public opinion here were largely anecdotal in nature. They scale 
up to a sense of the public interest, however, through frequent repetition to these examples. 
These purported conversations added up into public consensus through Roosevelt. 
Congress, therefore, was not only out of touch with the majority, but needed to hear from 
the people, as he had. “I shall ask this special session to consider immediately certain important 
legislation which my recent trip through the nation convinces me the American people 
immediately need.” Ultimately, then, it is the people of the United States, and not Roosevelt 
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himself, who need to start speaking up to Congress. If congressmen will not “go out through the 
country,” then citizens should send letters to make their voice heard. 
Thus, while the 1937 fireside chat did not contain an explicit call for letters to be written 
to congressional representatives, it was clear that in the address Roosevelt was confronting the 
limits of the vision of the executive branch he had established in his 1935 fireside chat. It was 
not enough, after all, for the president alone to channel and execute the public interest. Congress 
needed to participate in the processes of the “twentieth-century machinery” of government too. 
By arguing that the congressional vision was narrow and out of touch, Roosevelt implicitly 
called for citizens to remedy the problem by speaking to, and writing, congressmen—if not to 
bring Congress into the machinery of government, then at least to keep them from halting it. 
Intimate Accounting: Describing the President’s “Mail Bag” 
Letters are a personal medium. Letter-writing campaigns, however, would seem to be, by 
definition, an impersonal form of advocacy—they are there to be counted, not read. The 
Roosevelt administration was well aware of this dilemma. On the one hand, they wanted to claim 
the authority of the people’s voice via letters; on the other hand, they risked appearing to be a 
vast collection agency. Roosevelt’s calls to send letters as a means of understanding and 
channeling national sentiment and majority opinion made the administration’s public stance on 
letters all the more significant, and, as we will see, controversial. A clear exemplar of how the 
administration framed the significance of letters, and navigated the tensions of their counting, 
was Presidential Secretary Louis Howe’s 1934 article in the American Magazine. The article was 
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billed largely as a “day in the life” of the handling of presidential mail, covering an array of 
topics from types of letters to the sorting process and security for suspicious packages.46 
In the article, Howe positioned letters as a means of understanding the public interests 
and sentiment in the aggregate and as a means of bonding with the president. At issue here, 
Howe suggested, were two forms of democratic political authority: that of authorized procedures 
for quantitatively analyzing the influx of letters, and that of authentic connections between the 
people and the president. The former impersonally navigated volume and the latter personally 
navigated relationships. Letters to the White House, Howe suggested, are and are not counted. 
Howe depicted the sheer volume of letters sent to the White House on a daily basis as an 
indication of the president’s popularity. He celebrated, “everyone writes to the President these 
days,” noting that even “ordinary citizens are evidently doing so for the first time.” 47 He 
contrasted the large number of letters sent to Roosevelt with the relatively small number of 
letters sent to previous presidents, attributing the dramatic uptick in the volume of letters not 
only to the popularity of the president but to the “consciousness of the United States citizens of 
their own part in the Government and of an actual intimate bond between themselves and the 
man in the mansion on Pennsylvania Avenue.” 48 White House mail processing, therefore, Howe 
suggested, required a delicate balancing act between making aggregate assessments to gauge 
public and intimate connections between people and their president.  
It came down, he argued, to a process that began with the president’s staff of mail clerks, 
who could not only quickly categorize letters, but could also from long practice “quickly 
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separate the most important communications.” 49 Howe noted, for example, “the most important 
Presidential mail and letters addressed to me as secretary are carried to Mr. Smith’s desk.”50 The 
important letters, Howe reassured the public, were not just matters of official business. They 
were matters of intimate connections, coming not so much from powerful people but from the 
ordinary citizen. Howe detailed, for example, that, “it is the scrawled, perhaps illiterate, but 
always sincere note from the obscure persona which interests President Roosevelt most.” 51 Thus, 
Howe implied that White House mail processing was first and foremost a means of making sure 
that the people could authentically connect with their president. 
At the same time, Howe argued letters represented “the most important data from which 
to find the course of most direct benefit,” and the “most perfect index to the state of mind of the 
people.” 52 He thus carefully explained how letters become data to the White House, so as to be 
translated into action. Howe noted, for example, that the “President likes to see a cross section of 
the daily mail.” Roosevelt “has always insisted that he be sent daily a batch of letters picked at 
random from the miscellaneous mail.” 53 The language of “randomness” here spoke to the social 
scientific sensibility of the Roosevelt administration. Indeed, Howe went further to emphasize 
the power of “chance,” writing “there is always a chance” that the ordinary citizen’s letter “will 
be picked out of the mail and given to the President to read.” 54 Thus, Howe suggested that while 
the content of the letters was understood broadly, they were still valued as individual 
expressions.  
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Howe’s careful navigation of the aggregate public and the value of reading of individual 
letters was further emphasized in his descriptions of the impact of the letters. “More letters than 
you’d think out of such a large mail,” Howe celebrated, “come either directly or indirectly to the 
attention of the President himself.”55 The “indirect” attention gestured broadly to the perceptions 
formed by mail clerks in the reading, and in the brief. By collapsing the “indirect” attention with 
the direct, Howe was able to again draw attention to the importance of each individual letter. He 
went on to describe Roosevelt’s devotion to the ordinary citizen, for example, through “how 
frequently the President stops his daily work either to send a little personal note in reply or to 
direct that the sender’s request be granted if possible,” a practice Howe called “amazing.”56 
Howe echoed the vague “indirect” process of attention in the use of letters, where “some of these 
letters have undoubtedly influenced the President directly or indirectly in deciding his course.” 57 
The “indirect” attention became more concrete in letters on the New Deal, in which “the whole 
letter, or at least a summary, reaches the President’s desk.” 58 And yet, summary still provided 
little detail about the actual counting. Howe did not provide details of the process of analysis 
completed on letters, much of which undoubtedly accounted for the “indirect” influence.  
The direct and indirect attention reinforced Roosevelt’s role to understand and channel the public 
interest. It also presented the public interest as grounded in many encounters between Roosevelt 
(rather than the mail clerks) and the public.  
The subtlety of the language of counting was important, not just for this construction of 
the public, but also to maintain Howe’s second purpose in casting the letters as a reflection of the 
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authentic and intimate relationship each citizen had with the President of the United States. 
Howe began by offering an intimate vision of the letters describing key details describing the 
letters, the writers, and their locales. He vividly described letters that were “scribbled on butcher 
paper or ruled pages torn from a cheap pad.” 59 Similarly, on the writers, it was “the small 
merchant, or the country storekeeper, or the workman in a city factory, or the farmer on a worn-
out New England homestead,” who sent letters that were “read carefully by the secretaries.”60  
Elaborate description is also a means of creating a sense of magnitude, a way of adding weight to 
a particular issue. This strategy, when accompanied by a more quantitative claim to magnitude, 
humanizes what might otherwise seem like an impersonal process.61  
Howe relied further on such rich description to reinforce the intimacy of the relationship 
between Roosevelt and the average citizen by portraying letters as a joyous break from the duties 
of the presidency. He described colorfully seeing Roosevelt “spend precious moments poring 
over letters,” after which he “[directed] special attention or replies to the writers.” 62 These 
descriptions portrayed a vision of the importance of letters to Roosevelt through each individual 
citizen’s expression. Howe provided specifics of the letter writers that ground this relationship, 
but were broad enough to which a larger category of citizens might identify with the workman or 
the storekeeper. 
The intimacy of the letters was also evident in the letters that Howe suggested Roosevelt 
did not read, or at least not carefully. Letters that focused on “plans, plans and plans,” for 
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example, “must be read.” 63 And yet, they were not likely to be read by Roosevelt unless they 
represented unique ideas. Instead, “a brief abstract is made of it.” 64 Howe was careful not to 
outright condemn these types of letters, but offered subtle commentary about letters that were 
less helpful for the President, or less likely to receive attention. In addition to the subtle dig in the 
repetition of “plans,” Howe carefully described how Roosevelt “directed” attention to plans, but 
it was because he was “undiscouraged by the fact that most such plans have been either 
anticipated by some project actually underway or thoroughly considered and rejected.” 65 These 
plans were not often helpful, though certainly Roosevelt held to his duty regardless. Notably, 
“pressure mail” in form letters directed from organizations was the only type of letter Howe 
unilaterally condemned and labeled as “virtually the only letters coming to the White House 
which are not really read.”66 Howe went on to describe the treatment of such letters, where “if 
we are really interested in the matter they discuss, we pile them up and estimate from the size of 
the stacks, the extent of the sentiment for or against.” 67 Howe conveyed the process of tallying 
as a rough, careless analysis.  
In contrast, readers were left with the assurance that “the rest of the mail is read—really 
read,” on the basis of the value that Roosevelt placed on “a personal letter,” from “the farmer or 
miner or little shopkeeper.” 68 These less helpful letters stood in stark contrast to the intimacy of 
the letters to be celebrated. Citizens were encouraged, instead, to write letters that reflected the 
intimacy of their bond with Roosevelt. The letters from the “New England homestead” or the 
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“workman in a city factory,” were intriguing because they focused on “the problems confronting 
the writer, or his viewpoint on some of the proposed items in the New Deal program.”69 
Similarly, letters that reflected “the viewpoints of men whose daily lives and fortunes were most 
affected by the problems” were said to be of particular value to the President. Howe similarly 
emphasized the value in letters that eschewed overt political arguments. “But where the request 
is obviously sincere, and not for the purpose of getting a letter back from the President,” Howe 
noted, “it is almost certain to receive the President’s personal attention.” 70 The contrast between 
the intimate bond of the “important” letters and their content specific to the experiences of the 
ordinary citizen individualized the letters in relation to FDR. In the process, Howe centered the 
significance of being counted as one of the “6,500” letters every day through the lens of a 
personal correspondence with Roosevelt, rather than through their relationship with the 6,499 
other citizens who sent letters. Counting, after all, was and was not the desired outcome. 
Debating the Sorting Process 
Roosevelt’s calls to write letters became a point of contention for the Republican 
National Committee (RNC) in September 1936. The RNC released a statement that took issue 
with how the “million” letters sent to the White House on the Federal Emergency Relief 
Administration (FERA) and the Works Progress Administration (WPA) were handled. These 
letters made up a significant percentage of the presidential mail, and they were often sorted 
directly to the agencies in question. The sorting process was made more salient by the significant 
scrutiny on the WPA over accusations of grift by local administrators. Republicans pressured 
Roosevelt to turn over detailed records about workers for public oversight, which the 
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administration denied on privacy concerns. The RNC continued these attacks on Roosevelt and 
FERA through a different tactic, the mail from citizens about the agency, which would surely 
reveal the grift and ineffectiveness. The statement, however, focused far more on attacking 
Roosevelt on the grounds of sorting the mail, and thus failing to be accessible to the average 
citizen rather than the departments. The RNC argued mail sorting procedures made letters to 
Roosevelt a “futile” endeavor. 71 At the same time, they constructed sorting as a betrayal of the 
intimacy of letters to Roosevelt, reaffirming the tensions between counting and the bond with 
citizens put forward by the administration.  
The RNC statement placed significant emphasis on counting the letters as an aggregate 
and as a reflection of trends in the letters in order to demonstrate the flaws in the sorting process. 
This began with an appeal to the scale of letters ignored. For example, they argued that “the 
millions of Americans who wrote to their President at his invitation and received form letter 
answers will know the truth” on the “futility” of letter writing. 72 The statement also touted an 
“analysis” of the White House mail on FERA and the WPA over the course of a week sorted by 
topic. For example, they offered precise counts of the “83.3 per cent,” that consisted of 
“complaints about the WPA program in general, or the handling by relief officials of individual 
cases and specific instances with includes evidence of W.P.A. extravagance, politics, coercion, 
etc.” 73 The purpose of including such percentages was to showcase that all such subjects were 
treated largely the same. They argued that “the President has made no effort to see that these 
letters received any consideration; that in fact, they were treated in the same manner as 
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unsolicited ‘crank’ letters.”74 In spite of Roosevelt’s invitation, “sixty-five percent of them were 
routed by clerks to the WPA and FERA.” 75 Ultimately, these percentages aimed to showcase the 
importance of the material being ignored and to call for the letters to be read and responded to. It 
was therefore an argument for being counted, and counted better.  
In addition to counting, the RNC similarly positioned letters as a personal 
correspondence to President Roosevelt, rather than the White House more broadly. The 
statement specified that letters were written to the President specifically, where “approximately 
75 percent” of the million letters were “addressed to the President or to Mrs. Roosevelt,” and still 
“sent to the correspondence division of the W.P.A. and F.E.R.A.”76 This was a betrayal of 
intention, the statement argued, where “many of the letters written to the President of the United 
States,” were written “in the belief that the writer was speaking in confidence to the nation’s 
executive.” 77 The problem, then, was more than just counting. The letters, the RNC argued, were 
written to Roosevelt, not to the White House. The betrayal was made more significant because of 
Roosevelt’s own appeals to “write to me” in his various radio addresses. “Many of these sincere 
citizens who attempted to communicate with the President,” argued the committee, did so “at his 
solicitation.”78 The RNC contrasted these appeals with the response, where for example “twice 
the President has invited the public over the radio to write to him,” on foreclosures, after which 
“the thousands of letters written to the President in response to this invitation were promptly sent 
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to the FERA office.” 79 The RNC subsequently argued that letters about corruption and grift were 
merely being diverted back to the officials undertaking such corruption through the process of 
sending letters to departments. The RNC reiterated that neither did the President respond which 
meant “the only consideration given these earnest and sincere men and women from all over the 
country who responded to the request of the Chief executive to place their suggestions and 
problems before him, was a cursory reply from a clerk or petty official.”80 Like Howe, the RNC 
framed the letters as a recognition of an intimate relationship with Roosevelt.  
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have argued that Roosevelt called for letters to the White House as a 
way to both better gauge the “public interest” and to project intimate connections with citizens. 
He navigated the challenges of political authority in twentieth-century American mass 
democracy by asserting the competency of the White House in enacting authorized procedures 
for aggregating and rendering the public will; and presenting letter-writing as a form of 
authentically communicating with the president.  
In the process, Roosevelt advanced two distinct visions of letters in relation to public 
opinion. Letters were an aggregate that could be added, if not counted, to speak to the public 
interest. At the same time, letters were deeply personal and reflective of an intimate bond. In his 
overt calls for letters, Roosevelt brought these two visions together by building an aggregate of 
individual and personal encounters. The RNC, ironically, did not challenge this rhetoric—to the 
contrary, they reinforced these same arguments about the significance of the letters. Despite their 
opposition to Roosevelt, they affirmed the ends if not the methods by which the president was to 
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navigate the tensions between the individual and the aggregate. They reinforced his characteristic 
call to speak “to, and for” the American people by centering the executive branch as uniquely 
charged with counting, and listening to, citizens.  
In the process, Roosevelt provided a distinct vision of the rhetorical presidency that 
moves beyond an accountability to the public, or even references to public support. Roosevelt 
grounded his authority in his ability to collect, understand, and channel the public interest into 
action. Roosevelt’s depiction of the process of understanding the public interest through many, 
but still largely personal encounters with citizens or their letters placed the emphasis on who 
does the counting, over questions of who should be counted, and how that preoccupied 
suffragists. Roosevelt’s rhetorical construction of magnitude is far more concerned with scale 
than strict quantity. One individual’s letter could be scaled up in its importance through the 
uniqueness and substance of description to speak to a much broader issue. 
If suffragists demonstrated the potential to debate who should be counted, and how those 
counts should be compared, Roosevelt’s reliance on the traditional means of gathering public 
opinion was precisely what made his view of the public difficult to refute. Frank Stec argues 
citizen claims using numerical measures rely on a transparent process by which those numbers 
are produced, both in the methods and analysis.81 The discussions of these methods has 
significant implications for how citizens might engage with presidential invocations of public 
opinion. FDR’s negotiation of authority through the tensions between individual and aggregate 
views of the letter constrained the potential for debates over what it means to be counted through 
civic action. Roosevelt’s calls for public sentiment productively extend Drury’s call to study 
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“invoked public opinion.”82 His aim to understand the purpose of presidential invocations make 
his broad understanding of invocations of opinion independent from particular channels through 
which they might be measured appropriate. In keeping with Drury’s approach, I do not intend to 
argue for the effectiveness of one measure over another. My analysis, however, shows that close 
attention to the “modes of expression” that might accompany invocations of public opinion are 
key to the potential for substantive engagement by citizens. In the midst of the proliferation of 
surveys, polls, and other quantitative forms of opinion, the Roosevelt administration laid the 
groundwork for the political authority of counting by asserting that it can be simultaneously a 
process that is authorized and official as well as authentic and personal.  
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CHAPTER 4: “ONE [AFRICAN AMERICAN] NATION, UNDER GOD”: COUNTING 
AND VISIONS OF TRANSFORMATION IN THE 1995 MILLION MAN MARCH 
 
Crowd size is notoriously difficult to estimate, and has long been contested by 
movements, journalists, politicians, and the general public.1 The Million Man March remains a 
consistent touchstone for debates about crowd size because of the fervor of the debate, even 20 
odd years later. Newspapers listed figures ranging from 800,000 to 1.2 million. According to the 
National Park Service, the October 16, 1995 Million Man March would have more accurately 
been named the 400,000 Man March. Some argued that even 400,000 was an overestimate.2 In 
the middle of his keynote speech at the event, Louis Farrakhan—the leader of the Nation of 
Islam and the figurehead of the march— declared the attendance upwards of “two to three 
million.” He threatened to sue over the low count. In an anthology celebrating the march, a 
student organizer suggested that the low estimates were proof that “this system still sees us a 3/5 
of a man.”3 The vitriol over the crowd size prompted the U.S. House to remove funding for 
crowd estimates in a 1996 appropriations bill for the Department of the Interior that allowed the 
National Park Service to decline to count crowd size.4 A staffer responsible for the provision 
                                                
1 Susan Herbst, Numbered Voices: How Opinion Polling Has Shaped American Politics (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2001), 135-137.  
2 See for example, Boston University Center for Remote Sensing, “Million Man March,” Boston 
University, http://www.bu.edu/remotesensing/research/completed/million-man-march/ 
3 Calvin R. Atkins, “The Epiphany,” in Million Man March/Day of Absence: Commemorative 
Anthology, eds. Haki R Madhubuti and Maulana Karenga (Chicago, IL: Third World Press, 1996), 71. 
4 The National Park Service was previously obligated to release crowd size estimates for all events on 
park land. This included the National Mall, a frequent location for marches across the history of American 
civic participation. Those estimates would be left to private companies, organizers, or at times, police 
agencies, and would continue to inspire significant debate. 
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suggested naively of crowd counts, “in the end, the legacy from the Million Man March might 
simply be that we have one less thing to argue about.”5  
 The debates over the head count at the Million Man March were part of a more 
substantial debate about Farrakhan as both a figurehead for the march and the African American 
community. As John L. Pauley succinctly puts it, much of the controversy in the lead up to the 
march focused on the “coupling and uncoupling of the message of the march with its 
messenger.”6 Farrakhan was condemned not only by politicians and the predominantly white 
mainstream media, but also civil rights organizations, black feminist organizations, and Jewish 
organizations for his anti-Semitic, sexist, and homophobic comments both before and after the 
march. A few days before the march, he gave an interview with Reuters in which he argued 
Jewish people had purchased homes in African American neighborhoods, deeming them 
“bloodsuckers,” who “took from our community and built their community.”7 During and after 
the Million Man March, various civil rights leaders lauded the “spirit” of the march, but argued 
the meaning of the march was distinct from Farrakhan’s message. Paradoxically, the attempt to 
distance Farrakhan from the march meant that much of the media framing of the march focused 
substantially on Farrakhan, negative or otherwise.8 
Yet separating the message of the march from the words of its most prominent 
spokesperson was difficult to do if for no other reason than that Farrakhan would not let it be so. 
                                                
5 Jason Alderman, “Here’s Why We’ll Never Know How Many People Attended The 
Inauguration.” The Huffington Post, February 27, 2017. 
6 John L. Pauley II, “Reshaping Public Persona and the Prophetic Ethos: Louis Farrakhan at the 
Million Man March,” Western Journal of Communication 62, no. 4 (1998): 512.  
7 He extended the practice to “Palestinian Arabs,” “Koreans,” and “Vietnamese,” who he reiterated 
were “bloodsuckers.” 
8 S. Craig Watson, “Framing Protest: News Media Frames of the Million Man March,” Critical 
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He offered himself as its most important interpreter through an appeal to superior vision. For its 
attendees and the watching public, the debates about crowd size at the Million Man March were 
inseparable from debates over the messenger and the message. Farrakhan joined civic myths to 
mysticism and discourses of nationhood to argue for the transformative power of the Million 
Man March. And he did this by counting—counting, ultimately, to oneness, which for him was 
inseparable from nationhood. He positioned the magnitude of the march as an indication of a 
transformation more than a representation of the black community. Counting was a means of 
divination, revelation, and ultimately transformation. In this chapter, I consider how Farrakhan 
counted so as to show what he counted: one nation within a nation. 
The implications of Farrakhan’s preoccupation with oneness for understanding the 
rhetoric of counting in the broader dissertation are twofold. First, Farrakhan’s link between 
“one” as a key number in numerology and his subsequent focus on oneness of the nation function 
to reinforce the process of creating unity. For Farrakhan, gathering in one space at one time 
allowed for a moral and civic transformation of black men aimed to create a sense of the one 
nation. Second, oneness and the logic of nationhood represent a unique form of counting not 
quite encapsulated by appeals to quantity, degree, or even the more amorphous sense of the 
aggregate for Roosevelt or the majoritarian logics of the suffragists. Counting mattered to 
Farrakhan in ways that no pollster could measure or comprehend. They mattered because in the 
end, only one number mattered: the number one.  
Calling for the March: The Message, the Messenger, and the Million Man 
One of the many promotional posters for the Million Man March called for black men to 
attend the October 1995 march by emphasizing the significance of the “million,” urging 
marchers to “BE THERE. BE COUNTED.” Calls from organizers, most centrally Farrakhan and 
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Reverend Benjamin Chavis Jr., provided a vision of the march that focused on Farrakhan’s 
vision of spiritual renewal and atonement for African American men. He called for women, 
children, and black men who for one reason or another could not attend the march to take part in 
the “Day of Absence” by refraining from work and all other obligations. And like the early 
censuses, it was only men who would be counted. Farrakhan did not directly include women in 
the ritualistic display. “Mothers and daughters” Farrakhan argued, were called to “aid us in this 
march by staying at home with the children teaching them in sympathy with what your black 
men have finally decided to do.”9 That vision would not remain uncontested. In addition to the 
push for more concrete policy goals by other civil rights leaders, Farrakhan faced opposition 
from a number of fronts, each of which aimed to offer an interpretation of the significance of the 
march and Farrakhan’s role. Not surprisingly, Farrakhan’s vision of the march and the 
importance of the crowd as a way to unify and renew the African American community was 
challenged by those that aimed to disassociate the significance of the “million man” in the crowd 
from Farrakhan himself.  
Farrakhan’s vision of the Million Man March focused substantially on demonstrating to 
the outside world the dignity of black men. He formally announced the Million Man March in 
the December 14, 1994 issue of the Final Call, the official newspaper of the Nation of Islam. In 
his call for attendees, he cited the “mounting force of hate” and announced, “we therefore have 
deemed it necessary in this critical hour to call for one million disciplined, committed and 
dedicated black men, from all walks of life in America, to march in Washington, D.C.—showing 
the world a vastly different picture of the black male.”10 The “picture” of the black male was a 
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recurring theme for Farrakhan. The march was aimed at disputing stereotypes about the black 
male to external audiences. In an appearance on Larry King Live, for example, Farrakhan noted 
the tendency “to look at the black male as a criminal.” He told King, “our march on Washington 
is to say we are not that.”11 At the same time, Farrakhan argued that African Americans needed 
to look internally at their own communities to address chronic crises like rising crime rates and 
absent fathers. A promotional flyer for the march succinctly captured this balancing act, 
declaring the aim of the event was “to show America and ourselves” that the African American 
community was dedicated to these values. Attendance at the march, Farrakhan argued, would 
thus display a new “picture” of black men to the (white) world while functioning as a mirror for 
the black community to see itself.  
Farrakhan’s summons to the march focused largely on community rather than specific 
political issues or demands. Over time, however, he was pushed to attach a more specific agenda 
to the march. Three key issues were featured in organizing and promotional materials about the 
march: solutions to the issues of the “black family and community development,” voting rights 
and affirmative action, and economic reinvestment in the African American community.12 
Farrakhan saw the first goal—family and community—as nearest to the core purpose of the 
march. He returned over and over again to themes of self-respect and self-responsibility with a 
renewed emphasis on the black man’s role in the family. The march would later receive a third 
title that reflected these aims, in addition to the “Day of Absence” and the “Million Man March,” 
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the march came to be known as a “Holy Day of Atonement.” Chavis, a co-organizer of the 
march, called it a “march in Washington” not a “march on Washington” in contrast with a protest 
that he implied would make them “dependent on government programs” as opposed to building 
within their own community.13  
The focus on “ourselves,” however, could not downplay the importance of the marchers 
to the external white audiences—as Farrakhan framed it, the outside (especially white) world 
functioned as necessary witnesses to the rite of atonement. In Final Call, Farrakhan introduced 
the aims of the march as a demonstration of the atonement: 
We are calling on all able-bodied black men to set aside a day, October 16, 1996 
for a historic March on Washington to declare to the Government of America and 
the world that we are ready to take our place as the head of our families and our 
communities and that we, as black men, are ready to shoulder the responsibility of 
being the maintainers of our women and children and builders of our 
communities.14  
It was not simply that Farrakhan, as a spiritual leader, sought to argue for black men to take 
responsibility, but rather that they must demonstrate this responsibility to a watching world. At 
the center of both the spiritual and rhetorical logic of the Million Man March was ritualistic 
renewal achieved through enumeration. 
Criticisms of Farrakhan’s call for the Million Man March began soon after the initial 
announcement. His history of anti-Semitism, homophobia and sexism was a major focus. Chavis 
was similarly controversial. The former Executive Director of the NAACP, Chavis was forced to 
resign from his position in 1994 for using organizational funds to settle sexual harassment 
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claims. Black feminists provided some of the most substantial critiques, condemning the march’s 
focus on men and the gendered hierarchy it entailed and endorsed.15  
Still, many critics also wanted to express sympathy for the plight of black men in the 
United States and sought ways, as Pauley suggests, to differentiate between the message and its 
main messenger while still affirming the need for the march.16 Over and over prominent Civil 
Rights leaders condemned Farrakhan, but justified their support for or involvement in the march 
based on its positive aims. For example, the Washington Post ran a story two days before the 
march with the lead “March Foes Assail Leaders, Not Aims.”17 Mary Frances Berry, chairperson 
for the US Commission on Civil Rights, refused to endorse the march, declaring, “I do not 
support the leadership of Mr. Farrakhan and Benjamin Chavis.” At the same time, she expressed 
sympathy for the march’s importance for black men as a positive affirming activity she called 
“crucial.”18 
 Upon the occasion of the march itself critics did more than just distance Farrakhan from 
the message; they also attempted to dissociate Farrakhan from the size of the gathering. 
Farrakhan had long been leader of the Nation of Islam and the success of the march, for some, 
threatened to vault him to the forefront of the public stage for the African American community 
more broadly. Critics therefore sought to describe the spirit and motivations of those gathered as 
independent of the leadership of Farrakhan. Colin Powell refused to appear at the march for fear 
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of giving credibility to Farrakhan’s leadership. He did not hesitate, however, to explain its 
meaning: “what you're seeing in Washington today are hundreds of thousands of black men 
coming together not to celebrate Louis Farrakhan or to buy into his agenda . . . but to begin to 
uplift black men and uplift African Americans to be part of an inclusive America.” Powell 
added, “we should let those hundreds of thousands of men make their own decision” rather than 
assuming they affirm Farrakhan.19 Farrakhan’s supporters—many of whom were present at the 
march—insisted that neither the march nor its message could be separated from its leader. 
Debates over Farrakhan’s role in inspiring or even shaping the marchers continued well 
after the march. Reverend Willie Wilson, one of the organizers of the march, celebrated the 
“unseen presence” that drove the incredible assembly in spite of the “undermanned, 
underfunded, unorganized efforts to make something happen.”20 Haki Madhubuti, a prominent 
black writer and poet, introduced the commemorative anthology on the Million Man March by 
celebrating that “one-twentieth of the black male population responded with a fired up yes to the 
MMM/DOA call,” but downplayed Farrakhan and the other speakers. 21 He argued “the great 
majority of men,” during the march, “focused on themselves and each other rather than the 
speaker’s platform.” 22 Even if the audience wanted to listen, Madhubuti noted, “due to the 
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numbers and the inadequate video and audio systems, it was just about impossible to hear or see 
all that was coming from the speaker’s platform.”23  
Journalists turned to polling to attempt to find an empirical answer that answered the 
question of the significance of Farrakhan to the march. The Washington Post released a poll a 
week before the event that aimed to definitely settle the question of Farrakhan’s influence on the 
marchers and their desire to attend the event. The story concluded “many of those who approve 
of the march voice strong reservations about Farrakhan,” and noted that “84% of blacks 
surveyed,” thought the march was a good idea, but nearly half had a negative impression of 
Farrakhan.” 24 The Washington Post sent pollsters to the march in order to collect data about the 
attitudes of its participants. Survey questions included questions about views on Farrakhan prior 
to the march, whether they approved of the message of the march, and whether their attitudes had 
changed after the march.25 The survey indicated “it was the message and not the march's most 
prominent messenger that brought these black men and a handful of women and whites to the 
nation's capital.”26 Not surprisingly, supporters of Farrakhan rebutted that the sheer size of the 
gathering was proof positive of Farrakhan’s leadership strength. 
Subsequent articles citing the Washington Post poll, for example, suggested that in spite 
of the survey results that showed Farrakhan had not necessarily been the primary motivation for 
attendance, he was in fact quite popular among marchers, and that they were willing or even 
enthusiastic to see him take a larger role “as an emerging force in national politics” as a result of 
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the march.27 The Post concluded that “Farrakhan was clearly the star of yesterday's march,” with 
“9 out of 10 men” who held a favorable impression. Those who attended the march, they noted, 
“were far more willing to see Nation of Islam leader Louis Farrakhan assume a more prominent 
leadership role in the African American community.” Lu Palmer, a journalist and civil rights 
leader argued that “a vacuum in national black leadership” had helped Farrakhan emerge as “the 
preeminent leader in the black community today.” He had won the “confidence” of black men 
and “will gain greatly and the Nation [of Islam] will gain greatly.”28 The Anti-Defamation 
League agreed, taking issue with the strategy of affirming the message while questioning or 
repudiating the messenger. In an official statement they wrote, “It’s an illusion for people to feel 
that they can participate and endorse this march without in any way showing support for 
Farrakhan.”29 
President Clinton addressed the matter the morning of the march while on a stop in 
Texas. He applauded the message of “atonement” but condemned Farrakhan. He suggested that 
Farrakhan’s presence made the march more about “disunity” and separatism, when what was 
needed was unity. Clinton implicitly called for the march participants to separate themselves 
from Farrakhan. “One million men are right to stand up for personal responsibility,” he argued, 
“but one million men do not make right one man’s message of malice and division.” The 
president argued that there were not “two Americas,” citing the US’s motto: “E Pluribus Unum, 
out of many, we are one.” Indeed, Clinton suggested that at issue in the march was support for 
the leader of the Nation of Islam: “Let us pray that those who have spoken for hatred and 
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division in the past will turn away from that past and give voice to the true message of those 
ordinary Americans who march,” he declared. “If that happens, the men and the women who are 
there with them will be marching into better lives.” Ironically in making these arguments, 
Clinton replicated the very themes of nationhood, leadership, and oneness that Farrakhan himself 
would invoke in his keynote speech at the Million Man March. A speech in which Farrakhan 
would ask not, What does it mean to be counted?, but rather, What does it mean to count? 
The Prophet’s Tools: Numerology and Space on the National Mall  
Rhetorical scholars have argued that Farrakhan responded to attempts to disassociate the 
message of the Million Man March from him, the messenger, by focusing his keynote speech on 
the topic of his own authority. 30 Pauley notes Farrakhan bolstered his authority in part by 
positioning himself as an ecumenical prophet, with his speech providing a series of hard and 
important truths to the African American community and to white Americans, regardless of 
religious affiliation. In the speech, Farrakhan argued that the black community had clear and 
legitimate grievances with white America and that division within the black community and its 
lack of moral direction exacerbated these grievances. Farrakhan emphasized that division and 
moral deficit required atonement to transform the black community, and potentially the 
American nation, to a “more perfect union” and a “oneness with God.” White Americans, argued 
Farrakhan, also required a process of atonement to acknowledge the grievances of the African 
American community.  
 These arguments were anchored in the counting. Indeed, Pauley noted that numerology 
was one of the features of Farrakhan’s prophetic discourse, where he would “discern the divine 
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pattern in the things around him and interpret the code for his audience.”31 Farrakhan positioned 
himself as prophet, revealing the exclusions of the African American community through a 
performance of vision in which counting played a key role as it revealed historical truths hidden 
there on the National Mall. Prophesy was not the only theme used. Farrakhan echoed a tradition 
of numerology in Islamic mysticism, stating numerology “is a way to understand the principle of 
unity that underlies everything.”32 Indeed, unity is the key to understanding how Farrakhan 
framed counting in the speech. Counting is about making connections grounded in place and 
time. His invocation of numerology set the groundwork for how he understood what it means to 
be counted. In counting from “many” to “one,” Farrakhan divined a nation within a nation. 
Rhetorical scholars have approached the analysis of prophetic rhetoric through the 
category of ethos, focusing on the prophet’s “special capacity for truth.” 33 Judgment of prophetic 
rhetoric, as James Darsey argues, functionally necessitates a judgment of ethos, of the person, 
over the argument or vision in its own right.34 The judgment of ethos, as we have seen, was 
central to the criticisms Farrakhan faced in the lead up to march. In response, as Pauley argued, 
like many religious prophets, Farrakhan de-emphasized his own role and centered instead on 
God as a way to bolster his ethos and respond to critics. He argued, “you came not at the call of 
Louis Farrakhan, but you have gathered here at the call of God.” And yet, he added, “there is no 
human being through whom God brings an idea that history doesn’t marry the idea with that 
human being no matter what defect.” Farrakhan provided a litany of examples in which the 
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separation of the message from the messenger seemed absurd: “you can’t separate Newton from 
the law that Newton discovered, nor can you separate Einstein from the theory of relativity. It 
would be silly to try to separate Moses from the Torah or Jesus from the Gospel or Muhammad 
from the Koran.” Farrakhan clearly argued for the importance of his own role in the march. He 
ended his argument about the strong connection between message and messenger by asserting, 
“if my heart were that dark, how is the message so bright, the message so clear, the response so 
magnificent?” 
Yet, notably, in the Islamic tradition—in which only Muhammad could lay claim to be 
the “messenger of God”—Farrakhan could only use the hallmarks of prophetic rhetoric, but not 
lay claim to the title. Pauley notes, for example, that in a previous speech Farrakhan disputed the 
label of “prophet,” calling himself instead a “warner,” and a “man in the mold.”35 Farrakhan 
reinforced his integral role in the gathering through implicit and explicit references to the 
magnitude of the crowd. “I called for a million,” Farrakhan boasted, in spite of naysayers who 
“told me you better change that figure to one more realistic.” He quipped, “I should have 
changed it to the Three Million Man March.”36 Farrakhan used the size of the march to affirm his 
prescience.  
 Prophets provide a vision, a truth that the audience lacks and must come to see.37 
Farrakhan argued that in order to heal the divide between white and black America, and to heal 
the suffering within the African American community, the first step of atonement was 
recognition. For in recognition he contended, “we can’t cover things up, cover them over, give it 
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a pretty sound to make people feel good. We have to go to the root of the problem.” For 
Farrakhan, that meant numerological counting, which he offered as a critical tool to reveal the 
“root” of the mistreatment of African Americans and their exclusion from the American nation. 
This “root” was hidden in the physical and symbolic foundations of this country. 
Farrakhan opened a long reveal of the secrets of numerology on the Mall. The national 
mall has often been a site in which “Americans learn who they are as citizens, and has served as 
a gathering space for Americans to speak literally and symbolically to their government.”38 This 
has been especially true for African Americans, who have often gathered to contest these 
visions.39 Farrakhan begins with a simple question, “now, where are we gathered?”40 He started 
with a base description “we’re standing at the steps of the United States Capitol,” which 
transitioned into an appeal to what he could see, “I’m looking at the Washington Monument and 
beyond it to the Lincoln Memorial.”41 In the official taped version of the event, the camera pans 
to the Lincoln Memorial, echoing Farrakhan’s act of seeing, before returning to focus on the 
stage with a close up of Farrakhan and the Nation of Islam members who stood behind him. The 
material practices of memorializing offered Farrakhan a tool to ground his narratives about 
history. He gave vision to the historical figures across time by virtue of their interconnectedness 
in space on the National Mall, from what “Abraham Lincoln saw in his day, what President 
Clinton sees in this day. He saw the great divide between Black and White.” Thus, he used the 
National Mall as a way to make connections. 
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Setting a scene using solely what the eyes could see was seemingly not enough for 
Farrakhan, for it did not readily disclose the mysteries of history, the things “unheard” or 
“unseen”. To achieve the mystical, Farrakhan used the symbolism of numbers to make 
connections between seemingly unrelated ideas, figures, or events. Following the invocation of 
Lincoln’s vision of America’s racial divide, Farrakhan turned to the material features of the 
Lincoln Memorial. He noted that both the Jefferson and Lincoln Memorials were “19 feet high,” 
citing a “deep significance” of the number nineteen. This significance, however, required more 
than recognition of numbers, it required a calculation. If the memorials are both nineteen feet 
high, “19” then becomes significant in a connection between two historical figures. Farrakhan 
combined Lincoln “the sixteenth president” with “Jefferson, the third” to add, “16 and 3 make 19 
again.” 42 He then separated the numbers he had previously added, beginning with “when you 
have a nine, you have a womb that is pregnant. And when you have a one standing by the nine, it 
means that there’s something secret that has to be unfolded.”43 The “secret” that reaches into the 
foundations of the mall begins with the slaves who “were brought right here on this mall in 
chains to be sold up and down the eastern seaboard.”44 And on that same mall, George 
Washington “laid the foundation, the cornerstone of this capitol building where we stand,” and 
“George was a slave owner.” 45 At the same time as the “secret” foundations of slavery were 
revealed, the “the pregnant womb” also revealed a moment that was “pregnant with the 
possibility of tremendous change in our status in America and in the world.” 46 Washington 
feared that the “slave would prove to become a most troublesome species of property,” and, “the 
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day that these presidents feared has now come to pass,” because, “on this mall, here we stand.” 47 
For Farrakhan, numerology revealed the hidden history of slavery and foretold the triumph of the 
march. 
Farrakhan performed such calculations again and again in the first half of his speech. The 
hidden history of American slavery was visible, for example, in the Washington Monument: 
“there, in the middle of this mall is the Washington Monument . . . 555 feet high.” 48 Once more, 
the video follows Farrakhan’s vision, panning to the monument. “If we put a 1 in front of that 
555 feet,” he calculated, “we get 1555, the year that our first fathers landed on the shores of 
Jamestown, Virginia as slaves.” 49 Littering the mall were hidden histories of the black man, 
namely slavery. Hidden also was a more positive history of the influence of Egypt on the 
symbols of the National Mall. Farrakhan moved from “this obelisk at the Washington 
Monument, which is Egyptian” to the Egyptian design of the official seal, to the original design 
of “a coat of arms” which originally “measured in six quarters,” a number he declares “is 
significant.” 50 Farrakhan’s numerous numerological calculations brought him to the Egyptian 
pharaoh, who Farrakhan claimed was the first to institute the worship of “a- ton, the one god,” 
who was of course “symboled by a sun disk with 19 rays coming out of that sun.” 51 Over and 
over he repeated the pattern: invoking place to give way to vision, and vision to hidden meanings 
and mysteries, through the art of counting. This counting revealed hidden narratives, but it also 
eventually ended with one final calculation. The “a” in “A-ton,” Farrakhan explained,  
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“equals 440” in musical tones, but also “one” as “the first letter in the alphabet.”52 The 
culmination of all of Farrakhan’s numerological calculation of the mall was “a-ton” both God 
and one.  
This is rhetorically enhanced in Farrakhan’s repetitions. Just before his lengthy argument 
about the more perfect union, he centered the marchers again in their place on the National Mall. 
The march and the ground on which they “stand” helped to make a connection beyond those 
present:  
“And so, we stand here today at this historic moment. We are standing in the 
place of those who could not make it here today. We are standing on the blood of 
our ancestors. We are standing on the blood of those who died in the Middle 
Passage, who died in the fields and swamps of America, who died hangin’ from 
trees in the South, who died in the cells of their jailers, who died on the highways 
and who died in the fratricidal conflict that rages within our community.”53 
The repetition of “we are standing on” connects marchers directly to the sacred ground. That 
ground, and their responsibility, was rooted not in the grand statues of Lincoln, or Washington. 
Instead, it was grounded in the sacrifice of those who stood on American soil, and who 
sacrificed.  
The numerological calculations about the National Mall, Farrakhan argued, also allowed 
for the revelations of another form of “mythic” calculation of “one,” this time a far more 
conventional form of civic math towards the one nation. Farrakhan used the original design for 
the official seal of the United States as a way to talk about the true intentions behind the 
language of nationhood. The original design, a “coat of arms measured in six quarters,” was 
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meant to symbolize “England, Scotland, Ireland, France, Germany and Holland, the countries 
from which the new nation had been peopled.” 54 Missing from this design, pointed out 
Farrakhan, were Native Americans, African Americans, and any number of other “undesirable” 
populations for the founding fathers. The eventual design featured an Egyptian pyramid, again 
hiding the influence of the black man and the slave from the history presented on the mall. For 
Farrakhan, the original design reflected the logic in the motto that would later be placed on the 
Seal, “E Pluribus Unum” - out of many, one. In his words, the “Seal and the Constitution 
reflected the thinking of the founding fathers, that this was to be a nation by White people and 
for White people.” 55  
In Farrakhan’s message, the fundamental barrier to “oneness” was not just division, but 
also a lack of recognition. He was attempting to provide prophetic vision on the mall and a first 
step toward recognizing the calculations “towards” the “one.” Farrakhan made another 
connection from Washington to President Clinton, who “spoke today and he wanted to heal the 
great divide.” 56 However Farrakhan argued, “…I respectfully suggest to the President, you did 
not dig deep enough at the malady that divides Black and White in order to affect a solution to 
the problem. And so, today, we have to deal with the root so that perhaps a healing can take 
place.” 57 Farrakhan offers Clinton a choice. Perhaps he might have recognized the root of the 
problem. He addressed Clinton’s words directly; arguing his reference to “E Pluribus Unum” 
Farrakhan aligned their goals. He asked, “do you mean for them to be made into the one,” and if 
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so, “someone must ensure that “truth has to be spoken to justice.”58 In Farrakhan’s estimation, 
Clinton and the white establishment who critiqued him lacked the vision that Farrakhan imparted 
to the marchers, and would fail to recognize the real barrier to creating the one nation. 
Numerology, with its capacity to see the truth, but also to transform towards oneness was a 
precursor to the unity necessary for nation making.  
“And Why Have We Come”: The Many and the One Nation 
The transformation of the American civic body into an American nation as a whole 
served as a transition point in the speech. Even as Farrakhan critiqued the conventional process 
of nation making that excluded the African American community, he embraced the language and 
counting of “oneness.” The end goal of the process of atonement was unity. Americans and more 
specifically the African American community needed a transformation “towards a more perfect 
union,” and ultimately, towards a “oneness with God.” 59 Arguments about “oneness” or the 
“nation,” typically involve the transcendence of difference. Transcendence promotes unity by 
ignoring the disagreements between two parties on a specific issue and providing an alternative 
possibility for similarity. 60 Farrakhan used the presence of the march on the national mall to 
unite them and transcend their differences. Physical presence at the march was key to how 
Farrakhan framed the outcomes of the march and the progress “towards a more perfect union” of 
black men. The National Mall setting was not simply a space of civic history, but a means of 
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revealing hidden histories of oppression that served a different kind of unity. Farrakhan seized 
upon the mall as a means of making black Americans a true nation.61  
Farrakhan positioned the unity of the marchers as central to the meaning of the march. 
This began with positioning unity as a motivation for attending the march. Farrakhan posed a 
rhetorical question to marchers “And why did we come?” He answered, “we came because we 
want to move toward a more perfect union.” He identified unity as a “social benefit of our 
gathering here today.” As an outcome of the march, “from this day forward, we can never again 
see ourselves through the narrow eyes of the limitation of the boundaries of our own fraternal, 
civic, political, religious, street organization or professional organization.” Division was an 
outside force that could be transcended by gathering, “look at our division, not here, out there. 
We as a people, who have been fractured, divided and destroyed.” In seeing the mass, Farrakhan 
claimed to see no division, only connection. Only one. The mass of marchers was singular, a 
Million Man: “a sea of peace. A sea of tranquility. A sea of men ready to come back to God.” 
Later in the speech, Farrakhan invoked the vision of the gathering, arguing “we are forced by the 
magnitude of what we see here today” to transform future behavior as well. He continued, 
“whenever you return to your cities and you see a black man, a black woman, don’t ask him what 
is your social, political or religious affiliation, or what is your status? Know that he is your 
brother.” 62 Oneness, then, was made possible by the mass of marchers, but it is also predicated 
on the capacity to see the mass as one, and to adjust their vision moving forward.  
Even as attendance at the rally seemed to unify the assembled group of African American 
men, Farrakhan argued that unification was far from complete. As with numerology, Farrakhan 
unpacked the meaning of a “more perfect union” to reveal its significance for the marchers. He 
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emphasized the importance of a long and not fully realized process “towards a more perfect 
union” and reiterating that “we’re in progress toward a perfect union.”63 The atonement he called 
the march to achieve was the mechanism to achieve this progress. He spent the next section of 
the speech outlining eight steps to “atonement” that would accomplish the task of moving 
towards a union. The first two steps were “pointing out” and “acknowledging” the “faults,” 
something that Farrakhan had already performed in the first half of the speech, using numerology 
to reveal the fault lines of division in the black and white communities of the nation. He also 
offered his own list of faults of the African American community, ranging from a disregarding of 
their responsibilities in the home and community, to drinking and crime. He urged the 
“acceptance of responsibility,” repentance, and a change going forward. The steps of atonement 
and the progress to a “more perfect union” of the black nation, he argued, would not only heal 
the black community but “call America and the world to repentance.” This would bring all closer 
to atonement and to the perfect union. 
Conclusion 
I have analyzed how Farrakhan used numerology to develop an argument about the 
hidden symbolism of the National Mall. These symbols provide a template for a hidden history 
of the black man, in his triumphs and his mistreatment. Farrakhan counted, calculated, and led 
marchers through the first step in the process of atonement, the recognition and 
acknowledgement of ills. Where this dissertation explores calls to be counted, Farrakhan’s 
certainly provides a distinct answer to the question of how Americans have been counted. As 
bizarre and occasionally circular as Farrakhan’s uptake of numerology was, it provided a clear 
pattern. Farrakhan’s distinct approach to numerology was grounded in counting as a 
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transformational process of moving towards unity and towards “one”; whether that is “a-ton,” or 
“nation.” The final—and arguably most important— calculation Farrakhan attempted to reveal 
through numerology was the fundamental process of nation building, the creation of “one nation 
under God.” The original transformation of the many to the one nation may have excluded the 
black man, but for Farrakhan, the logic of nationhood like the logic of his unique brand of 
numerology still provided a blue print towards one. Oneness described the “sea of black men,” at 
the march and provided the march its spiritual aspirations. 
Farrakhan embraced the logic of nation making, the mythical process by which the 
“many” become the “one.” The logic of the one nation distinguishes Farrakhan’s approach to 
counting as much as his embrace of numerology. Creating the nation, like Farrakhan’s brand of 
numerology, positioned counting as a kind of alchemy. The process by which “many” became 
“one” relied on a transformation that transcended a concern for the many at all, or their 
differences. This was a language distinct from democracy, with a concern for the majority or 
minority. Majoritarian logic is premised on recognition of difference. What mattered was the 
nation. The nation in this argument was not a “whole,” or a majority. Nationhood presumes 
belonging and the language of citizenship is almost always predicated on exclusions of the 
“other.” 
And yet, if Farrakhan’s theme is the nation, the question of the progress of the American 
nation towards the perfect union remained unresolved at the end of the speech. There are after all 
two divisions revealed through the hidden calculations on the National Mall; the American 
nation, and the one Farrakhan envisioned, the African American “nation.” If oneness with God 
served as the final step of atonement, the slippage between the spiritual language of atonement 
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and the “more perfect union,” implied that the unity found within the “sea of black men,” was 
definitely something more like nation than community.  
Farrakhan’s construction of the black and white nation is perhaps best understood as part 
of a long and varied tradition of black nationalism in the United States. 64 Farrakhan had, prior to 
the march, often been an advocate for emigration and the creation of a black nation state. The 
Million Man March has often been read as Farrakhan’s shift to the mainstream, in the embrace of 
a more integrationist rhetoric.65 Michael West argues that Farrakhan exemplified the increasingly 
popular strain of cultural nationalism, which rejected an “active political program” for a focus on 
“cultural rebirth.”66 As Dexter Gordon argues, Farrakhan’s rejection of a political program was 
“core ideology,” of the march in so far as it placed the emphasis on “black self-definition and 
self-determination.”67 Numerology helped count, and indeed for Farrakhan, correct the civic 
myths and symbols that ground our understanding of the American nation. Rather than look at 
history as recited by white voices, he sought to paint a picture of the oft memorialized mall from 
the perspective of black men. Farrakhan sought to create a black nation by laying the same 
foundations upon which the American nation was formed; through the creation of shared myths, 
symbols, and histories, written in this case by the black nation. Ironically, where Farrakhan 
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centered on oneness, his logic of black nationhood essentially argued for two nations, a black 
nation within the American nation. 
And it is not just white Americans that are excluded from the nation. The creation of the 
shared history, and the shared vision of the black nation provided through Farrakhan’s prophetic 
vision is a precursor to the “perfect union.” After all, without the first step of “recognition,” 
atonement is not possible. Criticisms of the march and/or of Farrakhan are outside forces that 
sow “disunity.” In doing so, Farrakhan collapsed legitimate critiques of his anti-Semitic 
comments, or his gendered hierarchy with the negative stereotypes of the black community. The 
centrality of the shared vision attempted to forestall criticism of any kind.  
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CHAPTER 5: THE “FLASH CAMPAIGN”: COUNTING AS PUBLIC OPINION AND 
DEMAND, IN MOVEON’S 1998 ONLINE PETITION CAMPAIGN 
 
 
MoveOn’s 1998 “Censure Clinton and Move On” online petition campaign opposed the 
impeachment of President Bill Clinton. They argued instead for a compromise position of 
censure which would allow the nation to “move on.” The campaign represented a new form of 
calls to be counted on the American political scene and was hugely popular for its time.1 Within 
five days of its appearance, nearly 250,000 people had signed the petition and within a few more 
weeks, nearly 500,000. In interviews, Joan Blades—who founded MoveOn along with her 
husband Wes Boyd—celebrated the platform as representing the future of what would soon be 
called “digital democracy.” E-mail, with its ease of transmission through “word of mouse,” she 
argued allowed for the emergence of a new kind of political activist, the “five-minute activist.” 2 
MoveOn described the online petition as a “flash campaign,” creating a buzzword that became 
popular to describe a new style of internet-based activism and fundraising in which large-scale 
participation could be achieved in short periods of time. MoveOn was later dubbed the 
quintessential “netroots” organization, a combination internet and grassroots campaign without a 
physical location or a large staff.3 
Whether it was “five-minute activist” or the “flash campaign,” these phrases provided 
more than pithy promotional phrases, they served as organizing metaphors for MoveOn’s view 
of emerging possibilities for democratic participation in the age of the Internet. MoveOn’s 1998 
petition campaign exemplified what Damian Pfister identifies as the process wherein early 
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adoption of a new technology “exert[s] outsized influence in how citizens imagine the 
democratic potential,” which “subtly shapes subsequent citizen participation.”4 Pfister argues 
that this influence is not strictly technical; it is rhetorical, shaping how citizens talk about and 
within a democracy. 
In February 1999, MoveOn announced their plans to “move on” to other. Blades and 
Boyd argued that the actions of Congress during the impeachment proceedings were indicative 
of a more general failure of politicians to adequately respond to the concerns of their 
constituents. America needed a “democratic renaissance,” and government needed a renewed 
commitment to representing “our voice.” MoveOn sought to fuel a more sustained democratic 
movement, an ambitious project for what began as a single-issue online petition campaign for the 
“five-minute activist” that emphasized brief and fleeting engagement.5 Skeptics labeled MoveOn 
a product of “clicktivism,” a technological version of slack activism, or slacktivism. Clicktivism 
was a particular favorite of news coverage of the campaign, which alternatively celebrated and 
denigrated the emerging practices of digital activism.  
To transform a “flash campaign” into a “democratic renaissance,” MoveOn counted. The 
list of ways that MoveOn could, and did, count was lengthy. MoveOn counted signatures on 
petitions, but it also counted the broader opinions, demographics, and political affiliations of its 
“members.” MoveOn also counted the actions—or in their parlance, the activities—of petition 
signers, from phone calls to Congress to flag raising. The ease by which they were able to collect 
information about supporters and petition supporters was reflective of the capacities of 
networked technology. The internet emerged into the public sphere in the 1990s as a new kind of 
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“mass media” in which the “mass” could be broken down, itemized, categorized, and 
reprocessed in public discourse as a (very large) set of discrete actions. Indeed, what made 
MoveOn particularly noteworthy in the early stages of internet activism is not—or at least not 
just—the range of actions that could quite literally be counted, but the readiness with which these 
counts could be folded into public discourse.  
In this chapter, I look at the rhetoric of counting in MoveOn’s campaigns, focusing on the 
initial 1998 campaign opposing President Clinton’s impeachment. I argue that MoveOn 
presented censure as a compromise position, and reinforced this by emphasizing the diversity of 
petition signers, particularly in political affiliation, and by publicizing the opinions and even 
emotions of signers. Of course, they counted these as well. In turn, MoveOn presented counting 
as a means of creating loose alliances. These alliances, they argued, were reflective of the 
majority support for censure, but also the ideal political landscape for Congress and for citizens. 
Percentages, averages, and ratios allowed MoveOn to modulate differences among petition 
supporters and to reinforce the rhetoric of majoritarianism. Claims to degree also presented the 
opportunity for MoveOn to segment activities in short episodes of time as a way to demonstrate 
the intensity and immediacy of movement responses, in much the same way suffragists used a 
rhetoric of place and accumulatio. 
This chapter focuses on the first six months of the 1998 anti-impeachment campaign, 
which I will simply call the “1998 campaign” or “1998 petition.” I begin my analysis with the 
beginning of the campaign in September 1998 and end it with the announcement of MoveOn.org 
as an official organization in February 1999, shortly after the US Senate voted down the articles 
of impeachment. My primary object of study or “text” in this chapter is the MoveOn website 
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over the course of these six months.6 I read it iteratively, over time, just as internet users would 
have encountered it. My analysis focuses on how the campaign used the website as a means of 
recruiting new supporters. As part of this analysis, I look at key pages within the site: the 
homepage, the FAQ page, and the volunteer resources page. I also look at the talking points and 
press statements of MoveOn organizers.  
MoveOn and Digital Activism in the 1990s 
MoveOn was founded against a backdrop of President Bill Clinton’s impeachment trial. 
In 1994, Clinton faced a civil trial that extended for four years over sexual harassment claims by 
Paula Jones. In the process, Clinton would be accused of attempting to cover up a 1995 affair 
with Monica Lewinsky, an intern in the White House. Clinton’s conduct during the trial would 
eventually lead to him being only the second President to be impeached. In September, 
independent counsel Ken Starr delivered a report to the House alleging ten potential sources of 
misconduct that were impeachable. In December, the House Judiciary Committee would 
ultimately recommend to proceed with two charges: obstruction of justice, and lying under oath. 
Clinton was impeached in the House on December 19, 1998. A subsequent trial began in the 
Senate on January 7, where Clinton was acquitted five weeks later. 
MoveOn.org was created on September 22, 1998 by Blades and Boyd just a few weeks 
after Starr’s report was filed. The couple aimed to leverage their previous work in Silicon Valley 
in marketing and software development toward political activism—they had built expertise and 
significant personal wealth by creating and selling the profitable software company Berkeley 
Systems, where Boyd served as a technical expert and CEO, and Blades was the Vice President 
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of Marketing. Their technological savvy and wealth allowed them to build a popular petition 
campaign without the organizational structure or financial investment often required of “offline” 
petition campaigns. David Karpf argues that Boyd and Blades approached MoveOn much like a 
tech start up, rather than a traditional activist organization, privileging “a culture of ongoing 
experimentation and technological innovation.”7 Boyd and Blades relied heavily on their website 
as a source of organizing, information, and recruitment. They also relied on techniques that 
would become hallmarks of digital marketing: banners, clicks, regular contact, opportunities for 
interaction, and so on—all of which would rely on an infrastructure of various metrics. But it 
was not just the new tools of Silicon Valley that shaped their campaign. It was the optimistic 
tone of the Valley; over and over, Blades and Boyd framed technology as the key to solving the 
problems of democracy and partisanship exemplified for them by the impeachment proceedings.  
MoveOn’s 1998 petition was comprised of a simple web-based form where individuals 
could enter their name, e-mail, zip code, and additional comments. MoveOn relied primarily on 
e-mail as a means of popularizing the petition, starting with Blade and Boyd’s own personal 
networks, and urging supporters to circulate the petition outward to their friends, family, and 
colleagues. MoveOn’s homepage featured a brief paragraph about MoveOn’s general purpose 
and the one-sentence text of the petition: “The Congress must immediately Censure President 
Clinton and Move On to pressing issues facing the country.” Most significantly, the homepage 
featured an updated running count of petition e-signatures. Here visitors to the website could see 
the campaign in action through an explicit display of aggregation. 
In addition MoveOn maintained several pages where individuals could seek further 
information about the campaign. The homepage featured a link to the Frequently Asked 
                                                
7 David Karpf, The MoveOn Effect: The Unexpected Transformation of American Political Advocacy 
(Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2012), 27.  
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Questions page in both the navigation bar at the top of the page and as a hyperlinked resource at 
the bottom. The FAQ included basic information about the organization, and a running timeline 
of the campaign. The MoveOn website also featured a “press room” with quotations and links to 
news stories about the campaign, a volunteer page that included talking points about the 
campaign, and an example of the paper petition and e-mail that would be sent to Congress. 
(Names were compiled, printed out, and delivered to key Congressional representatives. 
Participants could also request that a digital copy of the petition, along with comments, be 
forwarded to their Congressional representatives). 
In the early stages of the campaign, MoveOn sought not only to promote their petition, 
but to overcome initial ignorance and skepticism about the nature and efficacy of online 
petitions. That is to say, Blade, Boyd, and their group had to engage simultaneously in two forms 
of public advocacy: anti-impeachment advocacy and championing on-line “activism,” which was 
seen as less than fully credible, particularly given the inconsistencies of form, circulation, and 
delivery to government officials. In 1999 the New York Times said of MoveOn that “petitions 
that circulate on the Internet are an iffy proposition. Many of them, no matter how lofty the 
cause, smack of spam. Understandably, people often ignore them.”8 It was not only the New York 
Times that expressed skepticism: other media outlets did the same, spanning the possibilities of 
internet-based political activism.9 E-mail petitions of the time were often seen as unreliable, 
impersonal, and limited in their efficacy; all of these were rhetorical constraints MoveOn had to 
address.  
 
                                                
8 Katie Hafner, “Mobilizing Online for Gun Control,” The New York Times, May 20, 1999.  
9Plotz, “The Five Minute Activist.”  
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Counting as Compromise 
Though polls showed that much of the public opposed impeachment, people did so for a 
variety of conflicting reasons. So too did MoveOn supporters. Given the variety of motives 
behind anti-impeachment sentiment, MoveOn faced an initial challenge of creating a non-
partisan sense of unity for their campaign. Within several years, the organization would become 
explicitly progressive in its politics—in 1998 and 1999, however, MoveOn’s campaign was still 
largely aimed at a non-partisan audience. To display such unity, MoveOn tailored its message to 
demonstrate support for “moving on” among Republicans. During the Senate hearings in the 
winter of 1999, for example, MoveOn emphasized Republican participation in the campaign. On 
their FAQ page, they argued that the campaign had “created a site that the broadest group of 
citizens can support.” Elsewhere, they tried to draw a distinction between the question of 
Clinton’s guilt and that of its remedy, acknowledging that not everyone they represented agreed 
about Clinton’s guilt; still, petition supporters were unified around skepticism about 
impeachment.10  
MoveOn thus embraced strategic ambiguity. This ambiguity was apparent in the broad 
language they used to argue for censure rather than impeachment, as well as in the ways the 
campaign steered around explicit discussion of Clinton, Lewinsky, or Starr’s accusations. This 
was reflected in the text of the petition, which stated “The Congress must immediately Censure 
President Clinton and Move On to pressing issues facing the country.” The argument was 
pragmatic: rather than impeachment, the movement’s faithful felt Congress needed to address the 
truly “pressing issues” before the country. What were these “pressing issues?” These too were 
                                                
10 MoveOn, “Frequently Asked Questions,” MoveOn.org, February 18, 1999. Available through the 
Internet Archive Wayback Machine, https://web.archive.org/web/19990218191833/http://www.moveon 
.org:80/faq.htm 
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ambiguous, allowing for a broad range of possibilities. A statement published on the website 
after the House impeachment vote framed the issues in the most generic terms:  
Despite strong public disapproval, the Congress has impeached the President. 
Now the President faces trial in the Senate. This is not in the best interests of our 
country. We face real economic and foreign policy challenges. A besieged 
President and distracted Congress will not address these issues. Through this web 
page, ordinary citizens are organizing to demand that our congressional 
representatives lead us out of this mess.11  
The campaign, nominally about Congress “moving on,” refused to define explicitly that to which 
Congress was supposed to move on. There was not even a defense of Clinton. It was strictly a 
matter of opposing impeachment as a formal matter. Such ambiguity would seem to undermine 
the case; yet, it was clear that MoveOn saw ambiguity as a way to aggregate as many supporters 
as possible, irrespective of their more basic motivations or political commitments.12  
This was a rhetoric of compromise. MoveOn emphasized compromise by counting in the 
percentages, ratios, and averages that defined the range of opinions and demographic 
characteristics of anti-impeachment supporters while still using the whole to create the 
appearance of unified opposition. In the process, MoveOn portrayed the movement as a tentative 
and provisional alliance best described through differences, yet best understood through unified 
opposition to impeachment. This was consistent with what MoveOn increasingly offered as their 
                                                
11 MoveOn, “Censure and Move On,” MoveOn.org, Dec 12 1998. Available through the Internet 
Archive Wayback Machine, https://web.archive.org/web/19981212031127/http://www.moveon.org:80/ 
12 A number of similar campaigns, both for and against, focused a great deal of attention on listing the 
ills of impeachment, or of President Clinton. EnoughisEnough.org, another popular impeachment 
website, for example, presented pages of reasons why impeachment was harmful, including lists of 
specific issues that were being ignored, and plenty of fairly strong statements on representatives who 
proceeded in spite of these harms. 
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representative function: rather than shaping public opinion, they presented themselves as simply 
articulating it. 
The most concrete argument MoveOn made about Clinton and impeachment was that the 
only proper response was compromise. Compromise—which would take the form of formal 
censure—reflected, they argued, not only the interests but the beliefs of a wide swath of 
Americans. The petition, they argued, brought together a mass of individuals from a range of 
political parties, and a range of opinions on Clinton, the impeachment proceedings, and even 
censure, but were willing to sign on regardless. MoveOn supported this claim by centering 
difference, even as they argued for the unity of the membership in the collective act of signing 
the petition. MoveOn used the counts of petition supporters as the primary means to maintain 
unity while emphasizing difference. These counts took two forms, first in counts of the 
sentiments expressed in comments from petition supporters to build a “unity of purpose” and 
second, in demographic data which allowed MoveOn to emphasize the diversity of supporters 
while still maintaining a sense of the whole.  
MoveOn began by emphasizing the range of opinions and beliefs among campaign 
supporters. For example, in October 1998 they described the campaign as comprised of “450,000 
individuals” who “have 450,000 different opinions as to the perfect solution.”13 In a FAQ page 
answer to the question of who has signed the petition, MoveOn stressed the different viewpoints 
and motives of the petition’s supporters:  
Liberals who would rather not Censure the President have signed because they 
believe this is the best way to gain consensus and return our legislative and 
                                                
13 MoveOn, “Talking Points,” MoveOn.org, October 3, 1998. Available through the Internet Archive 
Wayback Machine, https://web.archive.org/web/19991003055540/http://www.moveon.org 
/talkingpoints.htm 
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executive branch to the business of governing. Likewise, there are conservatives 
who would rather remove the President from office but are more concerned about 
the danger of allowing the impeachment process to distract our representatives for 
a protracted partisan fight.14  
MoveOn did not limit the reasons to these two basic liberal and conservative positions. Rather 
they emphasized the wide range of people’s opinions, linking to a “top 100 comments page,” as 
what they described as “the best way to get a sense of the participants.” The range of “unedited” 
comments that followed offered conflicting views of Clinton—for example, “Clinton and his 
team are doing a great job,” as compared to “Clinton is an ass.” Some specified the “pressing 
issues” that needed to take precedent over impeachment, from “terrorism” to the “farm 
economy.” Other comments expressed “reservation,” even directly arguing, “I don't even think 
he should be censured.”15 These “unedited” comments therefore articulated the range of public 
opinion as itself an ambiguous matter, all toward an argument for the formal compromise of 
censure over impeachment.  
MoveOn placed demographic differences among supporters at the forefront of their 
representation of the campaign. They regularly counted support for their cause in the form of 
percentages, averages, and ratios. For example, they reported, “150,000 constituent 
communications have been logged, an average of 350 messages for each member of Congress.”16 
                                                
14 MoveOn, “Frequently Asked Questions,” MoveOn.org, February 18, 1999. Available through the 
Internet Archive Wayback Machine, https://web.archive.org/web/19990218191833/http://www.moveon 
.org:80/faq.htm 
15 MoveOn, “First 100 or So Comments,” MoveOn.org, May 3, 1999. Available through the Internet 
Archive Wayback Machine, https://web.archive.org/web/19990218191833/http://www.moveon.org:80 
/faq.htm 
16MoveOn, “Constituent's comments delivered to Judiciary Committee,” MoveOn.org, October 4, 
1998. Available through the Internet Archive Wayback Machine, archived May 3, 1999, 
https://web.archive.org/web/19990503142442/http://www.moveon.org/release1004.htm 
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The simple calculation of the total communication from constituents against the number of 
representatives in Congress implied that MoveOn members not only outnumbered congressional 
representatives, but were geographically diverse. MoveOn also aimed to portray the differences 
in the campaign through party affiliation, emphasizing what they described as the “bipartisan” 
nature of the campaign. “[A] survey,” they boasted, “taken of our members show almost 40% to 
be Republican or Independent.” They also offered a lengthy list of supporter characteristics in a 
November 1998 press release, drawing on the already established rhetoric of an “open” internet.  
Mirroring the demographics of the Internet itself, members are younger than 
average, with more than one-third under thirty-five years of age. Reaching one 
Republican supporter for every six Democrats, self-described Independent voters 
make up more than 30% of members. Nearly ten percent of members are first-
time voters. More than sixty percent of members answered yes to, “Did 
impeachment hearings affect your vote?” The highest impact was felt in highly 
Internet connected states like New York and California—31% of MoveOn.org 
signers live in California and 11% in New York.17 
Upon closer examination, this list is difficult to parse. What is the relationship between the 31% 
of Californians, and the first-time voters, for example? In what way did the impeachment 
hearings affect votes? Parsing, however, was not the point: Like Louis Farrakhan’s numerology, 
MoveOn counted so as to count as one, lumping all manner of demographic information—from 
party affiliation, to geography, to voting record—into a singular anti-impeachment declaration. 
                                                
17 MoveOn, “Internet organizing rocks election,” MoveOn.org, November 6, 1998. Available through 
the Internet Archive Wayback Machine, archived May 3, 1999, 
https://web.archive.org/web/19990503142442/http://www.moveon.org/release1004.htm 
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Through demographic renderings, MoveOn’s membership could be represented as diverse and 
still be counted as one. 
This unity was best understood as a shared emotional state in spite of the differences 
MoveOn argued were central. MoveOn’s summed up the lessons from the campaign, and 
concluded “in general, the comments [on the petition] document a deep sense of frustration and 
anger.”18 MoveOn demonstrated their point through a simple but effective count of common 
words and phrases in the comments. For example, MoveOn argued the message delivered by the 
petitions to Representatives could be understood through those first 100 comments, where 
“‘Enough is enough!’ and ‘Enough already!’ competed for the honor of most frequent 
comment.”19 “Enough” provided an example of this frustration. The framing of frequency aimed 
to create unity through a shared emotional response. MoveOn reported on a more thorough 
analysis of the full 150,000 petitions in early October, “sixty-four percent” of which included a 
comment. MoveOn developed a press release to draw attention to the delivery of comments to 
members. The substance of these comments was described largely through counts of sentiments, 
which were similarly focused on creating a sense of unity in emotion. MoveOn again framed the 
“tone” of the comments by quantifying emotion response, which ranged “from frustration, to 
anger, hope, disgust, fear, and even humor.” The proof was further quantified in concrete counts 
of the frequency of phrases. For example, that “the word ‘enough’ appeared 19,293 times” or 
that “‘hope’ runs a close second.”20 MoveOn used counts of phrases to argue that these 
                                                
18 MoveOn, “Censure and Move On flash campaign takes fire,” MoveOn.org, September 23, 1998. 
Available through the Internet Archive Wayback Machine, archived May 3, 1999, 
https://web.archive.org/web/19990503110007/http://www.moveon.org/September%2023%20Release.htm 
19 MoveOn, “Constituent's comments delivered to Judiciary Committee,” MoveOn.org, October 4, 
1998. Available through the Internet Archive Wayback Machine, archived May 3, 1999, 
https://web.archive.org/web/19990503142442/http://www.moveon.org/release1004.htm 
20 Ibid.  
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comments could be understood as a whole in spite of their differences. Thus, the emphasis on 
difference was tempered by this shared rhetorical language in response to the circumstances. 
Percentages and ratios, as compared to flat counts are more easily comparable. If it is 
difficult to imagine how 180,000 of 450,000 petition supporters compared to the US population, 
it is much easier to slide between 40% of Republicans and Independents as a measure. MoveOn, 
for example, concluded that where “more than one-third” of supporters that were “under thirty-
five years of age,” and that the petition participants were on average, “younger than the 
population,” of voters. If MoveOn was younger, and thus not quite fully representative, they 
could, and did, make similar calculations about their membership that was transferrable to the 
broader population. The percentages of party affiliation, or age, or geography mimicked the ways 
in which polling today represents the national electorate. Thus, MoveOn claimed the campaign 
represented the prevailing public opinion and that their petition participants could be said to be 
representative of the broader population. 
Analysis reveals that percentages, in particular, are a way to reference the part while still 
maintaining the place in the one, the 100%. MoveOn aimed to position the campaign as a 
function of a plurality acting as a unity, however partial. It was not simply that Independents and 
Republicans were a part of the whole, but they were a part that could be understood in relation to 
Democrats through the petition. MoveOn argued explicitly that the range of opinions 
demonstrated by supporters, and particularly by the comments, reflected a necessary “centrist” or 
“common-ground” compromise. In framing user comments, for example, MoveOn argued they 
reflected “a diversity of backgrounds and a unity of purpose.” The comments highlighted 
“diverse backgrounds and reactions, yet strong consensus,” MoveOn wrote in a press 
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statement.21 Again a pragmatic argument designed, as Blades argued, to work toward 
compromise as the “best chance of moving forward.” Indeed, it could be said that for Blades, 
diversity and unity were not values in themselves so much as they were means of persuading 
audiences of MoveOn to persuade Congress to move from impeachment to censure.  
Despite the ambiguity of the official petition, MoveOn did not embrace ambiguity in 
order to transcend the potential differences of supporters. Instead, they argued the significance of 
the signatures in the campaign was the diversity of participants. MoveOn is often cited as an 
example of a trend towards informal associations with political organizations, where membership 
is loosely defined, and often focuses on specific campaigns rather than identification with the 
organization.22 MoveOn’s “loose” association was clear in its “unity of purpose.” The shared 
emotion and shared “purpose,” was best understood because of, rather than in spite of, these 
differences. MoveOn claimed and counted supporters as more of an alliance than a fundamental 
sameness. The wide array of characteristics of supporters – in the range of reasons to support 
censure as well as the diversity in party affiliation— demonstrated a compromise. The petition 
was not a partisan demand, or even a unified position on censure. It was in practice what 
MoveOn demanded Congress should find: compromise.  
Focusing the Opinions of the Majority 
MoveOn argued compromise was reflected in the public sentiment of the country as a 
whole, not just among MoveOn supporters. MoveOn frequently referenced public opinion, 
explicitly referring to polls. They constructed a sense of a collective national chorus, of which 
                                                
21 Ibid. 
22 Carty, Victoria. “Bridging Contentious and Electoral Politics: MoveOn and the Digital 
Revolution.” Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and Change Volume 30, ed., Patrick G. Coy 
(Bingley, UK: Emerald Insight, 2010), 171-196.  
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they were but one part, and explicitly and implicitly argued that their efforts were supported by a 
much broader base of supporters than those 450,000 who actively participated in the MoveOn 
campaign by signing the 1998 petition. By positioning the campaign as a “mediator” of public 
opinion, MoveOn’s members become a stand in for the broader American electorate.  
 In the very first stages of its campaign, MoveOn argued Congress should not impeach 
Clinton because of prevailing public opinion. On the FAQ page, MoveOn argued, “the vast 
majority of the American public understands that a continuing obsession with scandal will do 
great damage to our institutions, our economy, and our power and prestige in the world.” They 
continued, “we expect our representatives to understand this as well, and show true leadership.”23 
MoveOn did not simply present the petition as representing majority sentiment, they called on 
their participants to demonstrate that sentiment through online actions. Opinion on the matter of 
impeachment was already settled: Americans and Congress, they argued, already knew the 
opinions of the “vast majority” and knew of the “public disapproval.” Online action was a means 
of “focus[ing] a broad and deep consensus in the American public”24 In so doing they suggested 
that their role was simply to channel rather than to change public opinion.  
By positioning MoveOn as mediating public opinion, the group was able to argue that the 
relationship between supporters and the broader public had the form of a part-to-whole, at least 
with respect to the majority of Americans. MoveOn presented itself as a majoritarian movement. 
The purpose of the campaign was to provide an outlet for and bring attention to majority opinion. 
This is likely what they meant by “to focus” and other analogous verbs. The goal of the “flash 
campaign,” as MoveOn described it, was to “to collect” and “to crystallize,” or “to mediate,” all 
                                                
23 MoveOn “Frequently Asked Questions.” 
24 Even after MoveOn announced their two-year plan to develop a grassroots organization, this 
phrasing stayed, swapping “is” for “was” and dropping “can” from “we can focus a broad and deep 
consensus,” for a stronger claim that “we focus a broad and deep consensus.” 
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terms that indicate MoveOn’s role as an intermediary to the public and the opinions expressed in 
the campaign as reflective of that public. MoveOn stated, “In the campaign's first two weeks, by 
mediating constituent feedback, MoveOn.org has delivered over 250,000 emails and over 20,000 
hardcopy pages of constituent comments directly to House members and to the President.” 25 
MoveOn’s invocation of “focusing” helped amplify the opinions of supporters into a 
political demand. MoveOn was not a polling operation. Rather, they aimed to bridge the gap 
between polling and the many activities and modes of civic participation typically associated 
with the petition. This was particularly evident on the FAQ page, in answer to the question of 
“why” MoveOn was formed. MoveOn again reached for polling, arguing that  
The disconnect between our country's leadership and the will of the people is 
huge. Politicians are avid poll readers, yet often discount these results as 
reflecting ill formed opinion, likely to shift with the winds. This site is a way for 
citizens to express a clear message to Congress and to organize action if the 
message isn't heard.26 
MoveOn tapped into arguments about the problem of intensity in polling. Even if a certain 
percentage of Americans supported a particular measure, for example, it was difficult to gauge 
how deeply the belief was held, or even whether the individuals polled would be prompted to act 
based on those beliefs.27 MoveOn aimed to capitalize on the authorizing force of majority 
opinion by conveying the campaign as a channel that could also drive action moving forward.  
                                                
25 Move On, “Million Move-on March,” MoveOn.org, September 29, 1998, available through the 
Internet Archive Wayback Machine, archived May 3, 1999, https://web.archive.org/web/19990503164223 
/http://www.moveon.org:80/release29.htm 
26 MoveOn “Frequently Asked Questions.” 
27 This is a common theme in scholarly discourse about polling. See for example See Herbert Blumer, 
“Collective Behavior” in New Outlines of the Principles of Sociology, ed. Alfred Lee (New York: Barnes 
and Noble), 87. 
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Temporality and Intensity of Activities 
MoveOn framed counting as a demand and participation in the campaign as a 
demonstration of intensity of supporters’ commitment to action. The campaign emphasized a 
wide array of actions outside of just counting and collecting names that could be used by citizens 
to demonstrate the intensity of their feelings. These actions ranged from pledging money, to 
volunteering time, to downloading the banner and posting it on personal websites. Of course, 
these actions were still counted and represented numerically. First, MoveOn used counts of all 
manner of activities over short periods of time. MoveOn employed the language of the “flash 
campaign” to denote snapshots in time manifested as short bursts of intense activity. Every press 
release posted by MoveOn in the first few months of the campaign featured a new measure of 
this participation expressed as a number and nearly all of them had several in the first paragraph 
alone. For example, in the very first press release on the first day of the campaign, MoveOn 
concluded by referring to the “first dozen signatories each sending their email notices out to 
several dozen friends.” Similarly, in their second press release, MoveOn described its early 
success in which “the website collected 506 signatures and added 12 new volunteers its ranks.” It 
was not just that MoveOn received 506 signatures and 12 new volunteers, but that they did so “in 
the first 24 hours.” 28 The frequent numerical updates about the campaign bolstered MoveOn’s 
claims to the enthusiasm of supporters. These snapshots also demonstrate sustained involvement 
and growth that extended far beyond the “five-minute” activist. The more accurate depiction of a 
MoveOn member, they suggested, is not the five-minute activist, but rather the activist who 
spent five minutes five times over two weeks.  
                                                
28 MoveOn, “Censure and Move On flash campaign takes fire,” MoveOn.org, September 23, 1998. 
Available through the Internet Archive Wayback Machine, archived May 3, 1999, 
https://web.archive.org/web/19990503110007/http://www.moveon.org/September%2023%20Release.htm 
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In nearly every effort undertaken by MoveOn over the course of the six months of the 
campaign, this rhetorical formula remained consistent. After the announcement of the We Will 
Act pledge asking members to volunteer for congressional campaigns, MoveOn reported that, “In 
the past 24 hours, thousands of concerned citizens have taken MoveOn’s ‘We will act’ pledge.”29 
On the We Will Remember pledge, “By the end of the next day, we had received pledges totaling 
more than $5 million,” a figure Blades called “astounding.”30 The focus on short bursts of time 
created a sense of urgency and of perceived constant action. 
MoveOn also displayed intensity of support through the accumulation of lengthy lists of 
activities. The exemplar of accumulation was the FAQ page. In addition to very brief 
descriptions of the campaign and its goals, the bulk of the page featured a timeline that MoveOn 
used to communicate the substance of the campaign. This bulk was dominated by the list of 
actions organized by date. What does MoveOn.org do? Everything. Much of the list in 
September and October was dominated by updates on the petition, with new numbers of 
signatures. By October, MoveOn made no distinction between actions performed by supporters 
and those sanctioned by the campaign. These measures helped show the sheer volume of 
involvement in the campaign. The timeline featured updates such as “411 volunteer leaders 
selected” and the “3,000 mark” for the “volunteer pool” right before listing “20,000th ‘MoveOn’ 
                                                
29MoveOn, “Continuing Impeachment Trial Spurs Thousands to Work In Year 2000 Election 
Campaigns,” MoveOn.org, January 28, 1999. Available through the Internet Archive Wayback Machine, 
archived May 3, 1999, https://web.archive.org/web/19990503132838/http://www.moveon.org 
/release0128.htm 
30 MoveOn, “Grassroots Internet Campaign,” MoveOn.org, January 6, 1999. Available through the 
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bumper sticker downloaded for printing,” or the “500,000 impressions of ‘MoveOn... Vote 
today’ banner placed on Yahoo.” 31  
This was but one visual instance of what characterized so much of MoveOn’s discourse: 
flashes of individual actions added up to a powerful national campaign. The visual design of the 
website emphasized the same message, offering a running count of how many signatures had 
been collected, how many pledges made, and how many volunteer hours clocked.32 In their press 
releases, MoveOn similarly appealed to accumulation. They reported publicly on all manner of 
data, from hours volunteered to date, to the number of e-mails sent to supporters to get out the 
vote in the midterms, to the number of phone calls to representatives. Supporters, they suggested, 
did not just do one thing in a flash; they did two, or five, or six things in a matter of days.  
If polling, as MoveOn argued, was too easily dismissed by politicians who viewed the 
percentages as “ill formed opinion, likely to shift with the winds,” then representations of intense 
periods of flash activism could not so easily be disregarded. “And, if Congress and the President 
can't figure out how” to reach a compromise as MoveOn had, the signatures on the petition were 
also “a million reasons to try just a bit harder.”33 Their measures, MoveOn argued, “show[ed] 
dramatic growth” in citizenly commitment to their cause. 
Conclusion 
MoveOn’s triumphant discourse about the democratic potential of the web centered less 
on the logic of the “mass” that radio and television claimed as their audience and more on the 
logic of iterative intensity as a measure of participation. The internet was a medium of aggregate 
                                                
31 MoveOn, “Frequently Asked Questions.” 
32 MoveOn, “Censure and Move On,” MoveOn.org, January 25, 1998. Available through the Internet 
Archive Wayback Machine, https://web.archive.org/web/19990125090948/http://moveon.org:80/ 
33 MoveOn, “Million Move-on March.”  
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actions, not just attitudes or opinions. If MoveOn faced accusations of fostering “slacktivism,” 
they argued to the contrary that the campaign represented a network of intentional, and intense, 
actions. Their plethora of counts and their heavy reliance on percentages and ratios was meant to 
demonstrate, as Blades repeatedly suggested, that the internet could be a means of activating a 
new American consensus in an era typified by partisan political fracture.  
MoveOn, like Farrakhan, was concerned with providing a new means of counting in the 
face of inadequate counts by institutions. MoveOn turned not so much to who does the counting, 
but what does the counting. MoveOn’s answer was organizational and technological: the “web” 
was the channel through which opinion could become demand through the efforts of passionate 
citizens.  
Scholarship on online political participation, particularly e-petitions, has tended to focus 
on the degree to which online activities can be mapped onto offline public engagement.34 
MoveOn was much more than an online petition platform: they consciously sought to use the 
internet to spur citizenly action, even if said actions occurred in relatively short bursts. And 
MoveOn did this with remarkable organizational efficiency. As David Karpf argues, 
MoveOn.org was an exemplar of the rise in “organizing without organizations.”35 New activist 
or social movement organizations like MoveOn used internet technology to organize and 
mobilize without the resources required by their pre-internet predecessors (e.g., significant staff, 
                                                
34 David Karpf, “Online Political Mobilization from the Advocacy Group’s Perspective: Looking 
Beyond Clicktivism.” Policy & Internet 2, no. 4 (2010): 7-41; Stuart W. Shulman, “The Case Against 
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potential issues of online engagement. See Jodi Dean, Blog Theory: Feedback and Capture in the Circuits 
of Drive (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010); Robert W. McChesney, Digital Disconnect (New York: New 
Press, 2013). 
35 See Karpf, MoveOn Effect, 3. 
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a formal headquarters, or local bases).36 Indeed, as Blades often celebrated, MoveOn was able to 
do a lot with very little, financially speaking: “We spent 89.95 on a website, and sent out a few 
dozen e-mails. And now, a week later we’ve got 100,000 signatures.”37 But the internet did more 
than facilitate economic efficiencies: internet technology gave MoveOn access to metrics that 
were previously difficult, expensive, or time consuming to collect, such as the arduous processes 
of contacting petition signers to engage them in further activities.  
Thirdly, the internet gave MoveOn a new window on time. The “flash” was more than a 
metaphor. Because online activity can be measured in numerous ways, including using time 
metrics of minutes, seconds, hours, and days, MoveOn could provide new forms of “snapshots” 
of collective action and activity, even as they could break those snapshots into smaller parts 
through percentages, ratios, and other forms of comparative counting. In this way, as I have 
argued, they were able to do more than count signatures: they were able to count actions, and 
thus intensity—and then render them for public display.  
This ability has key implications for the vision of progressive activism MoveOn 
reconfigures. MoveOn focuses on short but intense bits of varied action by citizens rather than 
sustained work and membership in long-term organizations. Indeed, what makes MoveOn 
historically important is the ways in which they made the metrics they crunched and calculated 
not only public, but integral to their public rhetoric. Many advocacy organizations collect data on 
supporters and various other activities, but these are more often than not used for strictly internal 
                                                
36 Karpf, MoveOn Effect, 4; Debrej Ray and Joan Esteban, “Collective Action and the Group Size 
Paradox,” American Political Science Review, 95, no. 3 (2001), 663–72. 
37 MoveOn, “Million Move-on March.” 
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purposes in order to run campaigns.38 By contrast, given the arguments in the previous chapters 
of this dissertation, I argue that MoveOn turned the representation of data into a rhetoric, tapping 





                                                
38 In fact, MoveOn would later become known for their hesitance to share internal data, much of 
which they not only released, but used to describe the nature of their campaign in 1998 and 1999. Karpf, 
MoveOn Effect.  
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
 
 Whether it is a million signatures, a million marchers, or a million letters, the aspiration 
for a million is ubiquitous in the history of American civic participation. The National 
Association of Woman Suffrage sought the million-signature mark in 1908, which was the 
continuation of a tactic they learned from abolitionists. The 1995 Million Man March inspired 
the 1997 Million Woman March, two Million Youth marches in 1998, and the Million Family 
March in 2000. And despite the advances of technology that have made the million marker more 
accessible, a million mouse clicks remains a common goal in digital activism movements such as 
the 1995 MoveOn anti-impeachment petition. The “million” has a significant place in the 
national imagination. Though a fraction of the 330 million citizens of the United States today, a 
“million” still conveys weight, because it facilitates association without calling for precision. It is 
not 1.2 million, or 700,000—but a “million.” The generic quality of a million allows for the 
broad claims of a collective to mean something big in American democracy. And yet, in spite of 
this preoccupation with the “million,” NAWSA, Louis Farrakhan, Roosevelt, and MoveOn 
provide very different visions of what the million can tell us about the individuals they count, 
and the American public more broadly. It is these claims about American civic life that ground 
this dissertation. 
In Chapter 1, I argued that aggregates of citizen actions, beliefs, and behaviors have long 
been prominent in American public discourse, serving as resources for negotiating questions of 
national identity and public opinion.1 This dissertation contributes to the work of William Alonso 
                                                
1 On the census, see William Alonso and Paul Starr, introduction to The Politics of Numbers, ed. 
William Alonso and Paul Starr (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1987), 1-6. For public opinion 
polling, see Sarah E. Igo, The Averaged American: Surveys, Citizens, and the Making of the Mass Public 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), 14. 
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and Paul Starr, Sarah Igo, and others by exploring how these claims are reflected in various 
aggregating practices beyond polling and the census. Rhetorical scholarship on public policy 
shows that invoking collective opinions or beliefs as a representation of “the public” serves to 
reinforce the authority of political leaders and to authorize the role of the public in democratic 
decision-making. Rhetorical scholarship also shows that these claims are often contested.2 
Conversely, scholarship on public opinion shows that political actors construct public opinion 
within broader arguments about particular issues or policies, justifying measures through 
collecting opinion.3 Studies of citizenship illustrate how the performance or habits of citizenship 
have shaped conceptions of what citizenship is, and how individuals understand their 
relationship to other citizens and the nation.4 Among these performances, I have shown, is the 
practice of calls to be counted. 
Suffragists, as I showed in chapter 2, argued that not “all women” or “all men” should or 
need be counted. I argued that Julia Ward Howe and Alice Stone Blackwell emphasized the 
importance of counting active citizens with a “lively interest,” and in counting actions rather 
than opinions or beliefs. Suffragists framed counting as a means to understand the “public 
                                                
2 Jeffrey Mehltretter Drury, Speaking with the People’s Voice: How President’s Invoke Opinion 
(College Station, Texas A&M University Press, 2014), 5; J. Michael Hogan, The Nuclear Freeze 
Campaign: Rhetoric and Foreign Policy in the Telepolitical Age (East Lansing, Michigan State 
University Press, 1994), 120; David Levasseur, “The Role of Public Opinion in Policy Argument: An 
Examination of Public Opinion Rhetoric in the Federal Budget Process, Argumentation and Advocacy,” 
Argumentation and Advocacy 41 (2005), 155-157. 
3 Susan Herbst, Numbered Voices: How Opinion Polling Has Shaped American Politics (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1993). 
4 Angela G. Ray, “The Rhetorical Ritual of Citizenship: Women’s Voting as Public Performance, 
1868-1875,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 93, no. 1 (2007): 1-26; Michael Shudson, The Good Citizen: A 
History of American Civic Life (New York: Russell Sage, 1999), 7-9; Susan Zaeske, “Signatures of 
Citizenship: The Rhetoric of Women’s Antislavery Petitions.” Quarterly Journal of Speech 88.2 (2002): 
148. On citizenships exclusions, see Robert Dechaine, “Bordering the Civic Imaginary: Alienization, 
Fence Logic, and the Minuteman Civil Defense Corps,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 95 (2009): 44; 
Karma Chavez, Queer Migration Politics: Activist Rhetoric and Coalitional Possibilities (Urbana: 
University of Illinois Press, 2013), 13. 
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spirited minority.” This majoritarian logic, Blackwell argued, is the logic of American 
democracy. And yet, suffragists extended the logic beyond the vote to all manner of participation 
in public life. In response to Mary Ward’s arguments that “all women” needed to desire suffrage, 
and thus that the suffrage movement was in clear decline, suffragists counted activities ranging 
from petition signatures, membership in suffrage organizations, and voting participation to argue 
for suffrage. Suffragists sought ultimately to count a majority of votes, within a minority of the 
American population: active citizens.  
In chapter 3, I argued that Franklin Roosevelt called for letters to the White House as a 
way to collect, understand, and aggregate the public will, so as to “think as a nation.” Roosevelt 
adopted a rhetoric of aggregation which allowed him to develop a sense that letters could be 
added up to something more than the sum of their parts. Seeing them as more than merely social 
scientific data, Roosevelt focused on the political importance of individual letters to the 
president, which allowed him to reinforce his characteristic “personal” connections with ordinary 
citizens. Roosevelt negotiated the challenges of political authority during the Great Depression 
by asserting the competency of his administration to collect, sort, and determine the public will 
through an aggregate of letters sent to the White House, while at the same time maintaining 
letter-writing as a means to communicate intimately with the president. The Republican National 
committee, surprisingly, reinforced, rather than challenged, Roosevelt’s general vision of the 
letters and his capacity to channel the public, by claiming the White House was not handling 
letters responsibly enough. 
In chapter 4, I argued that Louis Farrakhan counted to identify the hidden history of the 
black man in the United States. Farrakhan linked a process of atonement to the recognition and 
airing of societal ills, which were revealed through a vision of the national mall that emerged 
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through Farrakhan’s distinct approach to numerology. In this case, counting was a 
transformational process of moving towards “oneness.” The transformation of the many to the 
one did more than atone; it revealed a nation—a black nation—within a nation. Farrakhan’s 
prophetic vision became a means of belonging to what he termed a “perfect union.” 
In chapter 5, I showed how MoveOn invoked counting to argue for an end to the Clinton 
impeachment proceedings. For them, public opinion, channeled through MoveOn’s web-based 
technologies, was more than a petition campaign. It was a repertoire of brief, digitally enabled, 
political actions: reflected in e-mails sent by volunteers, the number of impressions of an ad, 
donations received, and volunteers registered. MoveOn thus portrayed “digital activism” as 
comprised of brief but intense moments of action, moments that—like the logic of digital 
advertising itself—were repeated over and over to demonstrate the intensity and passion of 
digital citizens. And yet, in this case citizens did not act as “one” so much as a ratio of one. 
MoveOn’s heavy reliance on percentages and ratios demonstrated that it was possible to 
aggregate citizens in loose alliances, and to understand collective expressions as compromises.  
Therefore, calls to be counted provide distinct visions of what it means to be counted in 
democratic life. Calls to be counted, for one, negotiate questions of who should be counted in 
democratic decision making or in the nation. Suffragists, for example, argued that only “active 
citizens” should be counted, in order to determine whether a sufficient sentiment existed to 
legitimize women’s claims to the vote. For Roosevelt, it was all [literate] citizens that must be 
aggregated through the letter. Farrakhan invoked the black nation as an object to be counted 
according to secret mysteries and a shared vision. And MoveOn aimed to count in order to 
demonstrate the pragmatic sentiments of “most Americans” amid major partisan fights in 
Washington. 
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These calls raise issues of who does the counting. Roosevelt and Farrakhan are both 
concerned with counting as a way to ground their personal authority through the act of counting 
masses of marchers or citizens. Roosevelt positioned himself as a channel of the masses, while 
Farrakhan took the persona of the prophet providing vision to the march. MoveOn’s “who” was 
not personal so much as it was organizational and technological—concerned citizens using the 
web, in their vision, could do the best counting. Suffragists drew on the conventional democratic 
answer to who counts: political officials through the voting booth. Suffragists extended the logic 
of the voting booth to public debate to oppose the anti-suffragists and the American public’s 
perceptions of public sentiment.  
 How these movements counted citizens is similarly wide ranging, from orienting counts 
in specific places, to episodes of time, or through calculations. These methods of counting can be 
bolstered by common rhetorical strategies that emerge from the Aristotelian concept of 
magnitude, including accumulation, repetition, elaboration, as well as an emphasis on time and 
place. Place emerges as a common theme in calls to be counted. For Farrakhan, gathering in one 
place, both physical and spiritual, was key to being counted. Conversely, place can also be a way 
to demonstrate the scope of counting. Roosevelt referenced an array of cities or regions as a way 
to reassure citizens that they would all be counted. MoveOn referenced different congressional 
districts or states as a way to lay claim to speak to the public opinion as a whole, rather than 
simply the members. For suffragists, more than demonstrating the reach of the movement, 
references to specific states or cities were a means to demonstrate the clusters of activities, or 
members, or organizations in one place. These clusters demonstrated intensity. In contrast, anti-
suffragists relied far more on chronology to evaluate the declining intensity of the movement. 
The various defeats of suffrage amendments served as a way for the anti-suffragists to 
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demonstrate a waning interest in the movement across time.  
Time is also key to the rhetoric of counting. MoveOn segmented activities in short 
episodes of time as a way to demonstrate the intensity and immediacy of movement responses, 
much in the same way suffragists used a rhetoric of place. Roosevelt emphasized the constant 
need for letters, but in his explicit calls on FERA and the extraordinary session, he also created a 
sense of urgency, particularly in sending letters to pressure Congress over a shorter period of 
time. Suffragists, in contrast, sought to shift focus from recent unsuccessful votes for 
amendments by counting longitudinally. The long and dedicated activities of suffragists, which 
were only growing over time, suggested the inevitability of the movement’s success. Conversely, 
for Farrakhan, what mattered was the one day in which black men gathered to be counted and to 
account for their sins. These strategies often served to divide the counts of petition signatures or 
letter-writers into commensurate parts through time or space as a way to draw conclusions about 
the whole.  
Central to these calls are the distinct types and logics of counting that emerge from the 
rhetorical concept of magnitude, from degree, quantity, aggregation, or oneness. Counting as an 
aggregate emphasizes size or volume. Quantity, in turn, focuses on specific numbers such as a 
million members of the crowd. Claims based on the degree offer more complicated calculation 
from percentages to ratios to help create a sense of scale related to the whole. These discourses 
resemble and often borrow heavily from the logics of social scientific counting in which a 
sample (a “part”) of a given population is used in order to quantify and speak to the larger class 
(the “whole”) of American citizens, this is also often the logic of civic quantification. Simplistic 
counts—in which one million individuals sign a petition or show up to a rally— would seem 
difficult to speak to the whole of the American nation. And yet, movements do sometimes seek 
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to take on a broader voice than just participants in a campaign. The affordances of digital 
technology provided MoveOn with the capacity to quickly survey and measure all manner of 
actions or characteristics of members, from which they could claim to speak for the American 
public. Roosevelt, similarly, sought to use the subtle language of sampling to reassure citizens of 
his grasp of the whole nation. 
The conclusions about the “whole” however, are dependent on the logics of counting that 
emerge from each movement. Arguments about who counts, who should be counted, and how 
we should be counted, all emerge from what is ultimately being counted. This question 
engenders attention to what movements aim to speak to, be it public opinion or perhaps national 
characteristics or values. Counting, however, also attends to certain logics. Farrakhan is 
concerned with the logic of the nation, transcending the parts to the “one” nation. The process by 
which “many” become “one” relies on a transformation that transcends a concern for the many at 
all, or their differences. Nationhood presumes oneness rather than creates it. Oneness can also 
emerge from claims to the homogeneity of opinions or characteristics distinct from the nation. 
Claims to what “most Americans believe” are premised on the logic of majoritarianism, but these 
claims can easily slide into “what Americans believe” without the qualifier, which more closely 
resembles claims to oneness. Arendt’s concern for the eradication of the minority through 
majority rule is realized discursively in claims to oneness that transmit the majority opinion or 
characteristic to the whole.5 A lack of specificity can lead to claims to homogeneity, as is the 
case with Roosevelt’s call to think as a nation.  
Suffrage, on the other hand, appealed to majoritarianism but provided specific measures 
that made clear the existence of dissenting opinions. MoveOn assumed a degree of homogeneity 
                                                
5 Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (New York: Penguin Books, 1991), 155. 
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in public opinion on Clinton based primarily on polling. Still, MoveOn navigated the creation of 
a shared purpose without creating a sense of oneness by emphasizing the counting of loose 
associations through percentages and ratios of participant characteristics. MoveOn comes close 
to Danielle Allen’s call to utilize metaphors of “wholeness” rather than “oneness” as a way to 
understand the relationships and responsibilities within a collective. “Wholeness,” she argues, 
recognizes difference.6  
When citizens are called to be counted, these calls also negotiate the challenges of 
democracy and exclusion that emerge from majoritarianism and minoritarianism, homogeneity 
and heterogeneity. This dissertation ultimately argues that the discourses and logics of the 
rhetoric of counting are more than ways in which Americans contest and lay claim to the public 
will or to national identity—they are crucial performances of citizenship itself in the context of 









                                                
6 Danielle S. Allen, Talking to Strangers: Anxieties of Citizenship Since Brown v. Board of Education 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 17. 
